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 But, as always at the IP, the heart of the program was the presentation and 
discussion, in small workshop format, of the students’ own research papers, each 
devoted to the IP theme. Students were asked to develop original research papers 
addressing one of the year’s three European environmental sub-themes. Students were 
invited: 1) to consider what climate and other environmental changes might mean for the 
landscapes and natural spaces that have been constitutive of local, regional, national, 
and European-continental identities; 2) to explore the issues and themes in which 
European integration, international politics, and global environmental issues meet and 
intersect; and 3) to explore how European citizens are responding to climate change in 
Europe today, considering in particular the question of what it means to practice 
environmental stewardship, and how that might coincide or conflict with the practice of 
national and European citizenship. 
 This book collects and publishes a selection of the best of these papers. It bears 
witness to the students’ creativity and energy and innovative engagement with the 
complex, overlapping set of issues raised by environmental change in contemporary 
Europe. The papers explore these issues through a bold set of investigations that explore 
cultural identities as well as economic policy, local initiatives as well as EU-level debates, 
the politics of environmental regulation as well as the politics of radical opposition. We 
learn about the relationship of local identities to projects of environmental protection on 
English canals; the cultural and political strains on environmental identities as Chinese 
companies establish a powerful presence in French wine growing; the high stakes of 
political action revealed by the “No TAV” movement in northern Italy; the relationship 
between the call for “degrowth” and views on the project of European economic and 
political integration; the politics and economics of shale gas fracking; the legal status of 
environmental migrants in the EU; the EU’s role in promoting sustainable agricultural 
practices and in regulating aviation; the attitude of non-European powers to the EU’s 
claims to exercise global leadership on climate and environmental issues; and the role of 
deeply rooted cultural binaries in constructing our environmental understandings. 
 The crisis of global change, in Europe and the world, opens up exciting new 
challenges for students and scholars in the social sciences and the humanities. These 
papers offer ample testimony to these students’ efforts to take up this challenge. It is a 
great pleasure to be able to present these essays to a broader reading public. Some time 
has passed since our 2014 IP, of course, but developments since then, from the 2015 
Paris Climate Summit to the intensification of the debate on Europe’s reception of 
migrants, only underscore the relevance of the questions we addressed then. These 
papers suggest the fruitful possibilities of interdisciplinary humanistic research on 
environmental matters, demonstrating that the methods and concerns of environmental 
humanities and those of European studies can, and perhaps must, be brought together. 
It is, finally, a pleasure to thank those who helped make the Euroculture IP 2014 such a 
success, including Luc Ampleman, Monika Nowak, Cameron Ross, Juan Sarabia, and 
Gregor Vulturius. Thanks for help making this publication possible goes in particular to 
Catherine Burkinshaw and Juan Sarabia.
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Europe, in addition to a geographical designation, an idea, and a project, is also an 
environment—or rather, an interconnected set of natural and built environments. These 
environments, from the Mediterranean to the Arctic Circle, from Bulgarian mountains to 
Welsh coal mines, are the spaces of European life. They give Europe its characteristic 
features, define its possibilities, and are rich with cultural significance. Today, European 
environments are affected by the set of phenomena referred to as global change. These 
include climate change (“global warming”), but also pollution, ozone depletion, massive 
species extinction, melting of glaciers and polar ice, ocean acidification, and collapsing fish 
stocks. These developments are, according to overwhelming scientific consensus, the result 
of human activity—in particular the massive release of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere 
since the beginning of the industrial revolution.  The realization that human activity has been 
changing the very workings of the natural world has led some scholars to argue that the 
planet has entered a new geological era: the Holocene (the period of mild weather over the 
last 10-12,000 years) has given way to the Anthropocene—the age of Man.
 The Anthropocene is of course global, but it impacts each region of the globe 
differently. In Europe, environmental change raises a number of specific issues of interest to 
those concerned with the fate of the continent, of its social forms and cultural traditions, and 
of the “European project.” Rising sea levels and extreme weather will affect Europe’s 
historical landscapes, from a sinking Venice to a potentially glacier-free Alps. Climate change 
will affect global economic networks—in energy, food, transport, and migration—further 
transforming the place in the wider world of European states and of the European Union. 
Climate change highlights what some see as Europe’s special responsibilities, as the region 
that gave birth to the industrial revolution and that (along with North America) enjoyed the 
benefits of fossil-fuel-driven development. European states and the EU may also have a 
crucial leadership role to play in addressing the problems associated with climate change. 
Finally, Europe’s cultural or intellectual “environment” is also affected by the prospect of 
climate change, even as the arts and the media influence public perception of environmental 
issues. All of these issues demand interdisciplinary scholarly attention.
 In June 2014, the students of the Erasmus Mundus masters programme Euroculture 
gathered in Krakow for the programme’s annual Intensive Program (IP) for a week of study, 
discussion and reflection on European environments in the Anthropocene. Developed by the 
Euroculture programme at Uppsala University and jointly coordinated with our Euroculture 
colleagues at Krakow’s Jagiellonian University, this Intensive Program featured lectures and 
presentations from dynamic figures in politics, academia, and the arts.
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 But, as always at the IP, the heart of the program was the presentation and 
discussion, in small workshop format, of the students’ own research papers, each 
devoted to the IP theme. Students were asked to develop original research papers 
addressing one of the year’s three European environmental sub-themes. Students were 
invited: 1) to consider what climate and other environmental changes might mean for the 
landscapes and natural spaces that have been constitutive of local, regional, national, 
and European-continental identities; 2) to explore the issues and themes in which 
European integration, international politics, and global environmental issues meet and 
intersect; and 3) to explore how European citizens are responding to climate change in 
Europe today, considering in particular the question of what it means to practice 
environmental stewardship, and how that might coincide or conflict with the practice of 
national and European citizenship. 
 This book collects and publishes a selection of the best of these papers. It bears 
witness to the students’ creativity and energy and innovative engagement with the 
complex, overlapping set of issues raised by environmental change in contemporary 
Europe. The papers explore these issues through a bold set of investigations that explore 
cultural identities as well as economic policy, local initiatives as well as EU-level debates, 
the politics of environmental regulation as well as the politics of radical opposition. We 
learn about the relationship of local identities to projects of environmental protection on 
English canals; the cultural and political strains on environmental identities as Chinese 
companies establish a powerful presence in French wine growing; the high stakes of 
political action revealed by the “No TAV” movement in northern Italy; the relationship 
between the call for “degrowth” and views on the project of European economic and 
political integration; the politics and economics of shale gas fracking; the legal status of 
environmental migrants in the EU; the EU’s role in promoting sustainable agricultural 
practices and in regulating aviation; the attitude of non-European powers to the EU’s 
claims to exercise global leadership on climate and environmental issues; and the role of 
deeply rooted cultural binaries in constructing our environmental understandings. 
 The crisis of global change, in Europe and the world, opens up exciting new 
challenges for students and scholars in the social sciences and the humanities. These 
papers offer ample testimony to these students’ efforts to take up this challenge. It is a 
great pleasure to be able to present these essays to a broader reading public. Some time 
has passed since our 2014 IP, of course, but developments since then, from the 2015 
Paris Climate Summit to the intensification of the debate on Europe’s reception of 
migrants, only underscore the relevance of the questions we addressed then. These 
papers suggest the fruitful possibilities of interdisciplinary humanistic research on 
environmental matters, demonstrating that the methods and concerns of environmental 
humanities and those of European studies can, and perhaps must, be brought together. 
It is, finally, a pleasure to thank those who helped make the Euroculture IP 2014 such a 
success, including Luc Ampleman, Monika Nowak, Cameron Ross, Juan Sarabia, and 
Gregor Vulturius. Thanks for help making this publication possible goes in particular to 
Catherine Burkinshaw and Juan Sarabia.
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Heading South: BRICS Countries’ perspectives
on European Climate Change Leadership
Anne Bakker
Climate change today is quite literally a hot topic. It is one of the greatest challenges of the 
twenty-first century because of the threat it poses to our environment, but also because its 
regulation and mitigation have a profound impact on our economies and political systems. As 
a result of the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs), the last three decades have been 
successively warmer than any other decade since 1850.1 The first efforts to mitigate the 
emissions of GHGs started after the publication of the 1990 report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The formulation of a global response to climate change has, 
however, proven to be extremely difficult because of the non-excludable nature of mitigation 
policies.2 It is impossible for a country to exclude other countries from benefiting from the 
effects of its mitigation policies. As a consequence, countries are unwilling to start mitigation 
policies without the cooperation of others. The climate change regime is therefore not 
capable of autonomous development. This makes a concerted global answer to climate 
change very difficult to achieve. The climate change regime therefore has “a pressing need 
for leadership.”3 Some states have to lead by example to convince other states of the need 
for and the mutual benefits arising from the adoption of mitigation measures.
 The European Union (EU) has aspired to fill this leadership role since the 1990s. After 
the United States (US) weakened its commitment to the climate change regime, the EU filled 
the leadership vacuum. An important leadership moment of the EU came with the adoption 
of the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) in 1997. The 
commitments made within the FCCC, which was adopted by the United Nations in 1992, 
were considered empty because they did not impose clearly defined targets on the signatory 
parties.4 The Kyoto protocol, which came about under the leadership of the EU, was 
considered a success because it did impose binding, clearly defined targets.
 Also after Kyoto, the EU remained strongly committed to climate change mitigation. 
The European Commission defined its leadership role as having “been at the forefront of 
efforts to combat climate change” and articulated its wish to maintain its leadership position 
by committing to “leading global action to 2020 and beyond.”5 However, the leadership role 
of the EU was increasingly challenged. In the run up to the 2009 Copenhagen summit the EU 
1 T.F. Stocker and others, eds., IPCC, 2013: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis, 
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
(Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press): 5.
2 Dirk T. G. Rübbelke, “International Support of Climate Change Policies in Developing Countries: Strategic, Moral and Fairness 
Aspects,” Ecological Economics 70, no. 8 (2011): 1470.
3 Joyeeta Gupta and Michael Grubb, eds., Climate Change and European Leadership: A Sustainable Role for Europe?, 
Environment & Policy, v.27 (Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer Academic, 2000): 4.
4 Ibid., 7.
5 Elgström, “EU Leadership in an Emerging New World Order,” 1.
IP subtheme: The Climate of European Politics
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led by example by setting up a climate and energy package and by committing itself to 
the 2020 climate target. During the summit, however, the EU was not able to play a 
leading role. There, the EU was excluded by the US and the BASIC countries (Brazil, 
South Africa, India, and China), who struck a deal that resulted in the Copenhagen 
Accord. The member states of the EU were not consulted and therefore forced to accept 
the deal. As a result, internal perceptions of the EU as a leader in the climate change 
regime started to change. The EU was accused of “having discarded the yellow 
leadership jersey,”6 of not being a credible leader and of failing to present “an internally 
coherent, ambitious way forward in the ongoing climate negotiations.”7 In the run up to 
the 2015 Paris summit, the EU showed less ambition. Unlike 8 years earlier, the European 
Council did not commit itself yet to a new climate target. Furthermore, just like in 
Copenhagen, the major players were not the EU member states but the US and the 
emerging economies, notably China and India.
 Developments within the climate change regime reflect the changing global 
power balance. This balance is characterised by the rise of the BASIC countries and 
Russia, together referred to by the acronym BRICS. As the negotiations resulting in the 
Copenhagen and Paris Accords show, these countries have become influential within the 
climate change regime since 2007, challenging the leadership of developed countries 
such as the US and the member states of the EU.8 As environmental scholars Joyeeta 
Gupta and Nicolien van der Grijp argue, climate change thereby has intrinsically become 
“a North-South issue.”9
 Cooperation with the BRICS countries is essential for a successful global climate 
change mitigation policy. Although cumulatively developing countries are responsible 
for only 20 percent of GHG emissions since 1751 – while constituting 80 percent of the 
global population – they are responsible for the highest growth rates in GHG 
emissions.10 Currently, developing countries are responsible for more than half of the 
CO2 emissions.11 China has overtaken the US as the biggest global emitter of GHGs, 
while India is expected to overtake the EU as the world’s third largest emitter.12 The 
BRICS countries’ support for climate change mitigation policies is thus essential for a 
successful mitigation policy. As a leader in the climate change regime, the EU needs to 
direct its attention towards these countries. It is therefore important to look at how the 
BRICS countries perceive EU leadership in global politics, and more specifically, within 
the climate change regime.
Review of Existing Literature: From Euro-narcissism to External Perspectives
Euro-narcissism
There is a strong consensus among European scholars that the EU is a leader within the 
climate change regime. The majority of the research on the EU as a leader within this 
6 Kilian and Elgström, “Still a Green Leader?,” 256.
7 Ibid.
8 Joyeeta Gupta, Harro van Asselt, and Michiel van Drunen, “Global Governance: Climate Cooperation,” in Mainstreaming 
Climate Change in Development Cooperation: Theory, Practice and Implications for the European Union, ed. Joyeeta Gupta 
and Nicolien van der Grijp (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 142.
9 Ibid., 134.
10 With the term ‘developing countries’ I refer to the countries that are not mentioned in Annex 1 of the 1992 FCCC.
11 B. Sudharka Reddy and Gaudenz B. Assenza, “Climate Change – A Developing Country Perspective,” Current Science 97, 
no. 1 (2009): 52.
12 Ibid.
regime focuses on how European climate change policies are shaped by examining EU 
policy- making, the different leadership styles of the EU and what kind of a leader the EU 
is, wants to be, or should be to effectively combat climate change. Diverse labels have 
been used to characterise the EU as an actor in international relations. Among these are 
“civilian power,” “soft power,” and “normative power”.13 An example of research on the 
leadership styles associated with these different perceptions of EU power is that of political 
scientists Charles Parker and Christer Karlsson. Parker and Karlsson have identified three 
different leadership styles: directional (leading by example), structural (unilateral use of 
sticks and carrots), and idea-based (agenda-setting) leadership .14
 The research by Parker and Karlsson and other existing studies on the leadership 
styles of the EU are important indicators of the different self-perceptions of the EU, 
because theythey base their analyses of European leadership on internal perspectives. 
However, the EU’s leadership position cannot be fully analysed by looking in the mirror. As 
leading environmental scholars Michael Grubb and Joyeeta Gupta state, “a leader is one 
that is perceived as a leader”.15 European self-identification as a normative or civilian 
power loses meaning if the perspectives of other international actors on EU leadership do 
not correspond. The high degree of Euro-narcissism in existing research therefore prevents 
a full assessment of EU leadership within the climate change regime.16 In this paper, I argue 
that external perspectives on the EU are of crucial importance in understanding the 
leadership role of the EU within the climate change regime.
External Perspectives
Only recently has there been a growing recognition of the need to pay attention to 
outsiders’ views of the EU. One of the pioneering studies in this field is The EU through the 
eyes of the Asia-Pacific, published by the National Centre for Research on Europe based 
at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand, and led by the political scientists Martin 
Holland and Natalia Chaban.17 In 2007, Italian political scientist Sonia Lucarelli identified 
the lack of research on external perceptions on the EU as a gap in the literature.18 Other 
leading authors in the field of external perceptions are the political scientists Lorenzo 
Fioramonti, Arlo Poletti and Linda Sheahan.19
 Scholars within the field of external perspectives have examined whether the EU is 
perceived as a leader within the climate change regime by third countries. Their work 
provides valuable insights into EU leadership, as these studies demonstrate that external 
perspectives on the EU often do not correspond with its self-perception as a leader in the 
8
13 For an overview of literature using these labels see Michito Tsuruoka, “How External Perceptions of the European Union Are 
Shaped: Endogenous and Exogenous Sources.” Conference paper presented at the GARNET Conference ‘The EU in 
International Affairs,’ Brussels, 24-26 April, 2008).
14 Charles F. Parker and Christer Karlsson, “Climate Change and the European Union’s Leadership Moment: An Inconvenient 
Truth?,” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 48, no. 4 (2010): 925.
15 Gupta and Grubb, Climate Change and European Leadership, 69.
16 The term euro-narcissism is coined in Hartmut Mayer, “Is It Still Called ‘Chinese Whispers’? The EU’s Rhetoric and Action as a 
Responsible Global Institution,” International Affairs 84, no. 1 (2008): 62–79.
17 Martin Holland and Natalia Chaban, Perspectives on the Role of the EU: A Study of Asian Stakeholders’ Opinions from Six 
Countries (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2010). 18 Lucarelli, “The European Union 
in the Eyes of Others; Towards Filling a Gap in the Literature.”
19 For an overview of research in external perspectives on the European Union, see Natalia Chaban and others, “Images of the 
EU beyond Its Borders: Issue-Specific and Regional Perceptions of European Union Power and Leadership,” JCMS: Journal of 
Common Market Studies 51, no. 3 (2013): 436.
climate change regime. What is not yet presented in their research, however, is an 
overview of the different variables that shape these perceptions. As Natalia Chaban 
argues, her work hints at “an intricate interplay of exogenous and endogenous reasons 
shaping perceptions.”20 Swedish political scientists Ole Elgström and Bertil Kilian focus in 
their research on the reasons behind perceptions of the EU as a leader within the climate 
change regime, but their work does not yet take into account the changed global power 
balance in environmental politics after the rise of the BRICS countries.21 The variables that 
shape perceptions of the EU by the rising BRICS countries are yet to be researched. This 
article aims to take up this challenge by analysing one of the BRICS countries, India. In 
doing so, this paper aims to provide an answer to the following research question: what 
are the endogenous and exogenous variables that shape Indian perspectives on the EU 
as a global power and a leader within the climate change regime?
Methodology
This article seeks to analyse external perspectives on European leadership by using India 
as a case study. I do not wish to generalise the findings for all BRICS countries. Due to 
practical limitations, it is only feasible to assess one country’s perspectives here. 
Furthermore, research focusing on external perspectives of multiple countries at the same 
time has shown that there are as many differences between the perspectives of these 
countries as there are between internal perspectives on the EU.22 It would thus not be 
possible to generalise for all BRICS countries. Further research is necessary to get an 
overview of the different external perspectives of the other BRICS countries on the EU.
 This article focuses on India because of its expected population and economic 
growth. India has one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Its young 
population, essential to its rapid economic growth, will continue to grow in the coming 
decades. India’s population is expected to surpass that of China, eventually reaching 
around 1.5 billion people.23 It is responsible for one of the highest growth rates in GHG 
emissions. India has thus become a key actor within the climate change regime. This was 
also demonstrated at the 2015 Paris summit, where Indian support was crucial to secure 
the agreement.
 The analysis in this article is based on a literature review of existing research on 
Indian perspectives on the EU as a global leader, and more specifically on the EU as a 
leader within the climate change regime. One of the pioneering works in this field is the 
analysis of Indian views on Europe by French political scientist Karine Lisbonne-de 
Vergeron, which is based on interviews. In 2007, Italian political scientist Lorenzo 
Fioramonti published his analysis of Indian perspectives on the EU as a global leader. 
Grounded in newspaper analysis, Fioramonti scrutinises perceptions of the EU by Indian 
elites, civil society, and mass media. In my analysis I have also included the study “The 
External Image of the EU,” executed by the GARNET group in 2007 and analysed by 
Sonia Lucarelli. Furthermore, I analyse the study by Natalia Chaban, Ole Elgström, Serena 
Kelly and Lai Suet Yi of perceptions of EU power and leadership, which is based on 
interviews with the Indian elite. Finally, I included an EU policy analysis by Indian scholar 
Rajendra K. Jain. This article will combine the available research on Indian perspectives 
9
20 Chaban and others, “Images of the EU beyond Its Borders,” 448.
21 Elgström, “EU Leadership in an Emerging New World Order,” and Kilian and Elgström, “Still a Green Leader?”
22 See for example Chaban and others, “Images of the EU beyond Its Borders.”
23 Lorenzo Fioramonti, Different Facets of a Strategic Partnership: How the EU Is Viewed by Political and Business Elites, Civil 
Society and the Press in India, SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2007): 349.
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and analyse the results, and will contribute to existing literature by giving an overview of 
the variables that shape Indian perspectives on the EU.
 Subsequently, this article will analyse the different variables that influence Indian 
perspectives. In doing so, I will make use of Michito Tsuruoka’s distinction between 
endogenous and exogenous variables. As Tsuruoka argues, it is important to analyse how 
external perspectives are shaped.24 He therefore makes a useful distinction between the 
different variables that shape perceptions of the EU by third countries: endogenous and 
exogenous variables. Endogenous variables are the factors within third countries – in this 
case India – that shape perceptions of the EU. The EU has little influence on these 
variables. Exogenous variables are factors that originate outside the third country. EU 
policies and actions fall within this category. Using this distinction allows for an analysis that 
differentiates between variables that the EU can control, and variables to which the EU can 
merely adjust its actions and policies. Furthermore, since endogenous variables do not 
originate from within the EU they can only be known by analysing external perspectives. 
Using this distinction allows us to clearly see what knowledge we get from internal and 
external perspectives research respectively and is thus useful in assessing the added value 
of including external perspectives in research on EU leadership.
Heading South: Indian Perspectives on the European Union
Euro-narcissism revisited
Research on external perspectives on the EU as a leader within the climate change regime 
has shown that the EU is rarely perceived as a leader by third countries. As Natalia Chaban 
observes: “[the] EU [is] seldom viewed as a leader in security or environmental issues.”25 
This claim is supported by research by Fioramonti and Poletti.26 This article will now give an 
overview of the exogenous and endogenous variables that shape the Indian perception of 
the EU as (not being) a leader within the climate change regime. Many of these variables 
are not specific to the climate change regime, but also shape more general perceptions of 
the EU as a global leader. However, since the perceptions of EU leadership within climate 
change regulation cannot be viewed separately from perceptions of the EU as a global 
leader, these more general variables are essential to assess Indian perceptions of EU 
leadership within the climate change regime.
Exogenous variables
Previous research on leadership has identified credibility and coherence as essential to, or 
even preconditions for, effective leadership.27 In existing literature on the EU and climate 
change regulation, it has been argued that the EU has acted in a coherent manner as a 
leader within the climate change regime.28 Following the aforementioned definition of 
leadership given by Gupta and Grubb, however, the most important aspect of leadership 
is perception by others. An analysis of these external perspectives shows that the EU is not 
24 Tsuruoka, “How External Perceptions of the European Union Are Shaped: Endogenous and Exogenous Sources,” 9.
25 Chaban and others, “Images of the EU beyond Its Borders,” 442.
26 Lorenzo Fioramonti and Arlo Poletti, “Facing the Giant: Southern Perspectives on the European Union,” Third World 
Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2008): 172.
27 Kilian and Elgström, “Still a Green Leader?,” 260.
28 See for example Kilian and Elgström, “Still a Green Leader?” and Sebastian Oberthür and Claire Roche Kelly, “EU Leadership 
in International Climate Policy: Achievements and Challenges,” The International Spectator 43, no. 3 (2008): 35–50.
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perceived as acting in a unified way. Rather than as a single entity, the EU is perceived to  
act as “a conglomerate of states” that is “vague and divided.” 29
 EU actions and policies have influenced these perspectives. Climate change 
policy is a shared competence of the EU institutions and the member states, which allows 
member states to deal individually with third countries. Some member states, notably 
the United Kingdom France and Germany, have shown a preference for dealing 
bilaterally with India.30 Furthermore, EU-India cooperation is perceived as being led by 
“very small circles in Brussels.”31 This, taken together with the bilateral preference of 
arguably the most powerful countries within the EU, has undermined the coherence of 
EU leadership. This has resulted in a diminished incentive for India to deal with Brussels, 
which has far-reaching consequences for the EU’s perceived importance to India.32 As 
Karine Lisbonne-de Vergeron observes: “[though] Indian officials proclaim that ‘Europe 
matters,’ the truth is it does not.”33 Exemplary in this regard is the speech by then Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh on Indian Independence day 2005, in which he did not even 
mention the EU as one of India’s key strategic partners.34
 The second exogenous variable that can be distilled from analysing Indian 
perspectives is the preference that the EU seems to have given to China over India. EU 
commissioners have paid substantially more visits to China than to India. From May 2005 
to May 2006, for example, seven EU commissioners visited India, whereas in May 2006 
alone three commissioners visited China.35 Among Indian diplomats, this has resulted in 
the feeling that the EU would rather deal with totalitarian China than with its democratic 
Asian counterpart, India. The preference for totalitarian China questions the EU’s 
proclaimed commitment to human rights and democracy, and thereby undermines EU 
credibility as a global leader. As mentioned before, credibility is an important aspect of 
leadership. The failure of the EU to recognise India as a credible counterweight to China 
in Asia has resulted in the feeling that the EU “has failed to accommodate India in the 
international arena.”36
 Another exogenous variable influencing Indian perspectives on European 
leadership is the mismatch between Indian and EU security concerns. The biggest 
differences can be found in policies regarding nuclear power and relations with Pakistan. 
India has sought to become a nuclear power since 2001. The EU, however, has been 
reluctant to recognise India as a nuclear power and refused to share nuclear knowledge. 
One of the Indian interviewees stated that this had been clear from the outset: “It is clear 
that any primary nuclear recognition of India would have been inconceivable within the 
framework of the EU, even though Europe has a major interest in India’s capability to 
emerge as a more responsible player in world affairs.” Feelings that the EU prefers 
dealing with China over India were strengthened by Europe’s nuclear policies towards 
China. Where the EU has been very reluctant in sharing nuclear knowledge with India, it 
has no problem to accept China as a nuclear power.
29 R.K. Jain, “India, the European Union and Asian Regionalism” (presented at the EUSA-AP conference on “Multilateralism and 
Regionalism in Europe and Asia-Pacific,” Tokyo, 2005), 7; Karine Lisbonne-de Vergeron, Contemporary Indian Views of Europe 
(Paris: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2006), 20.
30 Lisbonne-de Vergeron, Contemporary Indian Views of Europe, 19.
31 Jain, “India, the European Union and Asian Regionalism,” 7.
32 Fioramonti, Different Facets of a Strategic Partnership, 354.
33 Lisbonne-de Vergeron, Contemporary Indian Views of Europe, 20.
34 Lisbonne-de Vergeron, Contemporary Indian Views of Europe, 21. 35 Ibid., 19.
36 Ibid., 23.
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 The nuclear question was not the only matter in which European security interests 
did not match those of India. Especially after 9/11, Indian concerns about its deteriorating 
external security environment rose.37 India wanted to put an end to Pakistani support of 
cross- border terrorism. It thereby felt supported by the US, who forced Pakistan to ban 
terrorist groups operating from Pakistani territory. In contrast, the EU did not side with 
India, but instead tried to reconcile India and Pakistan. Furthermore, the EU offered 
Pakistan a preferential trade package and increased development aid even after a military 
coup was staged in that country. For India, this significantly undermined the credibility of 
the EU as a global leader, as it was hard to reconcile the policies of the EU towards Pakistan 
with the EU’s ideals of democracy and human rights.38 The actions of the EU in Pakistan 
thus severely harmed the Indian perception of the EU as a credible global power.
Endogenous variables
While there is a strong perception in India that the EU prefers dealing with China over 
dealing with India, the US have valued India as an Asian counterweight to China. Bilateral 
relations between India and the US have been significantly strengthened during the past 
decade. This came at the expense of Indian perceptions of the EU, since the US often 
serves “as a reference point against which to conceive of the EU,” resulting in “a strong 
correlation between the rise of the US and the fall of the EU in terms of expectations and 
desirability as superpowers in world opinion polls.”39 The US is thus viewed as a 
counterbalance against the EU and vice versa. The growing popularity of the US in 
combination with the European preference for China has resulted in the view of Europe as 
the “dowdy old lady,” incapable of adapting its policies to the new global power balance 
and desperately trying to uphold the status quo.40 This has made it harder for the EU to 
cooperate with India. In 2002, during a trip to India, then President of the European 
Commission Romano Prodi voiced his “displeasure over the fact that India and Indians 
were constantly looking at the USA in all major areas of cooperation.”41
 While India’s leading security interests do not converge with those of the EU, the US 
has served India better in international politics. In March 2006, then American president 
George W. Bush visited New Delhi to sign a strategic accord between the US and India. 
Through this strategic accord, nuclear facilities were divided into two categories: military 
and civilian. The accord allowed India to access US civilian nuclear knowledge. The US 
thereby acknowledged India as a nuclear power and ended its pariah status in global 
nuclear politics. President George W. Bush’s visit to New Delhi greatly improved the 
external perception of the US by India. The visit was viewed as a recognition of India as 
America’s partner in Asia.42 Furthermore, the US forced Pakistan to ban terrorist groups 
operating from Pakistani territory.
37 Jain, “India, the European Union and Asian Regionalism,” 5.
38 Jain, “India, the European Union and Asian Regionalism,” 5..
39 Tsuruoka, “How External Perceptions of the European Union Are Shaped: Endogenous and Exogenous Sources,” 13-14.
40 Jain, “India, the European Union and Asian Regionalism,” 6.
41 Quoted in Fioramonti, Different Facets of a Strategic Partnership, 354.
42 Fioramonti, Different Facets of a Strategic Partnership, 353.
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 The bid for nuclear power was indicative of a shift in Indian foreign policy. Where 
India had previously relied on moralpolitik, since 1998 the country commenced with a 
new foreign policy. With the new realpolitik, India was overtly seeking the status of a 
Great Power. The bid for nuclear power was a sign of the successfulness of the new 
policy. As Lisbonne-de Vergeron explains: “[for] most Indians, it seems, their country’s 
commitment to succeed morally, as the world’s largest democracy, has been ‘less 
rewarding than its decision to become a nuclear power.’ Only after that was India ‘taken 
seriously by the world.’”43 Another aspect of India’s new realpolitik is its desire to become 
a regional power. In 2006, India sent military forces to Tajikistan, establishing its first 
military base abroad. Furthermore, Indian defence spending has soared. Since the 
mid-1990s its defence budget has doubled, just like the decade before.44 An important 
consequence of India’s realpolitik is its lack of interest in human security: humanitarian 
aid, the environment, and in particular climate change. The development of successful 
climate change mitigation policies are thus considered by India to be of minor 
importance.
 Another endogenous variable influencing Indian perspectives on the EU is the 
enormous knowledge deficit about the EU in India. This knowledge gap is described by 
Indian scholar Rajendra K. Jain:
 The average Indian has considerable difficulty in understanding what kind of   
 political and economic animal the European Union is. To him, the EC stands for   
 the ‘Election Commission.’ And if the EC Delegation is said to be an embassy,
 the usual query is for which country does it issue visas.45
 This knowledge deficit is caused by a lack of interest in the EU. EU policies and 
actions are rarely covered in Indian newspapers. An editor of one of India’s leading 
newspapers for example stated that: “the European Union is not currently more nor less 
a greater concern for India than South Africa.”46 This indicates that the EU is of little 
importance to the social and cultural debate in Indian society. It is furthermore a 
significant indicator that the EU is not perceived to be a global leader: if average Indians 
have difficulty to understand what the EU is, it is likely that they do not view the EU as an 
important player in global politics. In contrast, Indian knowledge of the US is relatively 
high. A majority of the Indian population views the US as a global leader, and 71 percent 
of that majority holds a positive opinion of the US and its government.47
 Finally, Indian perceptions of EU leadership within the climate change regime are 
influenced by India’s prioritisation of development. Developing countries have jointly 
stated that development is their top priority.48 For India and other developing countries, 
climate- change mitigation is thus not a primary concern. The United Nations have 
recognised their right to development by adopting the 1986 Declaration on the Right to 
Development, which holds that development is an “inalienable human right by virtue of 
43 Lisbonne-de Vergeron, Contemporary Indian Views of Europe, 24.
44 Ibid., 25.
45 Quoted in Fioramonti, Different Facets of a Strategic Partnership, 354.
46 Quoted in Lisbonne-de Vergeron, Contemporary Indian Views of Europe, 21.
47 Fioramonti, Different Facets of a Strategic Partnership, 354.
48 Joyeeta Gupta and Nicolien van der Grijp, eds., Mainstreaming Climate Change in Development Cooperation: Theory, 
Practice and Implications for the European Union (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010): 10.
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which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and 
enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development.”49 Some developing countries, 
including India, have used this declaration as a justification for their growing GHG 
emissions. This approach has been dismissed by the UN Development Programme by 
arguing that the “right to basic emissions as a corollary to the right to development” is not 
the same as a right to emit.50 Nonetheless, the Indian government under Narendra Modi 
pursues a ‘development first’-policy to stir economic growth. The government does not 
feel primarily responsible for GHG emissions. This is not without reason as there is indeed 
a big gap between the cumulative emissions of the developed countries and those of the 
developing countries.
 The UNFCCC recognised this disparity through the adoption of the principle of 
common but differential responsibility. This principle holds that all countries are 
responsible for combatting climate change, but that these responsibilities are divided “in 
relation to how much a country contributed to causing the problem and its respective 
ability to pay”.51 Under this principle, developed countries are obliged to lead the 
mitigation process, provide financial support for developing countries to meet their 
financial needs in complying with the convention, and facilitate technology transfer to 
developing countries to further aid its implementation. The mechanisms that were 
introduced to facilitate financial support and technology transfer, however, allowed 
developed countries to trade real GHG emission reductions for financial support and 
technology for developing countries. Furthermore, developing countries did not have 
binding targets under the Kyoto Protocol and the Doha amendment to the Kyoto protocol.
Conclusion
The analysis in this article has identified the following variables as shaping Indian 
perspectives on the EU as a global power and a leader within the climate change regime:
Table 1: Exogenous and Endogenous variables Indian perspectives
 Exogenous variables    Endogenous variables
 Disunity of the European Union   India-US bilateral relations
 EU-China bilateral relations   Changing Indian foreign policy
 Security context EU-India    Security context US-India
        Lack of knowledge/interest
         Development priority
As table 1 shows, there are more endogenous than exogenous variables influencing Indian 
perspectives on the EU. This finding underlines the importance of researching external 
perspectives, since we could not have identified endogenous variables by focusing on 
internal perspectives on the EU only. Furthermore, as my analysis shows, the EU can only 
partly control its perception as a global power and leader. While the EU can control the 
exogenous variables that shape its perception, it can only try to influence the endogenous 




variables. Since there are more endogenous than exogenous variables that shape the perception 
of the EU as a leader within the climate change regime the EU can only partly control its leadership 
position within the climate change regime.
 To improve its perception by third countries, it is easiest for the EU to start by changing the 
exogenous variables. The EU should therefore focus on its coherence and credibility as an 
international actor, since these factors are indispensable to effective leadership. Currently the EU 
is functioning as a fragmented political entity within the climate change regime. The EU should 
therefore invest in internal and external coherence. This coherence can be improved by speaking 
with one voice in global politics and by favouring multilateral over bilateral solutions. This poses 
considerable problems, however, since member states will most likely not be willing to give up 
bilateral relations with India.
 Another exogenous variable that the EU could try to influence is the perception that the EU 
has favoured China over India. However, it is unlikely that the EU will favour India instead because 
China is of crucial importance to the European economy. What the EU could do is recognise India 
as a regional power by paying more attention to India and its security context. This is rendered 
difficult by the nuclear and the Pakistan issues, as they have severely damaged the credibility of the 
EU as a global power. Rebuilding this credibility will therefore take time.
 The EU can merely influence the endogenous variables that shape its perception as a global 
leader, and this influence is small. There is little that the EU can do to influence the foreign policy 
course that India is currently taking, for example. Furthermore, the lack of Indian interest in the EU 
can only be overcome if the EU becomes more attractive to India as an ally. To do so would require 
better serving India’s development and security needs. This is rendered difficult by the strong 
bilateral relationship between India and the US. If the EU wants to become attractive to India, it will 
need to become equally or even more attractive than the US.
 An endogenous variable that can be accommodated is India’s prioritisation of 
development. The EU could support both Indian development and climate change mitigation by 
focusing on sustainable development. In doing so, the EU would take into account India’s right to 
development, while simultaneously mitigating GHG emissions. Integrating development aid in 
climate change cooperation allows the EU to better accommodate to India’s development and 
security needs.
 The analysis of Indian perspectives presented in this paper shows that the rise of the BRICS 
countries presents the EU with serious challenges to its aspired leadership position within the 
climate change regime. If the EU wants to prevent its climate change mitigation policy from failing, 
it should focus on the global South and their perspectives on the EU. Although India’s 
development and security needs make it difficult for the EU to effectively lead within the climate 
change regime, there are possibilities to become a more credible and coherent leader. The Paris 
Agreement stems hopeful. Under the agreement, India committed itself to an emission reduction 
of 35 percent and 40 percent renewables in its electricity demand by 2030, without making this 
commitment contingent on financial aid of industrialised countries. This increased willingness to 
cooperate in in the mitigation regime provides opportunities to be seized by the EU in the future, 
even though this commitment came about mainly as the result of US political pressure.52 Most 
importantly, EU policy makers should realise that the EU is only a leader when it is perceived to be 
one. The EU should therefore focus on how it is perceived by third countries. Only by looking 
beyond the mirror, the EU can become a successful leader within the climate change regime.
52 For more information on the Paris Agreement, see: Susanne Dröge, “The Paris Agreement 2015: Turning Point for the 
International Climate Regime”, SWP Research Paper 4, Berlin, February 2016.
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Chinese Investment in the Bordeaux wine region:
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Introduction
France, China, Bordeaux, wine. Which is the odd one out? Until recently the answer would 
have unanimously been China and still today most people (at least in the West) don’t 
immediately link China and wine. The pairing of France with wine however immediately 
seems to make sense. In France – a country highly acclaimed for its eating and drinking 
habits, for its rich culinary heritage with wine taking an important place in it – seeing or 
hearing the four, France, China, Bordeaux and wine, together has become a lot less odd and 
a subject of debate.
 Vineyards have long constituted an integral part 
of European environments and France hosts many 
world-famous wine growing regions. One of them, 
undisputedly, is the Bordeaux wine region in south-west 
France. In the context of an increasingly globalised wine 
industry – which also reflects a general reshuffling of 
world economic power relations – China now figures 
prominently on the French wine map. This concerns, on 
the one hand, the growing export of French wine to 
China and on the other, the recent Chinese investment 
in the Bordeaux wine region. Chinese investors have 
been particularly interested in châteaux in the region. A first château was bought in 2008 and 
many more have followed since then. This Chinese investment phenomenon, the arrival of a 
new climate metaphorically speaking, has repeatedly made it to the headlines of French 
newspapers and spurred much media attention in general.
 In a country where the diversity of its regions and their culinary specialties play a 
particular role at the level of national culture and identity, how is the new climate in the 
Bordeaux wine region reported on and how is it perceived among the French people? What 
is the discourse on Chinese wine investment in France which has emerged over the last few 
years like? These questions are analysed by examining three different sets of texts that deal 
with the phenomenon and participate in the same discourse, but write or speak from different 
points in society, namely a comical-educational show on French public television, online 
comments of Internet users on national and regional newspaper websites collected after a 
prestigious château sale and two articles, taken together as one source, reviewing the recent 
history of Chinese investment in the Bordeaux wine region. It is the underlying understanding 
of this paper that a text is not limited to the written word. Instead it is understood as any set 
of signs which transmit an informative message. Expecting that the new climate does not go 
IP subtheme: European Environments, European Identities
Keywords: French national identity, Bordeaux wine region,
Chinese investment in Europe, national patrimony
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unchallenged, especially at identity level, the social structure which is analysed as 
framing the discourse on Chinese investment and investors is an ‘us’ and ‘them’ or 
in-group-out-group relationship.
 The concept of in-group and out-group stems from the field of social psychology, 
in particular social identity and self-categorisation theory. At the heart of these theories 
lies the concept of social identity defined as “our sense of ourselves as being a member 
of a group or groups – our shared, collective or group identity”, e.g. being a member of 
the group ‘the French’.1 The in-group is the group to which a person sees him- or herself 
as belonging to, here the French, whereas he or she does not identify with the 
out-group, here the Chinese. The paper aims to investigate how this in-group-out-group 
relation is made explicit across the three sets of texts by focusing on what is said about 
Chinese investment and investors (also visually), what references to other issues are 
established and whether language, as a relevant indicator of relations of social proximity 
and detachment, is involved in constructing the out-group, for instance via the use of 
pronouns and demonstratives that actualise us-them distinctions.2 To answer these 
questions it is first of all necessary to take a look at the recent history of Chinese 
investment within the Bordeaux wine region and to delve into the construction of French 
wine- growing regions as part of a national heritage and identity.
 With regard to the broader theme of European environments and European 
identities this paper examines how a particular physical environment is constructed as 
national not least through its connection to a (very national) food product. It highlights 
an emotional attachment to a particular landscape and its produce. The paper 
investigates how the preservation of this natural environment, cherished as a source of 
national identity construction, while fostering a sense of common ownership and 
belonging among members of the national group, often also becomes exclusionary and 
even racist. It is suggested that the latter is observable in particular during times 
perceived as or bringing about a serious climate change metaphorically speaking.
Bordeaux and its Chinese investors
Bordeaux is a port city at the banks of the Garonne river in south-western France and 
capital of the Aquitaine region. Across the globe, the city is first and foremost associated 
with wine which is grown in the whole area of the Gironde department. Winegrowing in 
the region dates back to the first century BCE.3 Today, Bordeaux is the largest French 
AOC winegrowing area with 60 different appellations grouped in six categories.4 In 2013 
viticulture represented 15% of the production value of agriculture in France and wine 
exports produced a turnover of 7.6 billion Euros.5 Recently, China has become a crucial 
wine trading partner for the region. It now stands as the top destination for exported 
Bordeaux wines.
 As a port city, export and foreign investors have always been important in 
Bordeaux’s wine industry. An enduring role in developing Bordeaux’s wine trade was 
1 Paul Dickerson, Social Psychology: Traditional and Critical Perspectives, 1st Edition (New York: Pearson Education, 2012), 49.
2 See Anna Duszak, “Us and Others: An Introduction,” in Us and Others: Social Identities Across Languages, Discourses and 
Cultures, ed. Anna Duszak (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 2002), 6.
3 Georges Durand, “Vine and Wine,” in Rethinking France: Les Lieux de Mé moire, ed. Pierre Nora (Chicago etc.: University of 
Chicago Press, 2009), 206.
4 AOC stands for Appellation d’origine côntrolée, wine of controlled origin.
5 “Le Vin en quelques Chiffres Clés,” Vin et Société, accessed May 20, 2014, 
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played by England. Following the marriage of Eleanor of Aquitaine and Henry II, Duke of 
Normandy who in 1154 became King of England, the partnership lasted for three 
centuries.6 Later on the Netherlands and Belgium became very active, so that in sum the 
Bordeaux wine region can look back on an international wine history. The latest and first 
important non-Western arrival in the Bordeaux region is China. Chinese investment started 
in 2008 with the Chinese real estate and wine trading company Longhai International 
acquiring château Latour Laguens.7 Information on the number of wine-growing estates 
bought by Chinese investors since then varies. In her 2014 e- book publication le Vin, le 
Rouge, la Chine ou le Vin de Bordeaux et les Chinois journalist Laurence Lemaire refers to 
about 80 châteaux among more than 8000 Bordeaux estates. About 200 wine-growing 
estates including the Chinese properties were owned by foreign investors. Besides the 
Chinese these were mainly Belgians with around 50 châteaux, as well as Germans, British, 
Americans, South Africans, Japanese and Russians.8
 The group of Chinese investors is diverse. Some are individuals like the actress Zhao 
Wei, some are companies not usually involved in the production and distribution of 
alcoholic beverages and yet others are mostly state-owned Chinese food processing 
companies. The latter are in particular interested in strengthening the position of wine in 
China. Possessing a Bordeaux wine is therefore also a marketing affair and a way of 
acquiring savoir-faire from the experienced French staff.9 Since 2012 Chinese investors 
have searched for more prestigious wine-growing estates in the Bordeaux region such as 
the château Bellefont-Belcier, a grand cru classé from the Saint-Émilion appellation, which 
was sold for an estimated amount of 19.5 to 26 million euros.10 Burgundy, another French 
wine-growing region, has also seen some Chinese investment in its wine sector. But 
besides importing from and investing in other countries China has itself become a major 
wine producing country and it also hosts a number of foreign companies, mainly French, 
engaged in wine production in China.11
 Media attention in France, and beyond, to the Chinese investment phenomenon in 
Bordeaux has been substantial. If one focuses only on the number of châteaux owned by 
Chinese investors compared to the total number of estates could the attention dedicated 
to the former be called disproportionate? After all, nobody seems to write about the 
Belgian wine- growing estates. One of the reasons for the general interest perhaps is that 
it reflects important changes within an increasingly globalised wine industry which in turn 
also mirrors a global trend: China’s general rise in the world economy and on the world’s 
stage despite a certain economic slowdown in recent years. China’s economic foothold in 
Europe and especially its financial and commercial influence in crisis-struck EU member 
6 “BORDELAIS - Histoire et Traditions - Hachette-Vins,” accessed May 20, 2014, http://www.hachette- 
vins.com/le-guide-hachette-des-vins/regions-viticoles/bordelais/histoire-et-traditions-1-1-80.html.
7 Thiébault Dromard, “Un Groupe Chinois s’empare du Vignoble du Château Latour-Laguens,” Le Figaro Vin, January 30, 2008, 
accessed May 20, 2014, http://avis-vin.lefigaro.fr/magazine-vin/o8417-un-groupe-chinois-s- 
empare-du-vignoble-du-chateau-latour-laguens.
8 Laurence Lemaire, Le Vin, le Rouge, la Chine ou le Vin de Bordeaux et les Chinois, 2014, 52.
9 Charlotte Oberti, “France - Chinese Face Suspicion in French Wine World - France 24,” June 20, 2013, accessed May 20, 2014, 
http://www.france24.com/en/20130620-france-china-wine-vinexpo-bordeaux- competition-business/.
10 Laurence Lemaire, Le Vin, le Rouge, la Chine ou le Vin de Bordeaux et les Chinois, 61.
11 Kharunya Paramaguru, “How China Became the Wine World’s Most Unlikely Superpower,” Time, October 31, 2013, sec. 
Business, accessed May 20, 2014, http://business.time.com/2013/10/31/how-china-became-the- 
wine-worlds-most-unlikely-superpower/; Björn Kjellgren, “Drunken Modernity: Wine in China,” Anthropology of Food, no. 3 
December 2004: 2.
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states have recently animated debate in Europe.12 The Dutch author Paul Scheffer remarked that 
“when Europe asks for help from countries such as India, Brazil and China to get it through the 
monetary winter, then we know something essential has changed.”13 However, besides the 
backdrop of the changing power relations in the twenty-first century, it is also the symbolic and 
cultural value of wine and wine-growing regions in France that to some extent explains the interest 
in the Chinese investment phenomenon in the Bordeaux wine region.
“Without wine, France would probably not be France”14
In what today is known as France wine has been grown and drunk for centuries. Its cultivation dates 
back to the gradual advance of the Greco-Roman conquest.15 Today, throughout much of the 
world, wine is seen as the national drink of the French people. The historian Georges Durand for 
instance claims that “after the territory, the Republic, and the language, wine assumes its place as 
the distinctive national point of reference”.16 A recent barometer conducted by the Institut français 
d’opinion publique, the French institute of public opinion, on behalf of the association Vin & 
Société confirmed this view. 85% of the interviewed considered wine to be a component of the 
French art de vivre to which they felt particularly attached. 96% saw the French wine-growing 
regions as contributing to the scenic beauties of certain regions.17 How and when did wine and 
wine-growing regions come to constitute a distinct French tradition of cultural-symbolic value for 
the whole nation?
 Contrary to common belief, most traditions and symbols do not emanate from some very 
distant past but instead have been deliberately constructed or invented in response to 
transformations of and in society. The British historian Eric Hobsbawm coined this as the concept 
of invented tradition which, he notes, “automatically implies continuity with the past” whether real 
or imagined.18 Invented traditions are valued for their potential to establish social cohesion, a 
feeling of belonging together and of forming a distinct group of people – such as the citizens of a 
nation-state – based on sharing certain fixed practices. Invented traditions thus play a role in the 
field of identity construction, in particular at the collective or national level.
 Anthony D. Smith, a long-standing scholar of nationalism and ethnicity, defined national 
identity as “the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, 
memories, myths and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations, and the 
identifications of individuals with that pattern and heritage and with its cultural elements”.19 The 
socio-cultural-national glue provided for by the French wine tradition, besides defining a common 
lifestyle, also rests upon a territorial dimension, upon identification with the land.
 The perception of the land of rural France changed during the second half of the nineteenth 
century. This was an important development also for wine-growing regions as it played a 
considerable role in lifting these regions into the rank of national heritage at the turn of the 
twentieth century, in Europe’s mass-generation of traditions period. Marion Demossier notes that 
12 See for instance François Godement, Jonas Parello-Plesner, and Alice Richard, “ECFR Policy Brief 37: The Scramble for 
Europe,” July 2011, accessed May 18, 2014, http://www.ecfr.eu/page/- /ECFR37_Scramble_For_Europe_AW_v4.pdf.
13 Paul Scheffer, “The Old Continent in a New World,” in The Dwarfing of Europe? A Dialogue between Brazil, India, China and 
Europe, ed. Marjolein Cremer, Susanne Mors and Odile Chenal (Amsterdam: European Cultural Foundation, 2014), 116.
14 Sadoun et al. 1965, 48 cited in Marion Demossier, “Consuming Wine in France: The ‘Wandering’ Drinker and the 
Vin-Anomie,” in Drinking Cultures: Alcohol and Identity, ed. Thomas M. Wilson, 1st Edition (Oxford; New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2005), 145.
15 Durand, “Vine and Wine,” 206.
16 Ibid., 204–205.
17 “Baromètre de l’Image du Vin: Vin-Ifop,” September 2013, accessed April 14, 2014, 
http://www.lepoint.fr/html/media/pdf/vin-ifop.pdf.
18 E. J Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” in The Invention of Tradition, ed. E. J Hobsbawm and T. O Ranger 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1.
19 Anthony D. Smith, “Concepts,” in Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (Malden, Mass: Polity Press, 2001), 18.
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already in the eighteenth century the French people were aware of French culinary 
diversity including wine.20 In the course of the nineteenth century, this awareness grew 
further becoming an important part of the redefinition of the French nation. It was under 
the Third Republic with the advent of mass nationalist education that children became 
socialised to a common vision of the French nation.21 This included promoting French 
regional diversity and its culinary specialties as something to take pride in and familiarising 
French pupils “with the notion that all the regions of France, like their citizens, were linked; 
the unique products of those regions, like the nation that produced them, were to be 
savoured”.22
 The French wine sector built on this change toward a positive depiction of rural 
France when it saw itself confronted with the downside of the globalised, mass, consumer 
market. The latter made regional products easily accessible throughout the country and 
even the world but also created the problem that the name of a village or province – which 
served to designate a specific product originating in that place – could “become, in the 
eyes of the consumer, little more than a generic label specifying a type of food or drink”.23 
Fearing to lose the monopoly on their production fine wine growers convinced 
government officials of the need to protect fine wines as a national patrimony. The result 
was a “system of appellations d’origine – state sanctioned controls of the use of names 
that evoked a geographic place of origin” [emphasis in original] in the form of protected 
designation of origin laws.24 Wine growers and traders were able to present themselves as 
defenders of a national heritage. Further, it was another means of reconciling “the petite 
patrie of the village and region with the grande patrie [and]...recognised regional wines as 
goods essential to the nation of France, making them part of a uniquely French legacy” 
[emphasis in original] and invented tradition.25
 Today, this legacy and tradition have become more professionalised. Guide books 
for buying wines, wine tourism, festivals celebrating regional wines and the magic word 
terroir are examples of a flourishing, profit-making heritage. Many have tried to capture 
the meaning of terroir including an article in the New York Times Sunday Review:
 The importance of terroir to the French psyche and self-image is difficult to   
 overestimate, because it is a concept almost untranslatable, combining soil,   
 weather, region and notions of authenticity, of genuineness and particularity — of  
 roots, and home — in contrast to globalized products designed to taste the same  
 everywhere...terroir is...about honesty and community.26
20 Marion Demossier, “Culinary Heritage and Produits de Terroir in France: Food for Thought,” in Recollections of France: 
Memories, Identities and Heritage in Contemporary France, ed. Sarah Blowen, Marion Demossier, and Jeanine Picard, 
Contemporary France 4 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), 143.
21 Wendy L.H. Leynse, “Journeys through ‘Ingestible Topography’: Socializing the ‘Situated Eater’ in France,” in Food, Drink 
and Identity in Europe, ed. Thomas M. Wilson, European Studies, (Amsterdam etc.: Rodopi, 2006), 143.
22 Kolleen M. Guy, “Silence and Savoir-Faire in the Marketing of Products of the Terroir,” Modern & Contemporary France 19, 
no. 4 (November 2011): 465.
23 Kolleen M. Guy, “Wine, Champagne and the Making of French Identity in the Belle Epoque,” in Food, Drink and Identity : 
Cooking, Eating and Drinking in Europe since the Middle Ages, ed. Peter Scholliers (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2001), 166.
24 Ibid., 164.
25 Ibid., 165.
26 Steven Erlanger, “Vive le Terroir,” The New York Times Sunday Review, August 31, 2013, accessed May 09, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/sunday-review/vive-le-terroir.html.
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In urbanised France (77.5% of the total population live in cities) consuming a produit du terroir, a 
terroir product whether it is a wine or some other produce carries an additional, immaterial value.27 
It is a search for the seemingly timeless, authentic and local believed to be found in terroir, a 
“nostalgic quest for collective landmarks in an increasingly fragmented France”.28 How is a new 
climate perceived in this context?
The media reports
As mentioned at the outset I chose three different sets of texts for the analysis. The reason for 
building such a diverse dataset was to capture the discourse on Chinese investors and investment 
in the Bordeaux region from the standpoints of different social actors. The aim was not (and could 
not be) to represent the discourse in its entire scope, but to analyse and reveal certain tendencies 
by including public, popular, economic and wine amateur voices.
 I considered episode four of the comical-educational series DR CAC broadcasted in 2011 a 
public voice. The show centres on the question ‘why the Chinese cause soaring wine prices’ and 
was produced in reaction to a wine auction in Hong Kong in May 2011 where a very rare and 
prestigious bottle of Château Latour 1863 wine sold for 48 730 Euros to a Chinese bidder.29 DR 
CAC is produced and broadcasted by the TV channel France 5 which is part of the public television 
network France Télévision. Each show explains a specific economic issue in a highly comical yet still 
educational manner, so that the French Ministry of the Economy and Finances recognises Dr CAC 
as a pedagogical series, thereby granting it a certain status of trustworthiness and authority.30 A 
major comical element is the deliberate misuse of imagery, détournement d’images, which 
matches comedians’ voices with image material taken from films of the 1960s to 1980s. I 
transcribed the video to transform the spoken word into a written text and facilitate comparison 
with the other sources.
 I captured popular perceptions of the Chinese wine investment phenomenon in form of 
online comments collected on the newspaper websites of the national daily newspapers Le Figaro 
and Le Monde and the regional daily newspaper Sud-Ouest. On 28/29 November 2012 each of 
these newspapers reported that the prestigious château Bellefont-Belcier had been purchased by 
a Chinese investor which sparked vivid reactions among Internet users. After a preliminary reading 
to remove unrelated messages I retained 51 comments (20 Le Figaro, 6 Le Monde, 25 Sud-Ouest) 
from an original total of 74. To see whether or not similar reaction patterns emerged I selected 
differently positioned newspapers in scope (two quality nationals and one regional) and political 
orientation, with Le Monde representing the left and Le Figaro the centre-right political spectrum.
 Finally, I found a wine amateur and an economic perspective reviewing the recent history of 
Chinese investment in the Bordeaux wine region in an article from the wine magazine La Revue du 
vin de France (N° 575, October 2013) and in the weekly economic newspaper Challenges (N°382, 
27 March – 2 April 2014). La Revue du vin de France launched in 1927 is the oldest European 
popular magazine dedicated exclusively to wine with a circulation of 50 000 copies.31 In 2011 La 
Revue du vin de France Chine was developed for sale in China. Challenges, claiming a neutral 
27 Figures from 2007, François Clanché and Odile Rascol, “Le Découpage en Unités Urbaines de 2010,” INSEE, August 2011, 
accessed May 13, 2014, http://www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/ipweb/ip1364/ip1364.pdf.
28 Demossier, “Culinary Heritage and Produits de Terroir in France: Food for Thought,” 150.
29 Thierry Philippon, “Bordeaux: Les Profits Fous des Premiers Crus,” Le Nouvel Observateur, June 8, 2011, accessed May 18, 
2014, http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/economie/20110608.OBS4718/bordeaux-les-profits- fous-des-premiers-crus.html.
30 “Dr CAC, C’est Assez Clair, la Série Pédagogique sur l’Économie,” Le Portail des Ministères Économiques et Financiers, 
accessed May 18, 2014, http://www.economie.gouv.fr/facileco/dr-cac-serie-pedagogique-sur- leconomie.
31 Groupe Marie Claire, “La Revue du Vin de France,” accessed May 19, 2014, 
http://www.marieclairegroup.com/pageEN_International_Countries_France_La+Revue+du+vin+de+France.html
32 “Challenges – Chiffres,” OJD, accessed May 17, 2014, http://www.ojd.com/Support/challenges.
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Findings
At the analysis level it was complex to deal with this diverse dataset. I approached the 
three sets in a similar way with a focus on content and language as mentioned at the outset 
of this paper. However, the analysis had to be adapted to each text. A linguistic analysis 
revealed less fruitful than first imagined. In particular in the case of the DR CAC show which 
featured a dialogue composed of short sequences and even more so in the case of the 
online comments which likewise featured mainly short statements. Therefore, a content 
analysis, with attention to linguistic devices where appropriate was best suited, focusing 
on the construction of an in- group-out-group relationship.
 The in-group-out-group approach lends itself to treating these texts as primarily 
concerned with an identity issue linked to a particular European environment. Research in 
social psychology has shown that group members desire a positive difference between 
how they perceive themselves, the in-group, compared to the other group, the out-group. 
This can lead to a bias in the form of in-group favouritism and out-group derogation.33 
Moreover, contingent on the particular context and the in-groups’ needs, its members 
tend to perceive the out-group as less distinct individuals. This has been termed the 
out-group homogeneity effect.34 In a first step I examined each set of text individually to 
see whether expressions of these group behaviours could be found. Comparing the three 
sets I then found three main, often intertwined discursive practices which exemplify 
instances of out-group homogeneity, in-group favouritism and out-group derogation. 
These discursive practices are collectivisation, depicting the self as superior and the self at 
risk, each described in some more detail in the following sub-sections.
Collectivising the ‘other’
Collectivisation resulted in a more homogeneous and less differentiated image of the 
Chinese investors, a means of constructing out-group homogeneity. A major finding of the 
analysis is that what actually only concerns a small, privileged fraction of the Chinese 
society, the investors, is detached from these protagonists to become a Chinese 
phenomenon per se. For example DR CAC inquires “why the Chinese cause soaring wine 
prices” [emphasis added].35 And La Revue du vin de France (from now RVF) announces a 
revelation on “the Chinese in Bordeaux: the Clash of Cultures” [emphasis added].36 The 
effect is that the focus shifts from the activity investment to the level of nationality.
 Moreover, producing a collectivised image of the Chinese ‘other’ came at the cost 
of constructing a negatively distorted image of the Chinese society where “the Chinese 
squander money, that is why the good wine is getting more and more expensive” 
[emphasis added].37 Expressions like these also ignore the fact that although wine is 
becoming more and more popular in China it is a phenomenon of the moneyed consumer 
class. At a more subtle linguistic level definite and indefinite articles were used as a means 
33 Dickerson, Social Psychology, 337.
34 Ibid., 244.
35 DR CAC Pourquoi les Chinois font flamber le Vin, 2013, accessed April 18, 2014, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1H8ap9QH7dc&feature=youtube_gdata_player.
36 Jérôme Baudouin, “Les Chinois à Bordeaux: Le Choc des Cultures,” LA REVUE DU VIN DE FRANCE, no. 575 (October 2013): 
30.
37 (“Les chinois dépensent sans compter, c’est pour ça que le bon vin coûte de plus en plus cher”), DR CAC Pourquoi les 
Chinois font flamber le Vin.
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to accentuate individuality on the French side and to reduce it on the other as in “the French 
workers cannot be handled like Chinese workers” [emphasis added].38
 Collectivisation was also a means to express popular, oriental stereotypes and prejudice. 
The Chinese investment in the Bordeaux wine region was depicted as “a yellow wave causing 
quite a stir in the wine-growing region” [emphasis added].39 Descriptions of the Chinese ranged 
from depicting them as part of “all this exotic fauna” among which Indians were also counted, to 
making ‘the Chinese’ part of a bigger collective, that of ‘the foreigners’ in general.40
 But collectivising the ‘other’ was not only used in derogatory representations. One Internet 
user on the Sud-Ouest website defended the Chinese investors beginning his reasoning with “the 
Chinese are investors”.41 Even if this was a generalisation, the online user questioned the practice 
of singling out Chinese investors but never Dutch, English or any other foreign château owners. 
However, these cases of overtly defending Chinese investment and investors remained extremely 
rare and stand against a predominantly negative picture across the sets of texts. Among the online 
comments only 3 out of 51, one on each of the three newspaper websites hosting the comments, 
were found to do so. This and the reaction patterns in general showed that the newspaper’s 
political position had no influence on whether Internet users reacted more positively or negatively 
to the Chinese investment phenomenon. In line with its economic profile only Challenges largely 
refrained from negative depictions centring on the financial and economic benefits for Bordeaux.
The self as superior
As a second important finding, often in close relation with strategies of collectivising the ‘other’, I 
found the sources to depict the in-group as superior. At the same time the out-group was 
downgraded, exemplifying instances of in-group favouritism and out-group derogation. French 
wine culture almost exclusively related to the discursive practice of ‘self-superiority’. So did the 
in-group’s landscape, the beauty of the wine-growing region having “seduced” and “conquered” 
Chinese investors now “dreaming to possess a Gironde vintage”.42 The claimed superiority in 
scenery and wine culture was used to explain the investment phenomenon.
 With regard to wine, the out-group was commonly constructed as lacking know-how and 
culture, and being somewhat inferior. The alleged lack of knowledge about wine in China and 
among the Chinese château owners was interpreted in different ways. One the one hand, as 
financially rewarding for France able to profit from the lack of knowledge “because even a second 
class Bordeaux wine becomes a top of the range nectar over there”; note the use of the distance 
and difference accentuating utterance ‘over there’.43 A bottle which would have barely sold for 3 
euros in France could range from 15 to 100 euros in China. On the other hand, the alleged lack of 
knowledge about wine among Chinese château owners who would come to Bordeaux with the 
expectation that making a wine was “as easy as manufacturing a pair of shoes” was considered 
inacceptable.44 Whereas France was associated with the art of wine- making China’s economic skills 
38 (“Les ouvriers français ne se gèrent pas comme des ouvriers chinois”), Jérôme Baudouin, “Les Chinois à Bordeaux: Le Choc 
des Cultures,” 37.
39 (“une vague jaune qui provoque quelques remous dans le vignoble”), ibid., 31.
40 User Feen (“toute cette faune exotique”), “Le Grand Cru Château Bellefont-Belcier vendu à un Investisseur Chinois,” 
accessed May 22, 2014, http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2012/11/29/confirmation-de-la- 
vente-du-chateau-bellefont-belcier-a-un-investisseur-chinois_1797366_3234.html.
41 User jiefsourd (“les chinois sont des investisseurs”), “Vin: Un Grand Cru Classé de Saint-Emilion racheté par un Chinois,” 
accessed May 22, 2014, http://www.sudouest.fr/2012/11/28/vin-un-grand-cru-classe-de-saint- 
emilion-rachete-par-un-chinois-892873-713.php#article-comments.
42 Jean-François Arnaud, “Le Bordelais en est requinqué,” Challenges, March 27, 2014, 42; (“ces acteurs économiques chinois 
qui rêvent de posséder un cru girondin”), Jérôme Baudouin, “Les Chinois à Bordeaux: Le Choc des Cultures,” 32.
43 (“...car même un bordeaux de seconde catégorie devient là-bas un nectar haut de gamme.”), Jean-François Arnaud, “Le 
Bordelais en est requinqué,” 43.
44 (“Des nouveaux propriétaires chinois ont du mal à admettre que produire du vin n’est pas aussi simple que de produire des 
chaussures”), Jérôme Baudouin, “Les Chinois à Bordeaux: Le Choc des Cultures,” 37.
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were depicted as limited to lower quality, easy to make off- the-shelf products.
 A less negative, even sympathetic and benign thread, however affirming the self as 
superior, described the Chinese as “young consumers”.45  When comparing the French and 
Chinese wine drinking volume per year per inhabitant DR CAC graphically translated the 
superior self and inferior other into the field of physical strength (see figure 1) constructing 
France as strong and mature in contrast to a still rather inexperienced and weak China.
Figure 1: French and Chinese wine drinking volume (screenshot DR CAC)46
 Finally, another recurrent element to affirm the in-group’s superiority was to denigrate 
Chinese eating and drinking habits. Combing what and how ‘they’ eat and drink with the 
‘noble’ product wine was considered a waste and misuse. As one online user put it, “all those 
who know China know that they drink in one go... so, it’s a waste” to give good French wine 
to them.47 Across much of the dataset Chinese wine consumers and also the new château 
owners were, at least to a certain extent, depicted as violating the wine practice either by not 
drinking it the right way or by not drinking it at all and using it as an investment, an object of 
speculation (with the exception of a few French voices conceding that wine can also be an 
investment).48 The judgement violation was based on the norms of the in-group convinced 
that – much in line with the self as superior pattern – their way of doing was the only valid way. 
Noting that things were not done the right way contributed to a fear that the self might be at 
risk.
The self at risk
The analysis revealed that the Chinese investors and the Chinese were frequently constructed 
as a risk to the in-group. For some the wine itself appeared at risk. Moreover, many identified 
the Chinese investors as a threat to French national heritage and identity. Others linked the 
debate to China’s economic power and to globalisation as dangerous per se.
 In terms of wine the self was considered at risk because of suspected dishonest wine 
uses in China. This meant abusing the AOC Bordeaux by branding something as a Bordeaux 
wine which did not or only partially include Bordeaux. Besides constituting an issue of 
45 (“des jeunes consommateurs”), DR CAC Pourquoi les Chinois font flamber le Vin.
46 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1H8ap9QH7dc&feature=youtube_gdata_player, accessed April 18, 2014.
47 User ZORBECK (“tous ceux qui connaissent la Chine savent qu'ils boivent "cul sec"...donc c'est du gâchis”), “Un Chinois 
s’offre un Grand Cru Classé de Saint-Émilion,” accessed May 22, 2014, 
http://www.lefigaro.fr/societes/2012/11/29/20005-20121129ARTFIG00502-un-chinois-s-offre-un-vignoble- 
classe-bordelais.php?pagination=1#nbcomments.
48 For instance in DR CAC Pourquoi les Chinois font flamber le Vin.
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illegality it was seen as a morally charged fraud “gnawing at the Bordeaux wine-makers” and 
directed at the French people.49 Further, the quality of wine was seen at risk because it was 
suspected that the Chinese owners would change the wine to their taste, implying the idea of a 
shared in-group taste.50 The outcry mainly centred on the Chinese dabbler at risk of ruining a 
quasi-sacred drink.
 Whenever the discourse centred on heritage the risk became an overt threat. Selling 
châteaux to Chinese investors, to the out-group, was frequently interpreted as selling and losing 
national heritage and identity for once and for all: “when we lose them, we lose them”.51 Note that 
in this case the use of the pronoun ‘we’ not only functioned to rally compatriots but also alluded to 
the idea of a common ownership of the wine region. In this regard Chinese ownership was 
constructed as a threat to the self because of the general Chinese economic force, the pace and 
the reach of the acquisitions in the Bordeaux wine region: “in 4 years the Chinese have bought 
more properties than the Belgians in four centuries!”.52 RVF also included a map of the Bordeaux 
wine region indicating all the Chinese acquisitions it knew off with the effect that the entire region 
appeared to be covered. Even the economic voice Challenges participated in the image of the 
frenetically buying Chinese investors before ending on the positive note that this would only 
increase French wine exports to China.
 With the exception of the view centring on the economic opportunities for France the 
châteaux sales were frequently perceived as yet another step in the “wholesale of France” and the 
Chinese as part of the evil forces of globalisation to which France had fallen prey.53 “When will we 
stop being gulled by globalisation?”.54 Besides the Chinese, the Qatari, Arabs and Indians as 
buyers of real estate and companies in France were referred to as the globalisation winners. Wine 
and wine-growing regions were considered a cultural-national-identity asset that should be 
exempted from investment strategies, especially if these were headed by foreigners.55 The dataset 
revealed a widespread popular fear that soon no national patrimony would remain and France 
would slowly disappear from the world map: “Versailles, Chambord and finally the Eiffel Tower”.56 
In other words “everything is falling apart!”.57 In some cases the analysed texts drew parallels 
between the present situation of France and colonialism. Now France, this time in the role of the 
colonised, was to suffer as China and others had during the height of European imperialism.
Discussion and conclusion
This paper aimed to discover how the recent Chinese investment in the Bordeaux wine region was 
perceived and reported on in France in a small selection of different media formats (television, 
49 Jean-François Arnaud, “Le Bordelais en est requinqué,” 43; (“Autre interrogation qui taraude les vignerons bordelais...”), 
Jérôme Baudouin, “Les Chinois à Bordeaux: Le Choc des Cultures,” 38.
50 Users PF and Daniel, “Vin: Un Grand Cru Classé de Saint-Emilion racheté par un Chinois.”
51 User TH (“quand nous les perdons, nous les perdons”), “Le Grand Cru Château Bellefont-Belcier vendu à un Investisseur 
Chinois.”
52 (“Il faut dire qu’en quatre ans, les Chinois ont racheté plus de propriétés que les Belges depuis quatre
siècles !”), Jérôme Baudouin, “Les Chinois à Bordeaux: Le Choc des Cultures,” 35.
53 For instance user Los Craignos (“Finisson [sic] en, crevons l'abcés [sic]: mettons la France en vente sur le bon coin, qu'on en 
finisse.”), “Vin: Un Grand Cru Classé de Saint-Emilion racheté par un Chinois.”
54 User Feen (“quand donc cesserons nous d'être les pigeons de la mondialisation?”),“Le Grand Cru Château Bellefont-Belcier 
vendu à un Investisseur Chinois.”
55 For instance DR CAC Pourquoi les Chinois font flamber le Vin.
56 User Sicnarf45 (“Si on continue comme cela bientôt on vendra Versailles, Chambord et, finalement, la tour Eiffel!”), “Un 
Chinois s’offre un Grand Cru Classé de Saint-Émilion.”
57 User oxymore333 (“tout fout le camp!”), “Vin: Un Grand Cru Classé de Saint-Emilion racheté par un Chinois”; user 
Jean-Claude Meyer, “Le Grand Cru Château Bellefont-Belcier vendu à un Investisseur Chinois”; DR CAC Pourquoi les Chinois 
font flamber le Vin.
28
newspaper and magazine articles and online user comments) all understood as texts. As it 
discussed the cultural-symbolic and national value of wine and wine-growing regions in 
France and their economic importance, it became evident that change and transformation 
in the sphere of wine is something which will not go unnoticed in France. What is 
particularly interesting is that in contrast to other foreign investors in the Bordeaux wine 
region, the Chinese investment, which began quite suddenly less than a decade ago, is 
regarded as a significant change receiving substantial media attention. The discussion is 
often linked not only to transformations in the global wine industry but also in the global 
economy.
 The analysis of the three sets of texts has shown that in this climate of change an 
in-group- out-group relationship is constructed, with the French constituting the in- and 
the Chinese the out-group. Categorisation of this sort is a natural, human process. David 
Berreby, author of Us and Them – Understanding Your Tribal Mind, describes it as an 
“ever-changing mental dance [that] produces the permanent feeling human kinds we call 
tribes, races, religions, and nations”.58 This means that the simple in-group out-group 
distinction between French and Chinese is not that surprising. What is however revealing 
is the explicitness by which this was done across the dataset and the kind of connotations 
used. Collectivising the ‘other’ shifted attention away from the investors, the real actors, 
onto the largely uninvolved Chinese people. Moreover, there was a strong tendency of 
affirming the in-group’s superiority combined with unjustified generalisations, (some 
sympathetic) denigration, stereotyping and even xenophobic remarks about the Chinese 
seen as part of all these foreigners. Those who decided to criticise the turn the debate had 
taken were questioned about their true adherence to the in-group, to the French nation. 
Therefore, from within the analysed dataset it can be said that the reporting on and the 
perceptions of Chinese investment in the Bordeaux wine region emanating from different 
social ‘standpoints’ were multifaceted but rarely positive.
 Anthony Smith has argued that shared ancestry myths, common historical 
memories, unique cultural markers, and a sense of difference are vital elements which 
need to be preserved in the modern nation, “indeed cultivated, if the nation is not to 
become invisible”.59 The analysed material largely revealed a fear of becoming invisible, of 
losing an important cultural reference point due to a new climate perceived as changing 
the old world. The Chinese investment was repeatedly interpreted as one step in the 
process of losing a cultural marker, of losing terroir, national patrimony and ultimately the 
French nation.
 Is French national identity then, as the paper of this title asked, at risk? This 
question, at least partially nurtured throughout the dataset, is an expression of what 
Yudhishtir Raj Isar, Professor of Cultural Policy Studies, calls “a new avatar of the narrative 
of decline”.60 In contrast to the initial self-centred or Europe-focused use of the ‘decline’ 
narrative after the First World War, the trope is now linked “to anxieties about external 
58 David Berreby, Us and Them: Understanding Your Tribal Mind (London: Hutchinson, 2006), 212.
59 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London etc.: Penguin, 1991), 70.
60 Yudhishtir Raj Isar, “Further Thoughts on the ‘Dwarfing’ Narrative,” in The Dwarfing of Europe? A Dialogue between Brazil, 
India, China and Europe, ed. Marjolein Cremer, Susanne Mors and Odile Chenal (Amsterdam: European Cultural Foundation, 
2014), 83.
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threats from nations or groups of nations that represent Europe’s new ‘Others’.”61 Irrespective of 
which parts of this narrative are true or not, the trope of the dwarfing of the old world holds Europe 
and not just France firmly in its grip. After all would similar reactions not be imaginable if German 
breweries or Dutch Gouda cheese saw investment from those perceived as Europe’s new Other? It 
seems that a widespread feeling of uncertainty paired with the (believed or potential) loss of fixed 
parameters in an increasingly interconnected and faster moving world characterises European 
society in this twenty-first century.
 That the reshuffling of world economic power relations (which is quite distinct from the 
power of attraction) causes debate is not problematic in itself. On the contrary, it is needed. Yet, as 
the example of this paper has shown, what is not unproblematic is if within such a debate negative 
sentiment is created and directed at an entire group of people. Further, it is anything but harmless 
if such a debate focuses on the existence of a single national or continental culture, thereby 
effacing “pluralities that are internal to a country or continent.”62 This calls for informed, thoughtful 
and responsible news coverage with the mandate to take people’s feeling of uncertainty and 
uneasiness seriously while firmly renouncing any populist reasoning.
 To conclude, using the example of the Bordeaux wine region this paper examined how a 
particular natural environment was constructed as national and filled with cultural-symbolic 
meaning. It highlighted how in the current real and symbolic conflicts about national identities in 
the age of globalisation the natural environment and its produce can turn into a contested site. In 
particular during times perceived as lacking orientation and as witnessing a geopolitical climate 
change the generally positive features of creating meaning and building identities can also be 
used towards less begin ends; to foster exclusion and racist attitude.
61 Ibid., 84.
62 Ranabir Samaddar, „Anxieties and Dialogues of Continents,“ in The Dwarfing of Europe? A Dialogue between Brazil, India, 
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Messing About In Boats: Factors of Success
in the Grassroots Restoration of the British Waterways
Catherine Burkinshaw
Introduction
The inland waterways of the UK, their role as heritage sites and designation as cultural 
landscapes, seems at first an abstruse way of discussing climate change issues. However, 
these routes which criss-cross the landscape have become increasingly valued as places 
of cultural importance, nature reserves, vital habitats for diverse species and, importantly, 
a potential tool for mitigating and adapting to climate change.
 Climate change is a multi-faceted issue, and tackling it will require action in many 
different fields. This could include increasing biodiversity by improving habitats and 
providing “green corridors”.1 Dredging the canals as part of regular maintenance 
removes waste that is recycled and provides sand for building materials, negating some 
unnecessary carbon emissions.2 Studies are now focusing on the opportunities in 
low-emission freight and renewable energy. It is also necessary to deal with the effects of 
climate change such as increased risk of adverse weather. Such canals’ capacity for flood 
relief and drainage is well established.3
 Having been built to transport goods around the country and to ports, they 
enabled the boom of economic prosperity that came from the industrial revolution. Once 
railways and roads became the dominant form of transport, they dwindled into obscurity 
and even attracted a post-industrial stigma. Between 1900 and 1950 they suffered loss of 
funding and closure by the governing body to the point of extinction. A few romanticised 
memories lingered in literature, for example Kenneth Grahame’s Wind in the Willows, 
1908. The environmental improvements rely on the system being in working order. 
Currently only a tiny portion of the once vast network is in a good condition. Most of it 
could be restored, but this would require significant work and funding. Locally-driven 
campaigns focus on preserving what is left, and restoring what can be saved.
 Moreover, restored canals generate huge benefits for users and nearby residents. 
Economic assessments point to improved leisure facilities and health gains for users; 
social cohesion; benefits from volunteering; increased property values nearby; and 
increased revenue from trade and footfall for all types of businesses and consequently 
increased employment.4 Just within England and Wales, the area of this study, around 
1 “Trustees Reports and Accounts,” 13, canalrivertrust.org.uk/media/library/3684.pdf (accessed 13 May, 2014).
2 Ibid.
3 “Climate Change,” aina.org.uk/climate-change.aspx (accessed 10 May, 2014) and “Data and Case Studies,” 
aina.org.uk/data-and-case-studies.aspx (accessed 8 May, 2014).
4 Estimates count the returns as £6 or £7 for every £1 spent. See “Trustees Reports and Accounts”.
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70% of the population live within 10 km of a waterway.5 
The number of people therefore who would 
immediately benefit from improvements is 
considerable.
 Some efforts have already been made to restore 
parts of the network, and these stand as examples of 
the environmental, economic and social benefits. The 
whole system was until 2012 under the remit of the 
British Waterways, a government agency, which 
progressively closed down sections following loss of 
economic revenue. The campaigns to prevent closure 
originated in small, locally-focused groups wishing to 
save their own stretch of waterway. These groups are 
still the main driving force and thus the focus of this paper. I analyse their motivations, 
arguments and strategies. A common feature appears to be an ideological 
commitment to the waterways.
 This potential would have been permanently lost and the waterways largely 
obliterated were it not for this ideological campaign demanding their preservation or 
restoration. This ideology prized the waterways as valuable sites of historical 
importance, and its disciples saw the potential gains that could be enjoyed if the 
waterways were saved. This pre-dated widespread campaigns on climate change, but 
the contemporary movement is more well- informed about the environmental 
importance of these linear parks. The IWA has sought expert opinion and published 
reports detailing the waterways’ actual and potential climate change mitigation. These 
range from reduced greenhouse gas emission from more energy-efficient freight 
transport, renewable energy technology built into restored channels, improved water 
control for agricultural and domestic use, and preservation of threatened ecology.6
 Thus the campaign to restore the waterways is under pressure from many 
different interest groups with aims sometimes at variance with one another. Far from 
resulting in disagreement, this variety of interest has united a wide spectrum of society 
in favour of retaining and investing in waterways. Thus commercial interests both on 
and off the water see the possibilities of greener transport. Environmental groups see 
the chance to rebuild and build new habitats for local and/or endangered species. Not 
least, increasing numbers of visitors make use of the waterways where there are 
renewed leisure and tourism prospects.
 These local campaigns have succeeded in drawing attention to the issue and 
swaying official opinion in their favour. The waterways are now publicised by 
government as well as independent bodies as sites of immense historical interest. Over 
recent decades, the waterways have been officially recognised as home to around 
5 “Waterway corridor demographic data,” aina.org.uk/docs/Waterway%20corridor%20demographic%20data.pdf (accessed 9 
May, 2014).
6 Inland Waterways Advisory Council, “Climate Change and the inland waterways IWA report 2009”, 
www.waterways.org.uk/pdf/iwac/climate_change_and_the_inland_waterways (accessed 13 April, 2014).
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2,700 listed structures, 63 sites of Special Scientific Interest, 50 Scheduled Ancient Monuments 
and 5 UNESCO World Heritage Sites.7 Now the waterways are officially considered a valuable 
resource of linear parks and a fine example of the UK’s industrial heritage, they raise issues of 
interest for several scholarly fields, concerning protected nature reserves, transformed 
landscapes, contested heritage sites, and focal points of group identities. The disciplines 
associated with these different concepts range across the sciences and humanities.8 There is 
now a movement in academic circles to combine or closely collaborate across disciplines. 
Denis Cosgrove, a cultural geographer, appeals for interdisciplinary work to promote an 
EU-level of landscape protection and planning policies which surpass nationalist ideologies. 
He is a prominent supporter of the idea that the humanities can provide acumen for 
environmental and planning practices.9
 Helen Alumäe and other geographers have observed “landscape ecologists” begin to 
consider the “importance of cultural heritage and its role in the landscape planning process 
and landscape management.”10 Decisions become entangled with questions of authenticity, 
choice and function. When we choose to restore any given cultural landscape to a previous 
authentic state, who determines what authenticity is? Since the waterways will never resume 
their industrial dominance, what is their purpose?
 The historic volte-face indicates the importance of these waterways, and this paper will 
examine some of the reasons that they are of interest. Considering both the development of 
cultural landscape and place-bound identities will illustrate some of the factors which caused 
the local campaign groups to emerge. I analyse two such groups to discover their aims, 
motivations, how successfully they created working partnerships with key actors 
(interconnectedness) and compared their relative progress. Given then the manifold gains to 
be enjoyed from a fully restored waterway system, this paper highlights important aspects of 
the ongoing restoration project.
 This paper is in two parts: the first reconstructs the evolution of the case for waterway 
restoration using critical literature review. The second uses questionnaires, semi-structured 
interviews and content analysis to study local restoration groups’ interconnectedness and 
diversity of aims. This qualitative data shows the way for valuable and more in-depth analysis. 
I will show in the first section some of the factors at play in the restoration campaigns and the 
wider scene. The grassroots restoration movement did not appear in a vacuum, but arose from 
particular circumstances. Moreover, I discuss how it partly influenced wider trends occurring at 
academic, professional and government levels. It is intertwined with the evolution of the 
concept of cultural landscapes, conservation, and group identities. All of these factors 
combined to change official views and practices of heritage management, relations between 
citizens and governmental bodies, and scholarly discourse on what functions the physical 
world is imbued with. I place the groups and their activities in this wider setting, to illustrate 
how and why the factor of interconnectedness is so crucial for these groups.
7 “Our Work,” canalrivertrust.org.uk/about-us/our-work (accessed 21 November, 2015).
8 Gisli Palsson et al., “Reconceptualizing the ‘Anthropos’ in the Anthropocene,” Environmental Science and Policy, 28 (2013), 
passim.
9 Palsson et al., “Reconceptualizing the ‘Anthropos’,” passim.
10 Alumäe et al, “Cultural and historical values in landscape planning,” in Landscape interfaces, eds. Hannes Palang and Gary 
Fry (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), 125.
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When reflecting on the nature of these grassroots groups I perceived them to be harnessing 
popular opinion and crystallising around it. In the face of such diverse tasks (seeking political 
and public support, raising funds, project-managing the physical rebuilding of waterways, 
collaborating with experts in different fields), the groups seem to depend on maintaining a 
complex and well-developed sphere of influence. Allied to this is the diversity of aims 
espoused by the groups. Having a wide variety of benefits to lay claim to broadens the appeal 
of the project.
 My units of analysis and units of observation are the local activist groups. The variables 
are success; interconnectedness and diversity of aims. To measure success, I focus on the total 
number of locks and length of the canal, the unnavigable locks and length and the amount 
restored. This barely accommodates the complexities of the work or additional tasks e.g. 
raising road bridges. Different sections of the waterway required different amounts of work to 
restore them, from dredging and repairs to a full rebuild.11 A more accurate way of measuring 
the progress might be to calculate the number of man-hours necessary for full completion, but 
estimates are unavailable and technically challenging. For the same reason, I do not count how 
long the restoration projects have taken.
 My sample included presently active restoration projects as having the most current 
data. Of ten groups contacted, two consented to be interviewed. I gauged the groups’ 
interconnectedness and diversity of aims by content analysis and coding the data by these 
variables. Of the available material, I focused on their websites, as this feature is common to 
both groups. I also conducted semi-structured interviews by e-mail with at least two active 
volunteers of each group and sent out questionnaires, asking specifically about their 
connections, aims and motivations.
 I turn now to an outline of the history of the waterway system of England and Wales. 
Following this I will consider the historical and conceptual development of the restoration 
movement in the UK.
Section One: The Waterways of England and Wales
The concept of cultural landscape has been developing during the last five decades. As part 
of this development, it is being linked to heritage and to identity constructs. This time span 
matches almost exactly the growing interest in the question of waterway restoration. It is 
perhaps no coincidence that as public opinion has grown to favour the retention of these linear 
sites, there have been matching developments in the academic world which valorise industrial 
heritage.12
 Until locally-spearheaded groups of campaigners began to attempt to save and later to 
restore waterways, they were entirely dependent on their industrial function for funding and 
maintenance. Even as railways surpassed waterways as the preferred means of industrial 
transport, it opened the way for the canals to be repurposed for leisure and tourism, dating 
back to the early nineteen-hundreds. This in turn created new benefits, including economic 
and environmental.
11 See figures 3.1-3.7.
12 Niamh Moore, “Valorizing Urban Heritage?,” in Heritage, memory and the politics of identity, eds. Niamh Moore and Yvonne 
Whelan (Burlington: Ashgate, 2008). See figure 1.
38
Grassroots campaigns to save and repurpose the network began in earnest after World War II. 
Since then, over 500 miles of waterways have been reopened, and a further 500 miles are 
currently under restoration.13 However, there remains over 2,500 miles of derelict waterways in 
the UK by various estimates.14 Where the network once stretched to over 5,000 miles, there are 
around 3,700 miles of “actually or potentially navigable waterways in Great Britain”.15 The 
potential to maximise these economic and environmental gains is patently great and 
geographically widespread. The case of waterway restoration should be of interest to an 
eclectic range of stakeholders.
History of the canals
The waterway system of the UK is a network of myriad non-tidal artificial channels and locks. 
Some connect with rivers and the sea, whilst others are closed loops or lines.16 Early examples 
date from Roman or medieval period.17 Commercial enterprises began in the sixteenth century, 
and isolated constructions began to gather speed in the seventeenth century. By the 
mid-eighteenth century around 1200 miles of English rivers could carry barges. Between 1790 
and 1810 was the period of Canal Mania, when canal building reached its peak.18 These efforts 
extended and quickened the transport of goods like coal and limestone for trade.
 By the time the Industrial Revolution swept the country, there was a working network of 
river transport to move goods around the country, and to ports for export. The frenzy of canal 
building calmed in the early nineteenth century when the railways began to overtake canals. 
Initially, wealthy canal companies laid tram and railway lines as cheaper alternatives to link, for 
example, a mine to the canal rather than build feeder channels.19 As the railway system began 
to grow, canals at first benefitted from the additional traffic but rapidly began to suffer.
 Railways had more capacity to carry goods long distances and at greater speeds 
possible than canals. Driven by coal made cheap by the waterways network, railways took on 
ever greater market share. Canals barely managed to retain what traffic they had, and as 
revenues decreased, they inevitably fell below levels required for basic maintenance. By the 
end of the nineteenth century, one by one dilapidated waterways became “a nuisance to the 
towns and villages on [their routes] and this forced public authorities to take steps to end the 
life of the local canal”.20
 The once-powerful canal companies lobbied for government protection from a railway 
monopoly. Steps were taken to nationalise railway-owned waterways, particular at the 
outbreaks of the two world wars. From then they were controlled by the governmental agency, 
British Waterways. It was tasked with dredging and maintain the physical fabric of the 
waterways and drew revenue from traffic. However, military spending and loss of manpower to 
the armed forces further diminished commercial traffic and maintenance capabilities. Despite 
13 “About IWA,” waterways.org.uk/waterways/restoration/campaigns/restored_waterways (accessed 5 May, 2014).
14 “Why restore the waterways?,” waterways.org.uk/wrg/about_us/why_restore_the_canals (accessed 5 May, 2014).
15 “British Waterways,” parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN03184.pdf (accessed 6 May, 2014).
16 See figure 2.
17 Roger Squires, Britain’s Restored Canals, (Ashbourne: Landmark, 2007), 4.
18 Peter Maw et al., “Canals, rivers, and the industrial city: Manchester’s industrial waterfront, 1790-1850,” in Economic History 
Review 65 (2012), 1498.
19 Squires, Britain’s Restored Canals, 7.
20 Ibid., 8.
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this, from the early twentieth century pleasure craft began to take advantage of these largely 
rural routes. This new industry was growing at a time when the government was passing more 
and more parliamentary Abandonment Acts. These were orders of closure for individual 
stretches of waterway, effectively ending British Waterways’ responsibilities to maintain the 
waterways.21 A new group of users were beginning to appreciate this resource and opposed 
the governmental withdrawal of support.
 After the two World Wars, the country needed to rebuild on a massive scale. At this 
point, a select group of enthusiasts spearheaded a national campaign to save and restore the 
not-yet derelict waterways to full use for a mixture of pleasure and commercial use.22 They 
plied their ideas through the media, independent publications and directly to the government, 
garnering some public support. These individuals went on to form the Inland Waterways 
Association (IWA) as a public trust for waterway use and restoration. From the earliest stages 
of their campaign they emphasised the history of the canals as “part of the soul of England.”23 
The rhetoric suggests that they saw a link between the cultural identity of the people and this 
physical aspect of the landscape. This would become and enduring aspect of their campaigns. 
The group sought to establish connections to a variety of organisations, other experts, 
enthusiasts, the public, and the press. Furthermore, a key message was that these sites held 
national importance and had the potential to be repurposed for the benefit of all.
 In the early fifties the IWA remained diffused across the country, concentrating their 
efforts selectively on specific sites where deterioration was most advanced. Only in the late 
fifties could they reasonably claim to have widespread public support. To some extent they 
persuaded officials to reverse the mentality of closing canals, but the government agencies 
continued to remove traffic in favour of road and rail.24 At the time when my study commences, 
the inland waterways were threatened with extinction.
Cultural Landscapes and Aesthetics
The concept of a cultural landscape originated in an intense climate of nationalism, likely by a 
German scholar, Otto Schlüter.25  The concept  has developed historiographically.26 
Landscapes were primarily considered to be inert matter, to be  used and altered by 
humankind which itself was separate and distinct from the natural world. Cosgrove and 
Kenneth Olwig have described how, through language, humans have created distance 
between themselves and their habitats.
 One version of this development traces this movement back to Stuart England and 
Scotland as part of a deliberate attempt by the monarchy to bolster its claim to ownership of 
all English and Scottish lands.27 To do so, it needed to appeal to ‘natural laws’, which are 
21 British Waterways was until 2012 the government body responsible for the upkeep of the publicly owned waterways. It has 
been replaced by the Canal and River Trust, an independent charity.
22 Squires, Britain’s Restored Canals, passim.
23 Ibid., 13.
24 Ibid., 37 and “The 1950s,” waterways.org.uk/waterways/history/history/the_1950s (accessed 12 April, 2014).
25 Michael Jones, “The concept of cultural landscape: discourse and narratives,” in Landscape interfaces, eds. Hannes Palang 
and Gary Fry (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), 21. In the twentieth century many scholars have furthered the concept, including Carl 
Sauer, Denis Cosgrove, David Lowenthal, Marc Antrop, and Joan Nassauer.
26 Tadhg O’Keefe, “Landscape and Memory: Historiography, Theory, Methodology,” in Heritage, memory and the politics of 
identity, eds. Niamh Moore and Yvonne Whelan (Burlington: Ashgate, 2008), 3.
27 Denis Cosgrove, “Landscape: ecology and semiosis,” in Landscape interfaces, eds. Hannes Palang and Gary Fry (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 2003), 18.
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universal and thus transcend ‘customary laws’, which are particular to specific places and 
traditions.28 In Cosgrove’s treatment, the language of this understanding of land “emphasised the 
distanciated, perspectival and commanding gaze of the sovereign”.29 This was part of the growing 
tendency to see landscapes as views or prospects.30
 Cosgrove frames this concept of landscape in socio-economic terms. In the UK and 
Western European societies the concept has been dominated by agricultural and nationalist 
terms, especially during the nineteenth century. This was due to economic dependence on 
agriculture as well as a top-down ideological attempt to “naturalize the nation as a distinct 
territorial unit, home to a culturally, even ethnically distinct ‘people’ or folk.”31 This aesthetic way 
of understanding landscape has lingered to the present day.
 Much work has been dedicated to the relationship between collective memory and its 
manifestation in the landscape, for example historian Pierre Nora’s contributions on monument. In 
line with the ‘looking’ aspect of landscape, these studies have often privileged the visual aspects. 
These public monuments, the rituals and identity-forming structures which actively project their 
seeming fixed and age-old nature are now accepted to be fluid and flexible. Their content and 
meaning changes according to the needs of the day, subject to “perpetual revision”.32 I argue that 
Britain’s waterways are an example of this constant change. The meaning which we have imbued 
them with has changed dramatically, a change spearheaded by activist groups under the umbrella 
of the IWA. It is this meaning which underpins the ideology in favour of restoration.
Heritage and Cultural Landscapes
In what might be called the post-modern era, the methods of identity construction have come 
under intense scrutiny. Scholars agree that nationalism, as a product of modernity, fostered a 
period of powerful identity constructs. However, nationalism has lost many adherents since the 
nineteenth century. Paul Claval describes the current age as experiencing a widespread end of 
“faith in the capacity of technical progress to provide happiness and thus, the whole ideological 
basis for modernity”.33 What he calls the resulting ideological crisis has prompted people to find 
“new strategies to preserve memory and create identity”.34 The concept of landscape has 
become intertwined with that of consciousness, and is increasingly coupled with identity.35 This 
interpretation is particularly relevant for the waterways, because it helps explain how such a 
complete change in their perceived value came about.
 We can see this “paradigmatic shift” to combine human cognitive concepts with previously 
separate disciplines across the humanities.36 Tadhg O’Keefe sees this as the key development for 
the concept of cultural landscapes: if they are a product of our minds, then “everyone knows, 
possesses and partakes in ‘landscape’.”37 The process is ultimately democratised. Implementation 
28 For more details on this topic, see Denis Cosgrove, “Cultural Landscapes,” in A European Geography, ed. Tim Unwin 
(Harlow: Longman, 1998).
29 Cosgrove, “Landscape,” 18.
30 Cosgrove, “Cultural Landscapes,” 69.
31 Cosgrove, “Landscape,” 19.
32 Mervyn Busteed, “‘Fostered To Trouble the Next Generation’,” in Heritage, memory and the politics of identity, eds. Niamh 
Moore and Yvonne Whelan (Burlington: Ashgate, 2008), 70.
33 Paul Claval, “Changing Conceptions of Heritage and Landscape,” in Heritage, memory and the politics of identity, eds. 
Niamh Moore and Yvonne Whelan (Burlington: Ashgate, 2008), 87.
34 Ibid.




Implementation of this democratic interpretation at an official level has lagged behind, however. 
More usually, decision-makers were a group of experts determining land use and heritage 
conservation strategies at a far remove from the people affected by the decision, as it were, on 
the ground. But with increased time and money to devote to leisure and tourism, there was 
considerably more pressure being exerted by the public on heritage as a concept to deliver for 
this new audience. This is another reason I see interconnectedness as an essential variable for the 
local groups. With so many more people taking an interest, there were many more points of view 
to potentially accommodate.
 The heritage industry has developed a particular set of criteria “by which landscapes can 
be evaluated as cultural-historical ‘things’”38. These are usually “antiquity, uniqueness, history 
and/or historical association”. The very use of such criteria means heritage activities remain within 
the traditional elitist sphere, creating un-democratic privileges. However, the types of objects or 
places labelled as heritage has become more diverse. Judith Alfrey and Tim Putnam trace the 
widening of heritage concerns to include industrial remains back to a “generation of enthusiasts”, 
and in the case of waterways, enthusiasts were campaigning with increasing vigour from the 
fifties. From the perspective of professional heritage management, this enlarged perspective had 
become generally endorsed by the nineties.
Pre-industrial and Industrial heritage
Acceptance of the widened concept of linear landscapes and heritage has smoothed the way for 
the waterways to be revalued for their “cultural benefits”.39 However, the work to rehabilitate 
industrial remains as heritage has been an uphill struggle. Pre-industrial remains have been 
increasingly cherished, especially if dating from pre-1850, but little heed has been paid to the 
ever-changing structures of the industrial era.40 Indeed, very few industrial traces survive once a 
more updated or efficient system comes into force.41 This is diametrically opposed to the 
principles of pre-industrial heritage management which was often restored to a fixed point in its 
past, or maintained in its “original fabric”.42
 This pre-industrial heritage was usually judged to be “older, more rare, more beautiful, 
more traditional, more natural, more spiritual”.43 Heritage was increasingly accommodated under 
conservation but was usually “set aside as a particular, and usually secondary, use of resources.”44 
Planning deals with conservation and amenities, and has inherited specific aesthetic 
requirements. This aesthetic leads planners to attempt, with the best intentions no doubt, to 
“make good, tidy away and restore” industrial landscapes.45
 Additionally, the most visible industrial sites and remains tend to be in areas economically 
dependent on the former industries. Many communities sprang up directly from the needs of 
these industries. Such places suffered an almost total and persistent loss of revenue and 
livelihoods when these usually heavy industries closed down. There is understandable reluctance 
to attach positive value to an industrial heritage whose demise caused such painful 
transformations in the community.46 Those who sought to revitalise industrial heritage had to 
38 O’Keefe, “Landscape and Memory,” 10.
39 Judith Alfrey and Tim Putnam, The Industrial Heritage, (New York: Routledge, 2003), 2.
40 Ibid., 8.
41 Ibid., 3.
42 Bob McKercher and Hilary du Cros, Cultural Tourism, (Binghamton: Haworth, 2002), 74. Several notable buildings undergoing 
restoration had extensions which were later additions pulled down, for example, Burgh House, Hampstead, London.




struggle against its image as dirty, unnatural, commonplace, ugly, even dangerous.
 Such views were not universal however; many industrial relics like steam engines and 
the railways achieved a small but notable profile in the tourism industry. In the same way, many 
canals supported boating holidays and trips even when most threatened. However, partially 
derelict sites could not be as readily exploited for their environmental benefits. Fishing and 
nature walks relied on safe, passable towpaths. Despite this, waterways remained popular 
locations for such pastimes as shown by the great number of fishing clubs and by anecdotal 
evidence from the restoration groups and waterway authorities.
Local group identities
At the outset of the IWA restoration campaign, there were only a few enthusiasts. As popular 
support grew, not only did the IWA grow in numbers enough to form regional branches, but 
independent grassroots groups coalesced into societies. Whilst the many groups had different 
localised goals, the unifying feature was a commitment to preserve the waterways. At this 
point, the two groups at the centre of my case studies were founded.
 The Chesterfield group was founded in 1976. Nearly 26 miles of the original canal were 
saved through campaigns by the then Retford and Worksop Boat Club, and were officially 
classified as cruiseway by the 1968 Transport Act. The new Chesterfield Canal Trust (CCT) 
formed to campaign for and restore the remaining abandoned twenty miles. The second case 
study is the Shropshire Union Canal Society (SUCS), founded in 1964 as the Shrewsbury and 
Newport Canal Association. They soon decided to change their focus to the whole Shropshire 
Union system and in 1968 began to restore the thirty-five abandoned and derelict miles of 
Montgomery Canal. These groups’ work is the focus of my analysis.
 I site the emergence of these groups and their focus on preservation of a local landmark 
within the process of ideological substitution outlined by Claval.47 Their efforts run ahead of 
and parallel to the evolving definition of cultural landscapes and the role of heritage. The 
restoration projects have appeal for both specialist enthusiasts engaged with the technical 
aspects and the cultural heritage aspects. Technical projects include engineering challenges of 
rebuilding, creating nature preserves and habitats, and exploring clean energy possibilities 
such as solar or water power. On the cultural heritage side is reviving traditional buildings skills, 
crafts particular to waterway history, preserving UNESCO sites, or celebrating local history and 
identity. This diverse array of tasks and possibilities seems to have provided a good basis to 
garner support from interested experts, governmental and charitable bodies, and the general 
public, as without a wider appeal projects struggle to succeed.48 Their campaigning pushed for 
more and greater recognition of their values at every level of society and, I hypothesise, 
influenced the official discourse.
It would take much more detailed research into the group’s collective memory to confirm if 
they intended to undertake an identity project such as Claval posits. But the loyalty of these 
volunteers to their local group as opposed to, for example, the national IWA may be some 
47 Claval, “Changing Conceptions,” 87. Claval specifically identifies preservation of the physical environments of the past.
48 Alfrey and Putnam, Industrial Heritage, 99.
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indication of this. The groups’ behaviour fits the pattern Claval identifies. He sees a 
fundamental link between the “struggle to maintain local identities” and the same people 
attempting to prevent “transformations that would deprive local populations of landscapes 
representative of their historical triumphs”.49 Various scholars have focused on the increasing 
homogeneity from mass production and globalisation as a key factor. “While globalization 
makes landscapes all over the word look the same, there is a tendency towards using 
landscape as a cornerstone of regional and national identities.”50 I see the local activist groups 
behaving in just this way, attaching special significance to one type of landscape and linking it 
to national identity (the “soul of England.”)51
Waterways today
A more inclusive gaze soon encompasses the mundane and the changeable. If cultural 
landscapes are truly democratic, then all scenes, “from the bleakest urban industrial 
wastelands to the most verdant country estates, are socio-ecological, and all landscapes 
qualify as somebody’s heritage.”52 This is particularly apropos for the dilapidated and untidy 
state many unused waterways were in before restoration. Stakeholders in heritage 
management have had to deal with the difficulties in choosing which landscapes should be 
preserved. Bob McKercher and Hilary du Cros point out that it is impossible and misguided to 
try to preserve all landscapes. Neither can they be sealed, because a landscape frozen in a 
particular form “stops being the landscape that it was and becomes a new landscape.”53
 The waterways are a prime example of landscapes changing status from something to 
be erased to something to be cherished. As studies have drawn attention to their multi-faceted 
potential at a time when environmental concerns are mounting, some local groups have 
sought to exploit this potential. CCT and SUCS have had to confront the questions of function 
and authenticity. In both cases, their work has challenged the decisions and desires of 
officialdom to restore the landscape to its pre-industrial state. The groups’ efforts have instead 
rebuilt the industrial landscape, and repurposed it for environmental, leisure and heritage uses.
 Since the changes in the concept of heritage and its current strong links with cultural 
landscapes, official opinion appears to have changed completely in favour of waterway 
restoration. Recorded visits per annum indicate the popularity of the waterways, with a record 
high of 400 million visits in 2014, and volunteering levels also rose by 14%.54 We could judge 
the high level of professional, academic and bureaucratic interest and apparent support of 
restoration as an unequivocal success and vindication for groups like CCT and SUCS.
 But there are persistent and even new difficulties faced by these groups, not least in 
securing funding but now from conflicting new transport link plans in the form of HS2, the 
intended high-speed railway link between London and Manchester. My question is to address 
the variables at play in these groups’ successes to date, and to forecast how such projects may 
best be pursued in the future, given the huge task still remaining. In light of the developments 
and struggles outlined above, I turn now to the case study data and analysis.
49 Claval, “Changing Conceptions,” 90.
50 Hannes Palang and Gary Fry, “Landscape Interfaces: Introduction,” in Landscape interfaces, eds. Hannes Palang and Gary Fry 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), 9.
51 Squires, Britain’s Restored Canals, 13.
52 O’Keefe, “Landscape and Memory,” 10.
53 Ibid.
54 “Trustees Annual Reports and Accounts 2014/15,” canalrivertrust.org.uk/media/library/11269-annual-report- 2015.pdf 
(accessed 21 November, 2015).
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Section Two: Analysis of Interconnection and Diversity of Aims
Of the two groups, CCT exhibited noticeably more indicators of interconnectedness and, to a 
lesser degree, diversity of aims than SUCS. This was also the group that had achieved more 
successes and appeared to have stronger prospects for their future progress. However, the 
task facing that group appears overall smaller and less technically challenging.
 In order to assess the groups’ respective projects as regards, scale, number of locks and 
other structures, as well as state of disrepair, I asked each group to send me their up-to- date 
responses to the IWA’s latest questionnaire.55 This is the audit which the IWA periodically takes 
to assess the situation of the waterways directly from the activist groups. This was for reasons 
of practicality as groups should already have such data to hand in the easily-accessible format. 
On top of this, I conducted semi-structured interviews with interested members of the groups 
via email. I questioned them about their roles in the group, the perceived greatest challenges, 
greatest help, sources of funding, perceived demands on the waterways, and reasons for 
restoring them. As a result, I received various points of view from within the groups, 
highlighting both the problems and support which they perceived to be most critical to their 
success.
 The Chesterfield Canal is 46 miles long, with 65 locks. Of those, 20.5 miles and 49 locks 
were unnavigable in the 1950s. To date, 11.5 miles (56%) and 41 locks (84%) have been 
restored to navigable status. On top of this achievement, the CCT and the Chesterfield Canal 
Partnership has created a new marina at the former Kiveton Colliery.
In comparison, the Montgomery Canal is 35 miles in total with 25 locks, forming part of the 
Shropshire Union System which stretches over 150 miles. The Montgomery Canal was entirely 
abandoned in 1936 and partially infilled. To date, two stretches totalling 18 miles (51%) and 19 
locks (76%) have been restored to navigable status. Despite being the shorter stretch of 
waterway, the fact that it was entirely abandoned seems to have made the challenge of 
restoring it much greater.
 I also conducted a content analysis of the two groups’ websites, and coded the 
information found there into to the following categories:
 o interconnectedness with external organisations, public, press, official people/bodies
  • positive support 
  • funding
  • partnerships
  • negative effect
 o aims of the restoration 
  • environmental
  • heritage
This method relied on the groups’ willingness to record publicly their activities, challenges, and 
involvement with key actors, whether positive or negative. By combining the information on 
55 IWA, “IWA RESTORATION COMMITTEE SURVEY 2009”, www.waterways.org.uk/pdf/restoration/2009_questionnaire 
(accessed 4 April, 2014).
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their public record (their website) and the answers provided to me from questionnaires and 
interviews, I found certain patterns among the two groups.
 CCT’s website and interview content had more frequent positive references to external 
organisations, and the support from or positive alliances formed with them. The comments 
also pointed to much stronger and more co-operative relationships. The CCT successfully 
forged a Partnership which promotes the restoration, among the members were bodies such 
as the Canal and River Trust (CaRT); the former British Waterways; the IWA; English 
Partnerships; the Heritage Lottery Fund; and several other independent bodies which make 
grants or organise regional events. By comparison CCT’s website has remarkably little direct 
comments about the public involvement, and a moderate amount about governmental 
bodies. However, all of the comments were positive. These local groups are almost always 
charities, and thus tend to remain politically neutral, which may well affect the nature of official 
relationships.
 The data from the second group, SUCS, revealed similar types of affiliation and support 
received from external organisations, but the tone was overall less rosy. It implies relations 
which are now positive and effective where once they were strained or negative.56 At variance 
with CCT, it had more significant positive mention of the general public, and more comments 
directed at garnering further public support. It also had some mildly negative comments on 
actions by bureaucracy. This is in spite of also signing a working Partnership with near identical 
organisations to CCT promoting the restoration. I interpret the data to mean that the group 
relied more on public support, whether for direct action or as leverage for further leverage with 
external organisations. However, it also appeared that the group had to put in more effort to 
retain the level of public interest. Interestingly, the group had not experienced a difficulty 
which is still an issue for CCT, namely that the canal had never been sold piecemeal. This 
meant dealing with only one owner, whereas CCT still does not have full access to one section 
which is in private ownership.57
 The two groups exhibited similar signifiers of diverse aims, including references to the 
surrounding natural beauty, the nearby leisure opportunities of boating, fishing, and visitor 
attractions; the commercial connections but little to no mention of freight use. Allowing for the 
more detailed scope of the CCT website in general, both groups appear equally aware of the 
historical and heritage significance of the canals. Both groups maintained their own archives of 
the canals. However, the CCT can demonstrate more activity and promotion of environmental 
concerns in the creation of protected habitats and very many listed cycling and walking routes.
 These results were compared with the content of the interviews to balance possible bias 
or distortions in the website contents. As a result, CCT appeared to have stronger links with the 
general public than the website suggests. There is a strong emphasis on this public support as 
a tool in achieving influence in relationships with bureaucratic and independent organisation. 
The interviews also revealed more of the difficulties that the group is facing with the 
government’s plans for HS2 and its present destructive effect on their future planning 
capabilities.
56 “Montgomery Canal Restoration history,” shropshireunion.org.uk/the-canals/montgomery-restoration-history (accessed 14 
May, 2014).
57 “Restoration in Rotherham,” chesterfield-canal-trust.org.uk/index.php/restoration/history/28-restoration-in- rotherham 
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The SUCS interviews more accurately reflected the content of the website, demonstrating very 
strong emphasis in favour of volunteers from the public and their loyal commitment. 
Interviewees more plainly revealed perceptions of bureaucratic indifference and the logistical 
challenges faced by the working restoration teams, indicating a lack of technical support.
 This initial exercise in content analysis to investigate the hypothesis of factors of success 
has shown that there is a connection which merits further examination. More detailed study 
could show whether the increased diversity of aims follows or precedes strong 
interconnectedness. This would be of particular interest to ongoing and future restoration 
projects and organisations.
Conclusion
The inland waterways of the UK have been the focus of tensions between multiple forces, 
variously treated as obstacles to improved transport links and nuisances, sites of historical 
interest, local importance, and potential economic and environmental wellsprings. Their 
improved status has paralleled the growth of a scholarly discourse on cultural landscape, 
identity and environmental issues. As the concept of cultural landscape has gained currency 
and heritage has gained new importance for identity constructs, the two have become 
interwoven. Alfrey and Putnam directly attribute wider public support to conserve industrial 
heritage to the “efforts of a few crusading publicists”, such as the founders of activist groups.58
 Part of this development has been growing awareness that the conservation gaze needs 
to “adopt a communitywide or regional perspective”.59 This “more holistic approach” is able 
to enfold whole canals and vindicates local groups’ attempts to preserve more than isolated 
sites.60 A widened concept of cultural landscapes has become accepted at higher levels of 
authority, so “linear landscapes and heritage routes are now considered a special type of 
cultural landscape with their own management needs”.61 The vocal activist groups have both 
influenced and benefited from the development of concepts of cultural landscapes and 
heritage. Their progress was directly linked to the growing acceptance of industrial remains as 
valid objects of heritage interest, opening the way for an ever wider base of support.
 Even an enlarged notion of heritage has retained old criteria. There has been a constant 
emphasis on “the rare rather than the typical, the exceptional rather than the traditional”, with 
historical criteria accorded secondary status next to aesthetic ones.62 Local activist groups have 
been quick to adapt, and use key features to effectively promote their campaigns. The CCT 
acclaims innovative engineering feats of the Chesterfield Canal which are both the first created 
and last surviving examples.63 Further studies could profitably examine the groups’ relationship 
to the waterways as cultural landscapes, perhaps through the factor of diversity of aims, to 
more fully understand the identity constructs at play.
58 Alfrey and Putnam, Industrial Heritage, 92.
59 McKercher & du Cros, Cultural Tourism, 67.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., 69.
62 Alfrey and Putnam, Industrial Heritage, 8.
63 “A Brief History of the Chesterfield Canal,” chesterfield-canal-trust.org.uk/index.php/restoration/history/542- 
a-brief-history-of-the-chesterfield-canal (accessed 9 May, 2014).
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My analysis shows the local activist groups CCT and SUCS have used their 
interconnectedness to gain the necessary level of public support. From that strong 
negotiating position, they form the partnerships which bring in the funding and expertise 
necessary for the restoration from key stakeholders, especially the various levels of 
government and CaRT.64 The degree to which they have secured these relationships has 
significantly affected not only their progress but their future. Where the CCT has detailed 
plans supported by its partnership for the remaining works, SUCS is still labouring to gain 
the same approval. Although deciding on the canals’ new functions holds potential for 
conflict, both groups have, to differing degrees, successfully mediated between the 
heritage, commercial, environmental and leisure demands. I hope that further research 
could show whether this mediation was the determining cause or simply an accidental 
outcome of their success.
 Whilst at present, commercial interests in the form of freight or renewable energy are 
underrepresented in the restoration campaigns, market forces may soon demand more of 
waterway traffic. By their current practices of strong interconnection, I hope that the groups 
who restore canals and maintain completed canal projects will be able to involve additional 
stakeholders without conflict. Further work on these factors would bring greater clarity. As 
each case is quite different, with innumerable variables involved over decades, comparison 
is limited. However, I hypothesise that where canals are already partly in use, the current 
visitors provide a natural network of support. Those who wish to restore entirely abandoned 
and unused canals may find it hard to generate the level of interconnection necessary.
 Other local groups and stakeholders in similar projects which offer great 
environmental and economic benefits but which require significant investment and technical 
support may benefit from these findings. With over 36 million people in England and Wales 
living very near a waterway, a fully restored system would transform the environment and 
offer widely distributed socio-economic gains. Being spread across so much of the country, 
throughout urban and rural areas, the waterways are a system with irreplaceable benefits as 
a long-term project of climate change mitigation. It would impossible to create a network of 
green spaces with the same potential for climate change mitigation, so salvaging the 
existing waterway system is a unique opportunity.
 My analysis revealed almost no reference to European Union level involvement, but 
the potential for climate change mitigation is becoming more well-established through 
research. When national or EU governmental bodies are willing to devote more funding to 
projects such as these which can further their agenda of climate change mitigation, local 
actors may begin to seek out their support. I believe the EU should be more engaged and 
the UK should seek closer collaboration on this point. Any project that offers so many returns 
merits a Europe-wide approach.
64 Several interviewees refer to some historical funding from EU level organisations, but this appeared to be rare and of less 
priority to them than prospects within the UK.
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FIGURE 1. RESTORATION CAMPAIGNS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONCEPTS
FIGURE 2. MAP OF THE INLAND WATERWAYS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
Adapted from chesterfield-canal-partnership.co.uk/uk_waterways.pdf
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FIGURE 3.1 MILL GREEN BRIDGE, THE CHESTERFIELD CANAL, 1991
chestereld-canal-trust.org.uk/index.php/gallery/photos/167-staveley-town-basin (© John Lower)
FIGURE 3.2 MILL GREEN BRIDGE, 2014
chestereld-canal-trust.org.uk/index.php/gallery/photos/167-staveley-town-basin
FIGURE 3.3 CHANNEL LAYING, REDWITH BRIDGE, MONTGOMERY CANAL, 2008
shropshireunion.org.uk/montgomery-canal-restoration/redwith
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FIGURE 3.4 COMPLETED CHANNEL, REDWITH BRIDGE, 2014
The channel had been inlled but is now lined and rebuilt.
shropshireunion.org.uk/montgomery-canal-restoration/redwith/236-mcr-report-2014m05
FIGURE 3.5 NEWHOUSE LOCK, THE MONTGOMERY CANAL, 2002
shropshireunion.org.uk/montgomery-canal-restoration/newhouse-lock
FIGURE 3.6 NEWHOUSE LOCK, 2005
shropshireunion.org.uk/montgomery-canal-restoration/newhouse-lock
FIGURE 3.7 NEWHOUSE LOCK, 2006








Intangible heritage in multicultural Brussels:
A case study of identity and performance.
Current job:
Key Account Manager at Potentialpark
Catherine Burkinshaw
I have an academic background which bridges a variety of arts and social 
science disciplines. As a result, I bring influences from cultural studies both 
antique and contemporary to the social science perspective of this paper. I 
currently work at a small research company as an expat in Stockholm.
Focusing on the layers of meaning which people ascribe to their surroundings 
has highlighted for me the richness of the lived experience. I encourage those 
who read this work to look afresh at their surroundings, and apprehend the 
complexity of human relationships with the environment.
My best memory of Eurocuture...
I would recommend Euroculture because...
How has Euroculture helped me in my professional life?
Joining Euroculture has helped me position myself to work in interesting 
fields, with potential to grow in many directions. Its unique breadth prepared 
me to move into roles which combine diverse elements.
it expands your horizons in ways few other experiences can touch. You can 
develop into a more thoroughly realised version of yourself, and part of that 
is the group of friends you'll keep from it.
was easily the joy when all the entire cohort came together at the beginning 
of the IP week. It felt as though the potential of the group was truly limited 
only by our imaginations.
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The EU – An Environmental Leader or rather
a Regulator in Aviation Emissions Reduction?
Volha Kaleda
Introduction
It was not until recently that aviation has been agreed by industrialised 
countries to constitute a significant contributor to climate change with 
adverse implications for the environment and has drawn the attention of 
policy-makers and the general public. It can be explained by the fact 
that aviation emissions account for only 2 – 3% of all greenhouse gases 
(GHG) and often are regarded as insignificant numbers. Besides, not 
long ago air flights were predominantly a luxurious means of transportation affordable 
only to a higher stratum of society. However, the aviation boom that developed within the 
past two decades changed the approach of the public towards aviation emissions. The 
rise of low-cost airlines which offer cheap mass flights and the emergence of new aviation 
market regions in Asia put the problem of the compatibility of aviation and environmental 
protection on the international agenda.
 Nowadays aviation is the fastest growing transportation mode in the world. The 
aviation industry is 69% bigger than it was ten years ago in terms of revenue 
passenger-kilometres (RPK), according to a global market forecast by Airbus, which 
together with Boeing constitutes the world’s duopoly in the large jet airliner market.1 
Furthermore, air travel is expected to grow to about 14 trillion RPKs in twenty years with 
today’s figure being 5.5 trillion RPKs.2
 Generally speaking, according to the statistics of the European Commission (EC), 
aviation will increase by 4 – 5% annually over the next ten years with a doubling of traffic 
around 2020 and in a worst-case scenario will rise to 15 – 20% in 2050.3 Together with the 
growth of the aviation industry and popularity of this fastest means of transportation, 
aviation emissions which cause climate change are rising. To give an example, it was 
estimated that carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from a return flight from London to New 
York equals the amount of GHG emissions that the European Union (EU) citizen causes by 
heating their house for a whole year.4
 Needless to mention, uncompromising aviation growth, despite a considerable 
reduction in emissions due to technological progress, if unmitigated will nonetheless put 
1 It is a measure of airline traffic that constitutes one passenger flying 1 km and paying for that.
2 Airbus, “Global Market Forecast 2013-2032 | Airbus, a Leading Aircraft Manufacturer,” 
http://www.airbus.com/company/market/forecast/ (accessed May 1, 2014).
3 Joanne Scott and Lavanya Rajamani, “EU Climate Change Unilateralism,” The European Journal of International Law 23, no. 2 
(2012): 474.
4 European Commission, “Climate Action,” http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/index_en.htm (accessed May 
1, 2014).
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at risk efforts to keep global warming within 2 o Celsius above pre-industrial level set out by 
the Kyoto Protocol targets.5
 The problem of mitigation and adaption in terms of aviation emissions is of particular 
interest and importance for the EU. The Union is the only international actor that has set 
international agendas regarding aviation emissions. Unlike any other region, the EU 
formulates its external policy direction around climate change issues with a particular focus 
on aviation emissions. Furthermore, the EU is one of the few world powers to implement a 
multifaceted approach to tackle GHG emissions from aviation, which varies from 
technological to regulatory market-based measures. It has developed a comprehensive plan 
to approach aviation pollution from different perspectives, among which are air traffic 
management, research and development (R&D) for “greener” technology, and emissions 
trading system (ETS).6 Recently, however, the EU’s initiative and market-based approach to 
reduce international aviation emissions have been viewed by global actors as a unilateral 
normative measure that is forced upon other nations. This puts at risk the EU’s stance of 
being a long-term leader in climate protection and ascribes a regulatory role to the Union 
beyond its territory, which superpower states consider dangerous. Soyoung Jung, a South 
Korean researcher, regards such infringement of sovereignty and illegal extraterritorial 
application of a measure as aggressive regulation.7 Due to the fact that the paper is limited 
in scope and its purpose is not to establish the precise definition and legal provisions of the 
international regulation as a phenomenon, the paper will hence not research different 
interpretations and will challenge the EU’s regulation according to Jung’s definition of 
dangerous normative regulation.
 The paper will, therefore, research the following questions: Why is the EU interested 
in addressing aviation emissions? What role, leadership or regulatory, does the Union pursue 
in aviation emissions reduction?
 In order to answer these questions, the paper in its first part will provide a brief 
overview of theoretical framework on leadership and its modes that will support the analysis 
of the paper. It will then analyse the EU’s motivations for tackling aviation emissions and the 
significance of the compatibility of environmental protection and aviation for the EU. From 
there on, the paper will present a comprehensive overview of the EU’s approach to 
sustainable environmentally friendly aviation and its progress in this sector. In its next part, 
the paper will analyse the EU’s incentive of the inclusion of aviation emissions into the EU 
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). Subsequently, it will propose an answer to the research 
questions about the role the EU plays in curbing emissions from aviation. The paper will also 
outline how the EU’s unilateral approach to address international civil aviation emissions has 
been received in the US, Russia, and China, as well as on the global scale.
 The methodology includes a theoretical framework that is based upon the 
contributions of the scholars of environment and climate change Joyeeta Gupta and Michael 
5 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1998), 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf (accessed May 17, 2014).
6 European Commission, “Mobility and Transport,” http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/environment/index_en.htm 
(accessed May 1, 2014).
7 Soyoung Jung, A State’s Sovereign Rights and Obligations in the WTO to Harmonize Environmental Policies, SSRN Scholarly 
Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, August 18, 2012).
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Grubb. Monographs, legal documentation of international organisations, newspaper articles 
and academic reports are the sources that support this research.
 The purpose of this paper is to explore the role and motives of the Union regarding 
aviation emissions policy and to set the groundwork for more research and action in this area. 
The paper also aims to contribute to a more critical reading of the EU’s environmental 
leadership role in the international arena.
Introducing the framework: the EU’s leadership and climate change
For decades the EU has been trying to establish itself as a global actor. The EU has been in 
search for a sector where it could set an example and portray itself as a leading party. Climate 
protection and the Kyoto Protocol, having been on the agenda of the international community 
for quite some time, presented such an area.8
 Environmental protection is very much dependent on the multilateral governance 
approach and international law that are supported and promoted by the EU. The Union as an 
intergovernmental entity based on multi-level decentralised governance system has 
experience in effective negotiation and accommodation of different needs of 28 
member-states on a single matter.9 The Union’s environmental policy is on the list of shared 
competences of both the Commission and member-states. It represents an example of a 
possible cohesive EU coordination system.10 Consequently, being capable of harmonising 
environmental standards in 28 member-states and acting as a coherent entity in international 
climate policy, the EU demonstrated its potential to become a model for neighbouring 
countries and set the tone of international negotiations in environmental issues.
 Gupta and Grubb distinguish three types of leadership that the EU employs in 
environmental politics. Structural leadership is based on the EU’s power in the international 
order and its ability to influence the outcome of an issue area. It intends to change preferences 
and behaviour of involved international actors by using different incentives and punishment 
methods.11 Instrumental leadership rests on the efficacy of the Union’s negotiation skills and its 
design structure to meet the needs of other international actors. It often results in establishing 
coalitions to solve the problem.12 Finally, directional leadership constitutes the ability to set an 
example and engage others in climate change mitigation. Demonstration of successful 
domestic implementation of measures and schemes presents a way to influence the 
perception and behaviour of other states and actors.13 Regarding environmental policies, the 
EU makes use of all three types of leadership with a preference being given to a directional 
mode of leadership.14
8 Sebastian Oberthür and Claire Roche Kelly, “EU Leadership in International Climate Policy: Achievements and Challenges,” 
The International Spectator 43, no. 3 (2008): 35–50, doi:10.1080/03932720802280594 (accessed May 10, 2014).
9 Miranda Schreurs and Yves Tiberghien, “Multi-Level Reinforcement: Explaining European Union Leadership in Climate 
Change Mitigation,” Global Environmental Politics 7, no. 4 (2007): 21-22, doi:10.1162/glep.2007.7.4.19 (accessed May 3, 2014).
10 Oberthür and Kelly, “EU Leadership in International Climate Policy," 35–50.
11 Joyeeta Gupta and M. J. Grubb, Climate Change and European Leadership: A Sustainable Role for Europe? (Springer, 2000), 
23.
12 Ibid.
13 Charles Parker and Christer Karlsson, “Climate Change and the European Union’s Moment: an Inconvenient Truth,” Journal 
of Common Market Studies 48, no. 4 (2010): 923-943.
14 Ibid.
57
The EU’s motivation for addressing aviation emissions
Aviation represents an inalienable part of any state’s economy, because it ensures the world’s 
movement of people and goods necessary to enable economic growth and international 
cooperation. For the EU as an economic entity, where free movement constitutes a pillar of 
the Union, Europe’s aviation industry has always been a key industry sector. Consequently, 
challenges as well as future achievements of aviation are of particular relevance and 
importance for the EU. While the USA and Russia identify the environmental effects of 
aviation in local air quality at airports and noise level, for the EU these are a matter of GHG 
emissions that have adverse impacts on climate change.15 Already in the late 1990s, the EU 
clearly stated its goal to establish itself as an international leader in matters of global 
environmental politics, including the protection of the ozone layer, the research and 
adoption of biotechnology strategies and the sustainability of energy sources.16 The Union 
also works with industry and international partners within the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) to prevent and minimise the effects of air pollution caused by airplanes, 
thus reinforcing its leadership position in promoting environmental sustainability of 
aviation.17
 Environmental protection policy with a particular focus on the aviation sector has 
become a main focus of the Union’s attention as a result of the increase in oil and gas prices 
since 2005. The concern about the future security of its energy supply resulted in the EU’s 
search for alternative sources of energy and, consequently, promotion of more urgent and 
severe climate policy targets.18 Being mostly dependent on the imports of gas and oil from 
Russia and the Middle East, the EU stressed the importance of energy efficiency and 
research of bioenergy, which together with energy security would further support the EU’s 
stance as a “green economy” region.19 Aviation sector with its immense growth rate and 
consequent increase in fuel consumption is directly affected by this policy and, therefore, 
draws the special attention of the EU institutions.20
Western Europe, from a geographical perspective, represents a major metropolitan region 
that is crossed by airline routes.21 These routes are complementary to and competing with 
the routes of other regions. The 2004 enlargement of the EU to the east together with the 
emergence of a large number of new domestic connections presented a new problem of 
aviation regulation for the Union. As a result, together with the connectivity which promotes 
competition and prosperity around Europe, the EU agenda set out the necessity to develop 
more effective regulation system and to find a feasible solution to growing amounts of GHG 
emissions within its own territory.
 In conclusion, besides the EU’s incentive to lead climate protection and to establish 
itself as an independent significant actor on the global arena, a role it has wielded since the 
15 Ian Waitz et al., “Aviation and the Environment,” Report to the United States Congress, December 2004, 
http://web.mit.edu/aeroastro/partner/reports/congrept_aviation_envirn.pdf (accessed May 1, 2014).
16 Parker, Karlsson, “Climate Change and the European Union’s Moment,” 928.
17 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. An Aviation Strategy for Europe,” 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2015/EN/1-2015-598-EN-F1-1.PDF (accessed April 12, 2016).
18 Oberthür and Kelly, “EU Leadership in International Climate Policy," 35–50.
19 European Environment Agency, “Resource-Efficient Green Economy and EU Policies,” EEA Report No. 2/2014, 
doi:10.2800/18514 (accessed April 12, 2016).
20 Oberthür and Kelly, “EU Leadership in International Climate Policy," 35–50.
21 Stefan Gossling and Paul Upham, Climate Change and Aviation: Issues, Challenges and Solutions, First edition (London; 
Sterling, VA: Routledge, 2009), 123.
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1990s, the political-economic issue of energy dependence was a factor that motivated the EU’s 
concern with aviation. The Union’s governance system based on multi-level decentralised 
approach and developed supranational and national negotiation skills fit perfectly into the 
climate of international politics. It predetermined the EU’s agenda-setting in terms of climate 
issues. The aviation industry with ever growing CO2 emissions, however, stands apart from 
other climate change problems in the EU and nowadays is a case of particular importance for 
the Union. This can be explained by the significance of aviation in the European single market 
and the free movement pillar. Being the fastest growing and economically most important 
mode of transportation in the EU, it should respond to the “green economy” status that the 
EU set itself towards.22 As a result, the EU initiates a number of regulations and measures – 
taxes, charges, management demands, market-based measures and even minimum reliance 
on aviation – that are aimed at sustainable development of aircraft and are directed towards 
the reduction of aviation emissions.
The EU’s approach to the sustainability of aviation
Mitigation of and adaptation to the climate impacts of aviation constitute a global challenge. 
The EU faces the growing demand for air travel, the interdependence of air travel service and 
economic prosperity and little likelihood that the aviation industry will by itself take voluntary 
actions to reduce aviation emissions.23 In such a situation economic policy instruments (carbon 
taxation, cap-and-trade approach, etc.) together with research and technological 
improvements of aircraft become important alternatives to address aviation emissions. 
Generally speaking, sustainability encompasses economic, social and environmental priorities 
of a state when human welfare improvement takes place without causing additional 
environmental concerns beyond the levels that society can deal with.24 The EU has developed 
its own comprehensive approach to the sustainability of environmentally friendly aviation. It 
mainly consists of three streams:
  • R&D for “greener” technology
  • Modernised air traffic management systems
  • Market-based measure/Emissions Trading System (ETS)25
R&D for “greener” technology
By launching the Clean Sky Joint Technology Initiative in 2008 and developing alternative 
bioenergy sources, the EU aims to reduce fuel consumption and, consequently, CO2 emissions 
by 50% per passenger kilometre by 2020.26 The Clean Sky Initiative includes six main themes 
or Integrated Technology Demonstrators that cover diversified R&D work, such as fixed wing 
and rotorcraft, engines, systems and eco-design concepts.27 Nowadays, the EU strives for its 
recognition as a leading region in terms of the development of biofuel. It is mainly European 
22 European Environment Agency, “Resource-Efficient Green Economy and EU Policies”.
23 Gossling and Upham, Climate Change and Aviation, 10.
24 “Europe Needs To Change Its Whole Approach To Sustainability,” Neurope.eu, June 30, 2008, 
http://www.neurope.eu/article/europe-needs-change-its-whole-approach-sustainability (accessed May 3, 2014).
25 European Commission, “Mobility and Transport”.
26 Ibid.
27 The aim of this paper is to outline certain directions of the EU’s approach towards sustainable aviation rather than to provide 
detailed technological explanations. For more information on the Clean Sky Initiative see 
http://www.cleansky.eu/content/homepage/activities.
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aircraft that undertake test flights and perform commercial flights with biofuel in tanks. 
Among frontrunners are Virgin Atlantic Boeing 747 that undertook the first demonstration 
flight from London to Amsterdam using 20% blend of biofuels from coconut and babassu.28 
An Airbus A320 – Spanish airline Iberia – flew from Madrid to Barcelona using a mixture of 
conventional jet fuel and biofuel made from a species of camelina.29 Besides promoting 
research into alternative energy sources, the EU continues to support economically and 
foster the development of aircraft engines, airframe designs and the improvement of other 
operations, such as load factors and seat density, to benefit fuel efficiency and carbon 
intensity. Special attention is paid to the development of materials with a preference being 
given to lighter ones that have proved to have positive effects on the reduction of fuel 
consumed per passenger-km.30 Among significant European breakthroughs in aviation 
regarding reduction of fuel consumption is the development of low-cost carriers. Low-cost 
carriers argue their environmental friendliness in comparison with other forms of aviation. 
Their higher load factors in contrast to traditional airlines contribute to lower emission levels 
per passenger kilometre. Besides, low-cost carriers are believed to possess modern aircraft 
that produce fewer emissions than older ones due to their significant technological 
modifications.31
Modernised air traffic management systems
Aviation emissions are in direct proportion to aviation fuel use.32 The highest fuel burn takes 
place when an aircraft takes off and lands, which is why an indirect flight from Manchester to 
Madrid through London has a greater climate effect than a direct flight of the same 
destination.33 In the EU, in order to benefit the environment, the air traffic management 
requires revision and modernisation. According to the EC estimations, the average 
European flight is prolonged by 49 kilometres due to the fragmentation of European 
airspace, which, in its turn, produces more fuel burn and more pollution.34 As a result, in 
order to cope with immense air traffic growth and to provide passengers with cost- and 
flight-efficient and environmentally friendly aviation industry, the EU adopted the Single 
European Sky regulations in 1999 aimed at European aviation integration. Nowadays, 
European air traffic management system consists of “de-fragmenting the European 
airspace, reducing air traffic and delays, increasing safety standards and flight efficiency to 
reduce the aviation environmental footprint and reducing costs related to service 
provision”.35 Low-cost carriers that run point-to-point routes and hence avoid excessive fuel 
burn and network operations cost play a special role in European traffic management 
modernisation. It places them a step ahead of traditional long haul aircraft in terms of fuel 
28 Sam Jones and Dan Milmo, “Branson’s Coconut Airways - but Jet Is on a Flight to Nowhere, Say Critics,” The Guardian, 
February 25, 2008, sec. Environment, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2008/feb/25/biofuels.theairlineindustry 
(accessed May 4, 2014).
29 “Airbus A320 Flies on Biofuels in Spain,” Neurope.eu, October 09, 2011, http://www.neurope.eu/article/airbus- 
a320-flies-biofuels-spain (accessed May 3, 2014).
30 Alice Bows, Kevin Anderson, and Paul Upham, Aviation and Climate Change: Lessons for European Policy (Taylor & Francis, 
2008), 45.
31 Gossling and Upham, Climate Change and Aviation, 123.
32 Bows, Anderson and Upham, Aviation and Climate Change, 58.
33 Ibid., 55.
34 “Single European Sky Flying High,” Neurope.eu, November 28, 2011, http://www.neurope.eu/article/single- 
european-sky-flying-high (accessed May 4, 2014).
35 European Commission, “Mobility and Transport”.
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efficiency, operational options and, consequently, environmental consideration. In addition, 
low-cost aircraft use secondary airports and, therefore, decrease traffic congestion and noise 
level in national airports.
 The abovementioned measures outline the deliberate policy direction that the EU is 
pursuing towards modernising European aviation according to the standards of sustainability, 
competitiveness and environmental friendliness. Despite this ambitious initiative and 
undeniable considerable progress in the aviation industry, the belief that R&D technology 
together with the improved air traffic management can effectively decrease aviation emissions 
presents a challenge. The growth rate of aviation that has been characterised by at least 5.7% 
increase in passenger kilometre in the past twenty years, suggests that all these measures 
combined (fuel efficiency, improved air routes and carbon intensity) cannot prevent carbon 
emissions from rising, let alone reduce them.36 In an attempt to address this issue, the EU 
introduced a new measure that constitutes a potentially feasible solution to growing CO2 
emissions.
ETS – market-based measure
In 2005 the EU introduced an emissions trading scheme that covered GHG emissions from 
“power generators and energy-intensive industrial sectors”.37 Generally speaking, the ETS 
works on the cap and trade principle, where cap is a limit of CO2 emissions per year that can 
be emitted by power plants, factories and industries. This limit of GHG emissions is reduced 
with time in order to achieve the total decrease in the amount of emissions. Within this 
limit/cap, companies and industries receive allowances that they use to cover their CO2 
emissions or trade these allowances with other companies.38 If a company does not manage to 
fit into the allowances allocated to it, heavy fines are imposed. According to the European 
Commission, this strategy should create a financial incentive for emitters to cut back emissions 
or invest in clean low- carbon technology. Currently, the ETS is covering around 45 – 50% of all 
CO2 emissions of the EU.
 In 2008 the EU decided to include aviation sector into the EU ETS.39 According to it, 
82% of emission allowances are distributed free to aircraft operations, 15% are auctioned and 
3% are in a reserve to benefit rapidly emerging airlines.40 Since the majority of the EU’s total 
GHG emissions come from international flights rather than intra-European flights, in 2011 the 
EU undertook an attempt to include emissions from flights from, to and within the EU territory 
plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. This brought not only EU airlines, but also non-EU 
aircraft into the EU ETS. With such an introduction, the European Commission intended the EU 
ETS in aviation sector to equally apply to EU and non-EU airlines and hence address aviation 
emissions at the international level.41
36 Bows, Anderson and Upham, Aviation and Climate Change, 59.
37 European Commission, “Climate Action”.
38 European Commission, “Climate Action”.
39 Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 amending Directive 2003/87/EC 
so as to include aviation in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32008L0101, (accessed May 10, 2014). 40 Jane A. Leggett, Bart Elias 
and Daniel T. Shedd, “Aviation and the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme” CRS Report for Congress, June 11, 2012, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42392.pdf (accessed May 10, 2014).
41 European Commission, “Climate Action”.
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This measure, however, provoked a controversial and divided reaction among non-EU countries and 
opened up an intense debate in diplomatic circles. It constitutes primarily in accusing the EU of 
undertaking a unilateral approach instead of a comprehensive multilateral one to address such a 
global problem as international aviation emissions. In such an intense international atmosphere of 
criticism of the EU’s actions, the Community ran the risk of presenting itself as a unilateral regulator 
that illegally imposed its own measures on other international players, consequently jeopardising its 
long pursued stance of a progressive leader in environmental protection issues.
The EU ETS – a means to lead in climate protection or illegally regulate international aviation?
Before analysing the EU’s role in curbing aviation emissions, it is relevant to focus on the bodies 
responsible for coordination of international air transport. In this regard it is interesting to know that 
while the Kyoto Protocol covers national emissions from aviation, emissions from international 
aviation do not fall under the Kyoto’s targets. According to the Kyoto Protocol, emissions reduction 
should be a matter of common actions of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, established 
by Chicago Convention of 1944, and developed countries, indicated in the protocol as Annex 1 
Parties. 42 This decision comes from the uncertainty of estimating how much emissions each country 
should be responsible for. However, almost two decades after Kyoto, no real action took place and 
the ICAO’s work was mainly in the form of resolutions that do not have a legally binding nature.43 The 
way in which international aviation emissions are to be dealt with in the Kyoto Protocol proved to be 
ineffective. ICAO has mainly been active in setting fuel efficiency standards and biofuels plans. It has 
assisted and guided states in incorporating international aviation emissions into voluntary emissions 
trading schemes, where states wanted to put them into action. 44 To clarify, ICAO mainly performed 
a guiding role in aviation emissions without any significant attempt to reduce the emissions amount. 
ICAO has introduced no feasible flight plan in terms of stabilisation or reduction of emissions, thus 
failing to fulfil its obligations. The European Federation for Transport and Environment has 
characterised negotiations under ICAO “a lost decade”.45
 In the situation of the ICAO’s high “’aspirational’ goals”, but the absence of binding 
measures, the EU led with a specific proposal to regulate, stabilise and reduce international aviation 
emissions.46 It promoted its market-based measure – the EU ETS, where emissions are not included 
into national totals of the Kyoto Protocol, but present a responsibility of individual operators. In 2008 
the EU legislated that all aircraft, of the EU as well as non-EU origin, that operate flights from, to and 
within the EU territory and the European Economic Area were subjects to the EU ETS requirements.47 
The Community was very much in favour of the idea to bring international aviation under the ETS 
requirements, because CO2 emissions constitute a problem of not solely the EU within only its 
territory, but a global issue. It is an international problem that cannot be dealt with at the European 
level only. To specify, the EU is responsible for 11% of GHGs emitted each year, among which 3% 
come from aviation, the rest 89% is an international share.48 In order to achieve drastic changes 
42 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1998), 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf (accessed May 11, 2014).
43 “Grounded: How ICAO Failed to Tackle Aviation and Climate Change and What Should Happen Now," ICAO Triennial 
Assembly, Montreal September - October 2010. 2010 European Federation for Transport and Environment AISBL,10.
44 Ibid., 10.
45 Ibid., 4. To see the table of the ICAO’s lost decade.
46 Ibid., 3.
47 European Commission, “Climate Action”.
48 European Commission, “Climate Action”.
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regarding the stabilisation and further reduction of aviation emissions, the world’s society 
needs to participate and cooperate.
Third countries’ reaction towards the international aviation in the EU ETS
The EU’s initiative triggered an outrage from the world’s powers and was perceived as an 
attempt to illegally regulate international aviation rather than present a feasible solution to 
climate change. The EU faced great criticism and numerous attacks from the world’s 
community over its legislation attempt to bring international flights under the EU ETS. A group 
of countries among which are Russia, USA, Brazil, India, China, etc. claim that the ETS is an 
illegal, unfair, anti-competitive measure which breaches international law among other 
violations.49
 The US administration showed its rejection of the EU’s measure and passed a bill of 
non- compliance with the EU ETS and prohibition of the US operators to participate in the EU’s 
market-based measure. Furthermore, the US officials claimed that necessary activity would 
need to take place to avoid penalties from unilaterally imposed the EU ETS.50 Similarly, China 
prohibited its airlines to comply with the EU ETS.51 It also threatened to cancel a 12 billion euro 
contract with Airbus and hold up European flights if the EU intended to punish Chinese 
airlines.52 Russia in its turn intended to prohibit flights over its Siberian territory.53 Similarly, 
India threatened to ban European aircraft from its airspace if the EU imposed its sanctions on 
Indian operators.54 As an outcome of the international reaction to the EU ETS, a meeting of 32 
countries took place in Moscow in February 2012, where the opposing states signed a 
declaration against the EU’s inclusion of civil aviation in its GHG emissions cap and trade 
regime.55 It was followed by a meeting in September 2011 which resulted in Delhi Declaration 
signed by 24 governments. The central demand of the two meetings constituted the necessity 
of multilateral approach towards international civil aviation emissions.
 The world community received the newly introduced measure as an attempt to 
disregard and disrespect international negotiations on international issues. The EU was 
accused of breaching international law, attacking other states’ sovereignty and setting itself as 
an aggressive regulator of international matters. Moreover, the world’s indignation with the 
EU’s approach to international aviation made the director-general of the International Air 
Transport Association accuse the EU of an attempt to revive its past colonial hegemony in 
other territories.56
49 Nicole Domingos, “Fighting Climate Change in the Air: Lessons from the EU Directive on Global Aviation,” Revista Brasiliera 
de Politica Internacional 55, no. spe (2012): 71, http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S0034- 
73292012000300005&script=sci_arttext (accessed May 11, 2014).
50 Scott, Rajamani, “EU Climate Change Unilateralism,” 473.
51 Domingos, “Fighting Climate Change in the Air,” 76.
52 Caitlin Steffen, “China Threatens Retaliation against EU’s Carbon Emissions Tax,” Neurope.eu, June 13, 2013, 
http://www.neurope.eu/article/china-threatens-retaliation-against-eus-carbon-emissions-tax (accessed May 14, 2014).
53 Ekaterina Shatalova and Mathew Carr, “Russia, Nations Agree on Retaliation to EU Airline CO2 Trade,” Bloomberg, February 
22, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-22/russia-nations-agree-on-retaliation-to- eu-airline-co2-trade-1-.html 
(accessed May 14, 2014).
54 Simon Rabinovitch, “Chinese Airlines Refuse EU Data Request,” Financial Times, June 12, 2012, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cb1c7894-b478-11e1-bb2e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz31SJN6XLk (accessed May 12, 2014).
55 “Moscow Meeting Opposes EU Carbon-Emissions Tax,” Neurope.eu, February 24, 2012, 
http://www.neurope.eu/article/moscow-meeting-opposes-eu-carbon-emissions-tax (accessed May 14, 2014).
56 Hilary Whiteman, “Airlines Pile Pressure on EU to Scrap Carbon Tax,” CNN, September 27, 2011, 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/09/27/travel/europe-airlines-carbon-tax/index.html (accessed May 14, 2014).
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Addressing the criticism of the EU ETS
It was argued above that, on the one hand, facing decades of inaction on aviation emissions coming 
from ICAO, the EU acted as a frontrunner in introducing the EU ETS. On the other hand, the Union 
was accused of violations in the way it tackled international issues and of its aggressive regulatory 
intentions. To provide a balanced analysis of the EU’s intentions, leadership or regulating, and 
understand the EU’s motives behind the EU ETS introduction, this section will look at and address the 
criticism of the world leading countries.
 First, third states accused the Union of violating multilateral and bilateral agreements, mainly 
the Chicago Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Open Sky Agreement, and breaching 
customary international law by “extending its own regulations beyond its territorial jurisdiction”.57 
The accusation of the EU’s illegal actions was dealt with at the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU). It ruled in December 2011 that the EU did not violate the Chicago Convention simply 
because it was not a signatory party.58 To continue, the EU ETS was not in breach of the US/EU Open 
Sky Agreement because it did not constitute a tax or charge and did not presuppose a state’s 
revenue collection. 59 The EU’s unilateral approach did not infringe the articles of the Kyoto Protocol, 
which did not outline clearly the ICAO’s exclusive competence in environmental policy.60 Finally, the 
court stated “the application of the EU ETS to aircraft operators infringes neither the principle of 
territoriality nor the sovereignty of third States”.61 Despite the legal complexity of the issue at stake, 
the EU ETS was ruled not to have violated major international agreements. Since it was within the 
framework of international law, the EU did not attempt to illegally regulate international aviation or 
impose its measures beyond its borders. The environmental policy is top on the EU agenda. The 
Union uses its right to regulate how foreign aircraft operate in its territory and aims to protect the 
environment. The International Air Transport Association, Airlines for America, US state officials and 
other outside parties did not welcome the court’s ruling. The non-European opposition was growing 
and caused international tension. The conflict over environmental protection grew into a political 
one, demanding for global political will to address aviation emissions and climate change.62
 Second, after the inclusion of foreign aircraft into the EU ETS, third states accused the EC of 
undertaking a unilateral approach towards a global problem, rather than relying on comprehensive 
multilateral negotiations. The major global powers, such as Russia, the US, argued that, according to 
the Kyoto Protocol, aviation emissions were a matter of a common decision-making of all states 
under the framework of ICAO. The opposition countries claimed that since managing aviation 
emissions is a global problem and aviation is a global industry, a solution that needs to be applied 
should also be of a global nature.63 It is of note here that a similar action undertaken by the US 
administration regarding oil pollution did not provoke such an outrage as the EU ETS did. To clarify, 
57 Domingos, “Fighting Climate Change in the Air,” 77.
58 Eutopialaw, “Flying Too High? Extraterritoriality and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: The Air Transport Association of 
America Judgment,” Eutopialaw, February 02, 2012, http://eutopialaw.com/2012/02/02/958/ (accessed May 23, 2014).
59 The aim of this paper is not to tackle the legal details of the court’s decision. For more details on the ruling and decision see 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=117193&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst& 
dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=79872.
60 Jacques Hartmann, “EJIL: Talk! – The European Emissions Trading System and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction,” Blog of the 
European Journal of International Law, http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-european-emissions-trading-system- 
and-extraterritorial-jurisdiction/ (accessed May 23, 2014).
61 Directive Including Aviation Activities in the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme is Valid, Judgment in Case C- 366/10 by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, of 21 December 2011, Luxemburg, 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-12/cp110139en.pdf (accessed May 11, 2014).
62 Greenair, “ECJ Ruling in Favour of EU's Right to Include non-EU Airlines in its ETS Unlikely to Stem US Political Pressure,” 
Greenaironline.com, http://www.greenaironline.com/news.php?viewStory=1413 (accessed April 13, 2016).
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in 1990 the Congress passed laws that regulated security and pollution standards for foreign 
ships and planes entering the US territory. One of them was the Oil Pollution Act that after 
Exxon Valdez oil spill required all tankers in the US waters to have double hulls disregarding 
the origin of tankers.64 This act was not perceived by the world’s community as an attempt 
to unilaterally regulate maritime transportation, but rather a timely sensible measure. 
Analysing along these lines, the EU ETS should not be understood as a matter of the EU’s 
aggressive regulation aspirations but rather an attempt to address environmental issues in a 
cost-effective manner.
Third, after an aggressive reaction from third countries, the EU agreed to wait to include 
international aviation into the EU ETS until a global market-based measure is developed in 
2016, otherwise the EU ETS will come into effect in a full scope.65 This implies the EU’s 
willingness to cooperate at the international level providing that an effective solution will 
eventually be found and will benefit environmental protection. The EU’s flexibility in this 
matter, once again, shows the EU’s leadership incentive to find the best solution possible to 
climate change regardless its origin rather than the EU’s desire for aggressive unilateral 
regulation.
In October 2013 ICAO announced to develop a global market-based measure (GMBM) to 
address aviation emissions at the international level by 2016, and start it by 2020. Until then 
the ETS applies only to flights within and between countries in the European Economic 
Area. Since 2012 the EC has been working closely with ICAO to assist and develop key 
elements of the GMBM. In September 2016 ICAO will convene all member states for the 
39th Assembly in Montreal to agree on and adopt the GMBM to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions from aviation in non-discriminatory manner.66
 As shown above, by introducing the EU ETS the Union acted within the framework of 
international agreements and did not violate international law. It proves that the opposition 
from other states was legally unfounded and mainly politically based. Third countries’ 
concern was not about the EU’s way of addressing aviation emissions and its unilateral 
approach, but about the consequences of the introduced measure that would require 
restructuring the whole economy within low carbon targets.
 Indeed, unilateral approach itself is a proof of the leadership that the EU relies on in 
aviation emissions management. The means that the EU introduced with regards to climate 
change mitigation fall within the framework of directional mode of leadership. By making 
the first step and demonstrating the successful domestic implementation of the ETS, the EU 
intended to encourage other actors to follow its model. By presenting itself as a feasible 
example of the EU ETS implementation and demonstrating a way to reduce aviation 
emissions, the EU hoped to change the international attitude towards uncompromising 
growth of aviation.
64 “US Fights EU’s Aviation Directive,” Neurope.eu, October 25, 2011, http://www.neurope.eu/article/us-fights-eus- 
aviation-directive (accessed May 11, 2014).
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Having examined the EU’s motivations for introducing the ETS, one can conclude that the Union 
acted exclusively as a leader in environmental protection policy and had no intention to illegally 
regulate international aviation sector. The Union’s motives of shifting its climate policy focus to 
aviation emissions over the last few years, different measures and means developed and 
implemented by the EU, including revolutionary aviation programmes and initiatives, air traffic 
management operations, research and innovation technologies, prove its desire to be a frontrunner 
in climate change policy and support its leadership aspirations that it wielded in the 1990s. 
Nonetheless, the question whether innovation technologies and sky initiatives introduced by the EU 
could decrease or at least stabilise emissions from the fastest growing mode of transportation 
proved to give no positive response according to statistics and data.
 As a step forward in environmental protection, the Union suggested a unilateral response – 
Emissions Trading System. The unilateral approach of the EU ETS implementation should not be 
viewed as a primary intention but rather an outcome of the leadership mode that the EU has always 
relied upon in matters of climate change. Of course, as American economist Joseph Stiglitz put it, 
“unilateral action is second best to a comprehensive multilateral one, but it is far better in the 
presence of a critical and urgent global challenge”.67 The EU’s collaboration with ICAO and other 
international partners in the past years is another proof of the Union’s desire to work collaboratively, 
not as an aggressive regulator, towards an effective multilateral agreement on a global framework on 
aviation and the environment.
 After decades of ICAO’s inaction and procrastination, the EU decided to take the lead and 
found a solution to rapidly growing aviation emissions. By setting an example and including civil 
aviation into the ETS, the EU acted as an environmental leader to deliver real environmental benefit. 
Undoubtedly, the EU ETS has put a price on carbon and, therefore, imposed a cost on a number of 
airlines and consequently passengers which is far from being burdensome. In the presence of an 
aggressive climate challenge and no alternative solution to aviation emissions, the EU’s claim “if you 
can afford the price of a ticket, you can afford the cost of carbon” holds true.68
67 Lorand Bartels, The Inclusion of Aviation in the EU ETS: WTO Law Considerations, SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: 
Social Science Research Network, 2012).
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Epistemological challenges to the ontology of the capitalist
nature-culture discourse: a feminist hermeneutical perspective
Daphne ten Klooster
Introduction
The nature-culture divide remains largely unchallenged in 
political rhetoric related to the environment. Even though 
human’s dependence on nature is mostly recognised, 
exceeding anthropocentrism does not offer more credit to 
natural surroundings than something that is at best an 
essential source for the survival of the human species or an 
aesthetic object for artistic inspiration and at worst a ground 
that can be worked in order to maximise human innovation 
and an environment to be manipulated for the convenience 
of people. Political discussions and policy-making are often 
based on the taken-for-granted prevalence of a discourse that objectifies nature to a passive 
player in human-nature interaction. As such it reproduces a narrative that justifies a certain 
power of humans over nature.
 This paper aims to question the capitalist discourse about relations between humans 
and nature by explaining its meaning through approaching it from a feminist perspective. 
Capitalism stands for the hegemon and feminism for an oppressed form of knowledge and an 
alternative epistemology. A feminist approach is appropriate as gender inequality can be 
used as a metaphor for the nature-culture divide, because both discourses consist of binaries 
where the one dominates the other in a way that is rather hegemonic. As such the 
female-male divide has often been used in order to explain the nature-culture one. The 
comparison is useful, as the half of the binary that claims supremacy – i.e., culture and 
masculinity respectively – is often associated with the cultural, cultivation and civilization, 
whereas nature and femininity are said to resemble the originality and the birth of life. 
Offering alternatives to these dichotomies is a matter of offering a different ontological 
perspective, as it is related to a profound way of being and perceiving oneself, ones 
surroundings, and relations between entities involved. This is an epistemological struggle 
because it is argued that these alternative ontologies have been actively suppressed 
throughout history.
Most of these binaries have been socially constructed as a consequence of modernity. As 
such, many so-called non-modern societies are unfamiliar with the separation of obviously 
intertwined entities. This in itself is also a case of making a binary distinction, namely between 
the modern and the non-modern. The purpose of this research is to explore, through crossing 
these boundaries, a unity between two factors that, as a result of institutionalisation and 
rationalisation, are being perceived as irreconcilable dualisms. Therefore, even though this 
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1 David Harvey, “Neo-liberalism as Creative Destruction,” Journal compilation Swedish Society for Anthropology and 
Geography (2006): 147.
paper has been written in a European context exploring European (or Western, if you 
will) culture, it is appropriate to turn to non-European sources as it is desirable to 
overcome these constructed boundaries and as such, it is possible to encounter oneself 
in “the Other”. In order to do this, the paper makes use of sources that portray the 
indigenous American experience.
 A feminist hermeneutical approach will allow for a critical discourse analysis. The 
focus on religion is appropriate as the Christian faith continues to be an important part 
of the European cultural heritage. Despite secularisation many common European values 
find their roots in Christianity. The hermeneutical approach will pave the way for a 
spiritual journey that will allow for recognising oneself in “the Other” at multiple levels. 
This offers a different perspective on common dualisms such as the nature-culture and 
female-male ones and is a way to reveal the true meaning of the concept of Mother 
Nature, a knowledge (gnosis) that has actively been silenced by dominant groups, as 
power is inevitably part of the equation.
 In the end the paper will argue that in a dialogue, the perspective and positioning 
are often neglected whereas it is even more important than the content of the 
conversation itself; the context and the language respectively. The paper aims to show 
what this means in discussions on nature, the environment and human’s role in changing 
climate patterns.
Commodification of nature
It is possible to identify a correlation between capitalism in its strongest forms (neo- 
liberalism) and the commodification of nature, i.e., nature as a consumable “thing”, 
through e.g. tourism, private ownership, and exploitation.1 Modern capitalism has 
contributed to the commodification of nature, i.e., nature as a commodity or product 
that exists at the service of humans. Nature is made into something that can be 
consumed and digested by people, either as an aesthetic means to serve creative and 
artistic purposes or as a resource in order to assure the survival of the human species.
 In a neo-liberal society humans are the central beings (anthropocentrism) and 
consumption plays an important role. Nature is seen as a resource and something to 
exploit for the benefit of production, consumption, and innovation. Development often 
takes place at the expense of nature and the environment. Consumption levels have 
reached a standard where it is possible to own, manipulate, and master nature. For 
example, the production of food that is being consumed does not depend on the 
seasons. The ideal conditions can be created for any product to be available at any time 
of the year at any place in the world.
 Furthermore, techniques have been created in order to genetically modify natural 
products in order to make them meet the conditions and standards that the market is 
setting. It is clear that these ways of living have contributed to the deterioration of the 
earth. Wildlife is becoming endangered through human interference and great parts of 
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land have been overtaken to serve the purposes of consumer societies. The current 
discourse about global warming and the endangered environment revolves around 
humans having to save the earth and its resources. The idea of people having to come into 
action in order to save the environment attributes agency to humans, and a passive 
attitude to nature. This seems like an interesting paradox, as it reproduces the discourse 
about humans as active actors and nature as a passive one which caused many of the 
problems in the first place.
Feminist hermeneutical approach and critical discourse analysis
Through a feminist hermeneutical perspective this paper aims to approach this issue. 
American scholar David M. Scholer defines feminist hermeneutics as follows:
 “A hermeneutics from the “underside,” the neglected and the oppressed. Thus (...)  
 feminist hermeneutics can be defined as a reading of a Biblical text in the light of  
 the oppressive structures of patriarchal society.”2
 He also points out that one of the goals of feminist hermeneutics is to show how 
Christian scriptures describe the way in which Jesus treated women and the example that 
this sets. As such, a feminist hermeneutical approach can convey alternative viewpoints to 
those that are generally accepted and regarded as mainstream. Feminist hermeneutics has 
been juxtaposed with conservatism that aims to hold on to more generally accepted 
values and norms and rejects the feminist hermeneutical approach that offers alternative 
interpretations.3
 Complementing the feminist hermeneutical approach with critical discourse 
analysis allows for an analysis of the discourse through a focus on dominance and 
inequality.4 Critical discourse analysis always takes a socio-political stance. This means that 
the analysis contains aims for the discipline and society at large, which are ultimately 
political. This approach works perfectly with the feminist hermeneutics, as its focus lies on 
a historical analysis of how the current structures came about and what has contributed to 
the putting in place of these relations. This will allow for an explanation of the spheres of 
discourse that have contributed to the construction of the hegemonic narrative and the 
division between nature and culture, male and female.
Nature-culture and female-male
Sherry B. Ortner, an American cultural anthropologist, explains the nature-culture divide by 
noting that culture exists in complementarity to nature, and as such has come to enjoy a 
superior position because it seems to transcend it.5 Culture is the result of efforts of 
humans and for this reason has a higher status than those (natural) elements that can be 
taken for granted. Ortner argues that the gender metaphor is based on woman’s 
2 David M. Scholer, “Feminist Hermeneutics and Evangelical Biblical Interpretation,” JETS 30 (1987): 408.
3 Duane A. Garret, “Ecclesiastes 7:25-29 and the Feminist Hermeneutic,” Criswell Theological Review 2 (1988): 309.
4 Teun A. van Dijk, “Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis,” Discourse and Society 4 (1993): 253.
5 Sherry B. Ortner, “Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?” Woman, culture, and society (1974): 73.
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primary role in life is to give birth. She explains that female reproduction takes place 
naturally inside a woman’s body, and that the absence of such a phenomenon for men 
incites them to artificially create something.
 Ortner takes for granted the universality of this female-male nature-culture 
discourse and attributes this to biology, whereas Maria Lugones, an Argentine 
philosopher, has argued that it is mainly due to colonialism that this discourse has 
become prevalent in many different parts of the world. 6 From this perspective colonial 
oppression has played an important role in equalising the roles of women to that of 
nature on such a widespread scale. Also in this context it is argued that words like 
‘original’, ‘foundation’ and ‘basis’ come to mind when thinking of the role of women in 
this context. They are responsible for birth and the beginning of life, but do not actively 
participate in the public sphere. Men are seen as ‘stronger’ and better able to master and 
influence their surroundings.
 This common comparison of femininity and nature accounts for the concept of 
Mother Nature. This concept is universal in the sense that many different societies are 
familiar with the term, but its meaning has appeared to be different over time and space. 
As nature becomes more objectified, the use of the term seems to decrease and the 
concept seems to lose its meaning.
Gnosticism on femininity
The capitalist nature-culture divide is challenged by a feminist reading of Gnostic 
documents. In this approach, the hegemon is represented by capitalism and the 
oppressed by feminism. Challenging the nature-culture divide is an epistemological 
undertaking, as it aims to give a new meaning to the concept of Mother Nature in a 
modern context. Modernity, in this case, refers to the hegemonic, dominant group that 
represents the male capitalist system. Challenging the divide in this manner is an 
epistemological struggle because Gnostic writings have been purposely excluded from 
the Bible, as they would undermine the authority of the Church by the information they 
reveal. Accounts that question the complete humanity of Jesus would undermine his 
suffering on the cross. It can be said that this knowledge (or gnosis in Greek, where the 
name of the scriptures comes from) has been actively silenced by a powerful group 
because it offers an alternative perspective. These alternatives could pose a threat to the 
power of the dominant group and the status quo and therefore silencing this gnosis was 
an effective way of preventing this. In this light, it is important to remember that the Bible 
has influenced many societies and has set standards for centuries, including for 
interaction between men and women.
 The Gnostic documents convey a lot of interesting information on the role of 
women through the person of Mary Magdalene, a woman around whom many myths 
and stories have been created that aim to undermine the female. Even though not 
explicitly named in the Bible, in many popular interpretations Magdalene has been 
6 Maria Lugones, “The Coloniality of Gender,” Worlds and Knowledges Otherwise (2008): 13.
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portrayed as a sinful prostitute. The history of the Gnostic gospels and the meaning of the 
portrayal of Mary Magdalene is an important reading for anyone who wishes to understand 
the role of women portrayed in Gnostic writings. The struggle of Mary Magdalene is highly 
significant in that it has been suggested that she, a woman, not Peter, would have been the 
first pope if it were not for the exclusion of the books from the Canon in which she is 
portrayed as potentially the most important disciple.7
 For the purpose of this paper it suffices to mention a passage from the Gospel of 
Thomas. The Gospel of Thomas is a collection of 114 sayings of Jesus. Many scholars 
believe that it is even older than the gospels in the Canon, which would make it a more 
authentic account of Jesus and his teachings. In this gospel Peter is particularly attempting 
to undermine Mary. He claims, amongst other things, that women are not worthy of life 
and he wants Mary to leave. One of Jesus’ sayings is particularly interesting in this regard, 
as he says that “any woman who will make herself male, will enter the kingdom of heaven”. 
This saying seems rather peculiar. It should not be taken literally; clearly Jesus does not 
mean that Mary has to physically make herself male. Rather, it means that if there is no 
dualism between male and female, one will experience true knowledge, or gnosis. It 
symbolises human perfection, and a transformation in order to enter the realm for which 
humanity was made.8
 Doubting Thomas, the Thomas to whom the Gospel of Thomas has been 
attributed, had been seeing all along, and therefore he needed to make his knowledge 
physical. The fact that the Gospel has been attributed to him does not mean Thomas has 
written it. It is common practice for Gospels to be named after a person because it is very 
difficult to discover who has written it. In this case it seems very significant that the Gospel 
has been named after Thomas, because in the New Testament he is portrayed as the 
disciple who needs to feel Jesus’ wounds in order to believe that his Christ has truly 
resurrected from death. For Thomas, the seemingly opposing factors of spiritual and 
material knowledge had to be made one. It is very important that a gospel about hidden 
knowledge has been attributed to this particular disciple.
 The dichotomy of sex juxtaposes male and female. The focus on this particular 
dichotomy symbolises a much larger one. Jesus wants to teach his disciples that 
everything is one. He says that the kingdom of God is already present in the current world; 
it is inside and outside of people. He also says that if the disciples want to know about their 
end, they have to look at their beginning. They have to “enter into the realm of the first 
androgynous human”.9 Therefore the journey upward is inseparable from a journey inward. 
Believers have to find their truest selves, because in finding themselves, they will find 
Jesus, and in finding Jesus, they will find themselves.
 This passage teaches us that God is everything and that everything is God, because 
an important union exists. This immanent principle that was apparently very important in 
the Gnostic tradition is rather contradictive to the transcendent teachings of the God of 
the Bible. This information explains the condemnation of many of the Gnostic texts. An 
7 Dan Burstein et al., The Untold Story of History’s Most Misunderstood Woman: Secrets of Mary Magdalene (New York: CDS 
Books, cop., 2006), 320-327.
8 Guido Kindt, Maria Magdalena: Vrouw, Minnares of Apostel van Jezus? Speurtocht naar de ware Maria Magdalena, 
Sleutelfiguur uit ‘De Da Vinci Code’ (Rijswijk: Elmar, 2006): 49-52.
9 Robin Griffith-Jones, Mary Magdalene. The Woman who Jesus Loved (Norwich: Canterbury Press, 2008), 55- 59.
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unclear distinction between humanity and divinity would indicate that Jesus could have 
not been completely human as he died on the cross. His suffering is vital to the salvation 
of confessing Christians, as it shows the price God was willing to pay in order to prove 
his love.
Finding oneself in the Other
 “The cosmic vision of life is to be connected with the surroundings, and all the   
 surroundings have life, so they become SACRED: we encounter earth, mountains,  
 valleys, caves, plants, animals, stones, water, air, moon, sun, stars. Spirituality is   
 born from this perspective and conception in which all beings that exist in Mother  
 Nature have life and are interrelated. Spirituality is linked to a sense of    
 COMMUNITY in which all beings are interrelated and complementary.”10
 This is how Sylvia Marcos, a scholar who has written extensively on the spiritual 
experiences of indigenous women in the Americas, describes the role of nature in 
spiritual experiences in indigenous contexts. She juxtaposes this with general Christian 
beliefs, that generally hold a transcendent view of God as seated in the heavens, mighty 
and powerful and much greater than any human being could ever imagine. In this 
general Christian view, there is a clear dichotomy between the human and the divine. 
Even though nature has to be respected and taken care of, it is regarded as an object 
given by God. From this view, it can be used as a resource and there is no perception of 
nature as a living entity in relation to humans and the rest of the cosmos, as is described 
in the quote of Marcos. It is often even seen as blasphemy to regard something ‘profane’ 
as possessing supernatural qualities. God’s existence is regarded as independent from 
any other form of life and the only entity which possesses almighty powers.
Modernity suffers from a need to categorise, define and classify everything. Whereas 
from an alternative perspective relational ontologies are at the basis of the nature of 
being, the modern capitalist system is organised in terms of dualist ontologies.11 The 
hegemonic binary system has been naturalised and normalised and permeated into all 
realms of human life. However, these dichotomies are completely alien to many forms of 
spirituality. Josef Estermann, a Swiss philosopher and theologian, explains that these 
forms reason along the lines of ‘non-dualism’ rather than metaphysical monism:
 “Reality – the whole of what exists and is imagined – is not conceived as divided  
 in incomparable or even contradictory aspects and spheres: the divine and the   
 humane, the true and false, the heavenly and the earthly, the religious and the   
 profane, the masculine and the feminine, the living and the inert, the eternal and  
 the temporal.”12
10 Sylvia Marcos, “Mesoamerican Women's Indigenous Spirituality: Decolonizing Religious Beliefs,” Journal of Feminist Studies 
in Religion 25 (2009): 42.
11 Arturo Escobar, “Latin America at a Crossroads,” Cultural Studies 24 (2010): 39-44.
12 Josef Estermann, “Andean Philosophy as a Questioning Alterity: an Intercultural Criticism of Western Andro- and 
Ethnocentrism,” in Worldviews and Cultures, Philosophical Reflections from an Intercultural Perspective, ed. Nicole Note et al. 
(Milton Keynes: Springer, 2009): 138-139.
76
These alternative philosophies go right against the capitalist system on which the 
dominant discourse is based. Estermann calls the dichotomising practice a “male 
characteristic”. In this regard it should not go unnoticed that Thomas, he who had trouble 
believing, is a man. In this sense, masculinity stands for the capitalist hegemon, a product 
of modernity, and often seen as being at the roots of the divide between human and 
nature, as explained at the beginning of this paper. The epistemologies described above 
offer a new perspective comparable to the Gnostic alternative described earlier. 
Displaying these examples here is a way of making this alternative discourse more 
understandable.
 The fact that the cultural context differs does not matter in this sense. In keeping 
with the plea for union it is possible to find oneself in the Other. In a meeting with the 
Other we are reminded of who we are ourselves. In this case the Other can be of help in 
giving words to insights to which the connection have been lost, without trying to 
appropriate his or her knowledge or culture.
 It is possible to distinguish two different ontological forms in these various ways of 
being and relating. The first one is a dualist ontology, to which modern liberalism mostly 
adheres.13 As an alternative there is the relational ontology, which can be associated to the 
indigenous and Gnostic knowledges discussed in this paper.
 Dualist ontologies are based on a strategy of categorising and classifying. This often 
constitutes dichotomies in which there is supremacy of one half of the binary over the 
other. Examples of dualist ontologies are male vs. female, white vs. black, and culture vs. 
nature. Those who do not see the necessity of this conceptualisation are inclined to think 
in terms of relationality, which proposes the complementarity of different forms. 
Differences are acknowledged, but all are seen as part of a bigger whole.
Alienation from alternative Christian epistemologies
The spiritual process is a transformation in which the “woman who can make herself male” 
can recognise that everything stands in relation to each other. In Christian terminology, she 
can find Jesus in herself and herself in Jesus. With respect to what he calls “the dwelling 
of the divine”, Raimon Panikkar, a Spanish priest and proponent of inter-religious dialogue, 
says that “man is “more” than an individual being and, the Divine different from a supreme 
Lord” and “that the space of man is in God in much the same way as the space of God is 
in man”.14 This relation between humanity and divinity cannot be captured in terms of 
transcendence nor immanence.
 This kind of thinking is alien to many current-day Christians. Modernity has led to 
the institutionalisation of religious beliefs.15 Consequently, this has caused the division 
between spirituality and religion. God has left the churches as there was a too much 
emphasis on the worldly and material side of religion. In other words, there was no equality 
between the tangible and the intangible. Whereas previously spirituality and religion were 
inseparably connected to each other, it is now possible to be religious without being 
spiritual and vice versa.
13 Ibid.11, p.39-44.
14 Fred Dallmayr, “A Secular Age? Reflections on Taylor and Panikkar,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (2012): 
200.
15 Daniel L. Pals, Eight Theories of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006): 274-275.
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As a result of this, religion is regarded as an irrational form of knowledge and is supposed 
to be a private rather than a public affair. There are many people who will say that they 
are ‘not very spiritual’. They do not believe that one is spiritual by virtue of being human. 
This is due to the alienation from religion, which has become void as a result of its 
disconnection from spirituality. It is important to note that Jesus himself never started a 
religion; he only shared his gospel with the people around him; a way to shape their 
spirituality and make it more understandable. The Christian religion came into existence 
over the centuries following the life of Jesus Christ, when the Bible was compiled and 
popes and bishops defined dogmas.16
 The argument is not to neglect existing accounts in religious heritage that support 
the capitalist discourse, which is in line with a dualistic worldview stemming from a 
liberalist ideology. In particular, texts which give humans the task of “taking care of and 
looking after the earth” (Genesis 2:15), which render the earth passive and subjected to 
the care of humans. This is rather in line with the dominant modern discourse. The 
argument, however, is that texts like the one in Genesis just mentioned and the example 
of Isaiah 55:12 are not mutually exclusive:
 “You will go out in joy and be led forth in peace; the mountains and hills will burst  
 into song before you, and all the trees of the field will clap their hands.”17
 This text shows a completely different worldview which almost seems 
irreconcilable with the one mentioned before. This is due to the extermination of 
coexistence and the oppression of the alternative view portrayed in the text in Isaiah. 
Therefore its meaning has been neglected and forgotten, which has led to the alienation 
from this alternative epistemology that does exist within the European cultural heritage. 
This allows for terms such as ‘Mother Nature’ to be attributed with a wholly different 
meaning that is much more significant and regards her as active, powerful and having 
agency. It is important to be reminded by the female and Mother Nature that there is an 
important gnosis that we are somehow part of, but have become estranged from.
 The text from Isaiah 55:12 is not an exception and the Bible contains many more 
verses that portray a different worldview. An interesting example is a little earlier on in 
the same book, which shows a specific kind of resistance act of Mother Nature:
 “Even the junipers and the cedars of Lebanon gloat over you and say, “Now that  
 you have been laid low, no one comes to cut us down.” ” (Isaiah 14:8)18
There are many other examples of portrayals in the Bible of natural entities with agency 
– mainly in Psalms – that show that a different perspective on relations between humans 
and nature is not misplaced at all in a context where values are largely based on Biblical 
texts. However, in support of the capitalist discourse and a general preference to keep 
16 José Comblin, “The Crisis of Religion in José Comblins Last Thinking.” Voices 8 (2012): 70-75.
17 New International Version.
18 Ibid.15
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immanent teachings out of the picture in order to attribute a private status to spiritual 
experiences that does not deserve any place in public debates, the gnosis has been 
deemed irrational and is seen as blasphemy in certain cases. As part of this project, 
passages have been eliminated from the Canon and allowed for the dominant group to 
shape societies to their advantage. Texts that did make it into the Old and New 
Testaments, as the ones from Isaiah mentioned above, have lost their meaning for the 
most part or are difficult to grasp for many current day Christians. This could also be said 
for other relational ontological phenomena in the Bible, such as the trinity and the claim 
that Jesus was completely human and completely divine at the same time.
Conclusion
In the light of the nature-culture divide this paper has attributed an important task to 
feminism. The comparison with the female-male divide is easily made and as a knowledge 
from the suppressed feminism can show the importance of the set-up of a dialogue. In this 
sense feminism is not merely about women’s rights; rather, it is about alternative voices 
being heard. Acknowledging that there is no innate supremacy of one of the partners that 
engage in a conversation allows for a fair dialogue to take place. This will allow for 
everyone involved to exist, have a voice and be heard.
 This means that a completely different worldview or ontology is necessary; one that 
might feel alien in a context of modernity. However, this paper has attempted to show that 
this alienation is the result of modernity and that within a Euro-Christian religious heritage 
relational thinking is not misplaced. On the contrary, it is vital to understanding Christian 
thought. Examples of the female in a Christian context can give an alternative meaning to 
the concept of Mother Nature; one from which subjects in a modern context have largely 
become estranged. A meeting with “the Other” can play a role in restoring the meaning of 
this alternative discourse. This meeting takes place at various levels. The Early Christians 
have identified this process as a spiritual journey in order to acquire gnosis. It will allow for 
a fair dialogue and a healthy balance between humans and nature.
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Fracking Europe – Assessing the role the
European Union could play in regulating shale gas
Richard van Schaik
Introduction
The commercial exploitation of shale gas in the United States is said to have caused a true 
energy revolution. Whereas in 2000 shale gas accounted only for 2% of the US energy mix, 
this amount has risen to nearly 40% in 2012.1 Shale gas made the US almost completely 
energy independent and has therefore been called a game changer. This revolution appears 
irreversible as even the sharp decline in global energy prices did not bring it to halt.2 Although 
so far the shale gas boom has been limited to the US, other countries have been affected too 
as the increase in supply brought down global gas prices. Europeans thereby profited from 
cheaper gas prices before even “a single molecule of unconventional gas has been produced 
from the European basins.”3 The American success stories led to a shale fever in Europe too, 
but the continent has been slow to catch up in exploiting shale gas reserves due to 
“demographic, political, regulatory, environmental and social differences.”4 There are both 
passionate supporters who are eager to move forward, as well as opponents who try to make 
sure it never happens. The question of ‘fracking Europe’ is thus very contemporary and 
subject of much debate.
 The various EU Member States have taken very different positions. France, Bulgaria 
and the Czech Republic have banned fracking: France argues that the current state of 
hydraulic fracturing technologies brings too many uncertainties and the Czech Republic 
argues that “its current regulatory framework is not sufficient to safeguard shale gas 
extraction in an environmentally viable fashion.”5 Netherlands and Germany have both 
(temporarily) banned all fracking. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, had suspended it 
at first but later began supporting it actively.6 These mixed responses raise the question how 
it is possible that all Member States take very different positions independently of each other. 
If there are serious environmental concerns that might have cross-border effects in other 
Member States, is it then not an area which should be regulated by the EU? In this paper I will 
IP subtheme: The Climate of European Politics
Keywords: shale gas, fracking, environment, EU regulation
1 J. David Hughes, “Energy: A Reality Check on the Shale Revolution,” Nature 494, no. 7437 (February 21, 2013): 373.
2 Economist, “Fractured Finances: America’s Shale-Energy Industry has a Future. Many Shale Firms do not”, The Economist, July 
4, 2015, accessed November 16, 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/business/21656671- 
americas-shale-energy-industry-has-future-many-shale-firms-do-not-fractured-finances.
3 Maximilian Kuhn and Frank Umbach, Strategic Perspectives of Unconventional Gas: A Game Changer with Implications for the 
EU’s Energy Security (London: European Centre for Energy and Resource Security (King’s College London), 2011), 45, accessed 
April 26, 2014, http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/research/groups/eucers/strategy-paper-1.pdf.
4 Roderick Kefferpütz, “Shale Fever: Replicating the US Gas Revolution in the EU?,” CEPS Policy Brief, no. 210 (2001): 5.
5 Corey Johnson and Tim Boersma, “Energy (in)security in Poland the Case of Shale Gas,” Energy Policy 53 (February 2013): 391.
6 Lisa Nandy and Kerry McCarthy, “'Tory U-turn on fracking regulations will leave safeguards totally inadequate'”, The Guardian, 
October 26, 2015, accessed November 17, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/oct/26/
tory-u-turn-on-fracking-regulations-will-leave- safeguards-totally-inadequate.
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answer these questions by looking at theory about how EU environmental policy is made 
and how various stakeholders play a role in this, and I will apply these theories to the 
case of fracking. I will then discuss the role the EU could possibly play as a regulator. 
Finally, the paper will look into possible future developments in the field of shale gas.
Theoretical Framework
There has been much discussion about the future of shale gas, but much of this has been 
done in technical rather than political terms. The nature of political decision-making is, 
however, primarily non-scientific. This means that even if all parties were to reach a 
consensus on scientific and technical issues, this would 
not necessarily result in an agreed political response.7 
For example, it is highly subjective what one counts as 
the benefits and the costs of fracking. Does one include 
possible environmental damage as costs? We have to 
consider these different perspectives when trying to 
understand the different responses of various Member 
States. I have done this by analysing various themes in 
the interests and arguments with which stakeholders can 
be associated. I do this by drawing upon theories of 
Stakeholder Analysis and environmental policy 
formation. Both theories share the presumption that the European Union is not a 
monolithic entity, but that it is rather comprised of many different interests. The only way 
of understanding the political end-product is by dissecting the preceding processes. It is 
only then that we can see that the EU is not always able to act according to that which it 
is convinced would be the best solution.
European policy formation
There are different perspectives on the role and influence of each actor involved in the 
process of EU policy formation. A scholar of institutional theory, Tanja Börzel, argues that 
the Member States remain the most important actors when deciding upon and 
implementing new European policies, but that we should not disregard the influence 
that the Commission, Parliament and the various domestic actors have.8 In her model of 
policy formation, Member States always try to minimise the costs they would incur when 
having to implement new rules and norms. Countries with a high level of regulation will 
want to upload their domestic policies to the European level: if their own regulation 
becomes the norm, they would not incur additional implementation costs while 
industries in other – less regulated – countries would lose their competitive advantage. 
Lower-regulating countries, on the other hand, will push for maintaining the status quo 
7 Timothy T. Eaton, “Science-Based Decision-Making on Complex Issues: Marcellus Shale Gas Hydrofracking and New York City 
Water Supply,” Science of The Total Environment 461–62 (September 1, 2013): 167.
8 Tanja A. Börzel, “Member State Responses to Europeanization,” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (June 1, 
2002): 195.
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or further deregulation in order to keep benefitting from lower production costs. Different 
Member States thus all aim to influence European policies in such a way that adverse 
domestic consequences are minimised.9
 Börzel identifies three strategies that countries pursue for achieving these 
objectives: trend-setting, fence-sitting and foot-dragging.10 I will use this typology to 
analyse the process of shale gas regulation. First it should be noted that even if shale gas 
is a new phenomenon, many of its aspects are already subjected to existing EU and 
national laws and regulations.11 There are differences among the various national laws, as 
well as how EU legislation is understood and applied in each country. According to Borzel’s 
theory, low-regulatory countries are likely to become ‘foot-draggers’: if the Union would 
seek more regulation they will try to prevent this or try to push for deregulation. It is in their 
perceived interest to be bound only to their own legislation and not to be subjected to 
additional European rules that might incur extra (economic) costs. ‘Fence-sitters’ are those 
countries that are not interested in extracting shale gas or those that already have strict 
regulation but have no interest in imposing this on others. The last category, ‘pace-setters’, 
consists of those countries that already have strict national regulation in place; it is in their 
interest for economic or environmental reasons if other countries would have to implement 
similar regulations. As it is in all countries’ environmental interest to advocate for more 
regulation, reality shows that not all Member States attach equal value to environmental 
concerns.
 Besides the Member States, there are also many other actors that try to influence 
EU decision-making. The most salient example of this are the environmental groups that 
are calling for additional EU legislation. They are sometimes even supported by the energy 
industry, albeit for different reasons. Multinational companies often lobby for 
harmonisation of legislations as they find it easier to comply with one set of European 
regulations rather than twenty-eight different ones.12 They would therefore also be in 
favour of a new EU framework, as long as this would not result in additional costs. These 
interest groups attempt to directly influence European decision-making by lobbying the 
institutions or indirectly via the Member States in what political scientist Putnam called the 
two-level game.13 Policy outcomes are thus a result of long process of decisions at various 
levels and it is essential to understand the various interests and stakeholders involved in 
order to understand the end-product.
Stakeholder Analysis
Abstract policies are transformed into concrete realities that affect many different 
stakeholders. Socio-economists Robin Grimble and Kate Wellard noted that in the field of 
natural resources, projects and policies that are perceived to be successful from a 
governmental perspective often came at the expense of other stakeholders (most often 
9 Ibid., 194–196.
10 Ibid., 193–214.
11 Philippe & Partners Law Firm, Final Report on Unconventional Gas in Europe,, Contracted Report for DG Energy (Brussels: 
Philippe & Partners, 2011), para. 324.
12 Börzel, “Member State Responses to Europeanization,” 197.
13 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 03 
(1988): 427–60.
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the local population).14 One can conduct a Stakeholder Analysis in order to better 
anticipate or handle these conflicting interests.15 Following this approach, I will identify 
the key interests and their associated stakeholders in the discussion about fracking in 
Europe. I have studied the arguments put forward in news articles and position papers 
and identified three main themes among them. Regardless of whether the EU will decide 
to (de)regulate, these stakeholders will be affected.
Energy security
An often-heard argument is that shale gas could provide energy security to the EU. 
Currently all Member States combined are importing about 70% of their gas needs. 
Some state that this is expected to rise to 89% if the EU does not start exploiting its shale 
gas reserves.16 The growing reliance on natural gas, and thereby EU’s growing reliance 
on a few suppliers, is seen as “the Achilles heel of Europe’s energy security”.17 There are 
just three suppliers which currently provide 84% of EU’s gas imports: Russia (42%), 
Norway (24%) and Algeria (18%). Furthermore, many of the new Member States as well 
as Sweden, Ireland and Finland are completely dependent on Russia gas.18 US’ success 
story of becoming energy independent thanks to shale gas therefore sounds very 
appealing to EU politicians. Shale gas could potentially reduce EU’s import dependency 
and enhance its security of supply. The Russia- dependent Central European Member 
States therefore often raise such concerns; especially Poland as it also has the most 
promising shale gas reserves.19
 In the recent Ukraine crisis, the EU was confronted once more with the 
consequences of this dependency: the fear of Russia limiting the gas flows was initially 
an important argument in the discussion whether to impose sanctions or not. Russia had, 
after all, used its position as a gas supplier as a political instrument before. Shale gas, on 
the other hand, could be a solution to decrease this dependency.20 Some therefore even 
said that “Moscow’s policies have become unintentionally the major enabler for 
unconventional gas developments in Europe.”21 Nevertheless, the threat of energy 
insecurity is not felt equally in all countries. For example, Germany has major 
investments in infrastructural projects with Russia (the North Stream), France is already 
well-diversified with its reliance on nuclear energy, while Denmark and Sweden see a 
more promising future in renewable energy sources.22 Poland, on the other hand, often 
talks about energy as if it were a matter of “national security and an existential threat”.23 
The necessity of decreasing the reliance on Russian gas is thus perceived differently from 
14 Robin Grimble and Kate Wellard, “Stakeholder Methodologies in Natural Resource Management: A Review of Principles, 
Contexts, Experiences and Opportunities,” Agricultural Systems 55, no. 2 (1997): 186.
15 Ibid., 175.
16 John Williams and Phil Summerton, The Macroeconomic Effects of European Shale Gas Production (Pöyry Management 
Consulting, November 2013), 44.
17 Kuhn and Umbach, Strategic Perspectives of Unconventional Gas, 39.
18 Ibid.
19 Agata Gostyńska et al., Path to Prosperity or Road to Ruin?: Shale Gas under Political Scrutiny, ed. Ernest Wyciszkiewicz 
(Warsaw: The Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2011), 25.
20 Selina Williams, “Ukraine Crisis Spurs Calls for Europe to Rethink Shale,” Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2014, accessed April 
11, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303725404579460961609694356.
21 Kuhn and Umbach, Strategic Perspectives of Unconventional Gas, 43.
22 Gostyńska et al., Path to Prosperity or Road to Ruin?, 25–26.
23 Johnson and Boersma, “Energy (in)security in Poland the Case of Shale Gas,” 396.
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country to country. The current sanctions on Russia do not seem to have drastically altered 
views on this. Nevertheless, the Russia-dependent countries are likely to oppose stricter 
shale gas regulations as this is perceived as a limitation on a possible alternative to 
dependency on Russian gas.
Economic interests
Other stakeholders, mostly governments and the industry, primarily rely on economic 
arguments when talking favourably about shale gas. Shale gas can be economically 
rewarding in several ways, the most obvious one being the profits that are made by the 
companies and the taxes that the state would incur. Indirectly, this will also lead to lower gas 
prices, which will benefit gas-intensive industries and – insofar the Member States produce 
electricity from gas – energy prices in general. Lower gas prices are said to have led to an 
industrial renaissance in the United States: production went up as the costs dropped, which 
led to many new employment opportunities.24 This promise has often been repeated as an 
argument in Europe, including in policy papers of the European Commission.25 Fracking is 
seen as a very positive development from an economic perspective, which makes it tempting 
to overlook its more negative sides. For example, an MEP’s assistant said that “the group 
[Social Democrats] hasn’t agreed on a final group position since they are too divided whether 
to give primacy to economic profit and job creation over environmental protection or not.”26 
It therefore interesting to note that the potential benefits are left unquestioned and that they 
are considered to be so importance that they could potentially outweigh the negative 
environmental consequences.
 Others such as, for example, Parisian think tank IDDRI, however, question shale gas’ 
economic benefits.27 Furthermore, since the rapid decline of (traditional) oil prices since 2014 
the economic argument became even more questionable. If oil prices will remain low, shale 
gas exploitation will not be economically feasible. Nevertheless, anticipating that prices 
might rise again one day, those countries that have large deposits of shale gas can still be 
expected to be less inclined towards further European regulations. Countries with little or no 
shale gas, on the other hand, are more free to choose whatever policy they please.28 In 
practice, we indeed see that Poland and the United Kingdom - both with relatively large 
deposits - are very eager to exploit shale gas commercially. Interestingly, France has 
temporarily put a moratorium on the production even though it has a vast amount of the gas. 
We can thus see that the economic benefits can be a major argument but that this is not 
necessarily decisive. At a European level there should be a careful consideration of the 
possible economic gains and the (environmental) price at which this comes.
24 Arthur Neslen and Frédéric Simon, “Europe Abandons Hopes of US-Style Shale Gas Revolution,” EurActiv, February 28, 2014, 
accessed April 11, 2014, http://www.euractiv.com/specialreport-industrial-renaiss/Europe- 
abandons-shale-gas-revolution-news-533546.
25 European Commission, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT on the Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons (such as Shale Gas) Using High Volume Hydraulic Fracturing 
in the EU, January 22, 2014, 12.
26 S. Buisset, J. Øye, and J. Selleslaghs, Lobbying Shale Gas in Europe (Brussels: PACT European Affairs, May 2012), 6.
27 E.g. Thomas Spencer, Oliver Sartor, and Mathilde Mathieu, Unconventional Wisdom: An Economic Analysis of US Shale Gas 




The most salient discussion is the one on the environmental implications. Interestingly, 
environmental arguments are used by both those who support fracking, as well as by 
those who argue against it. Shale gas can be argued to be a clean solution to 
environmental challenges, while others argue that it is extremely harmful.29 This paper 
will not judge which side is right, but it will look at the actors involved in this debate and 
the arguments they use. Those that are in favour of shale gas argue that it could reduce 
EU’s CO2 emissions by replacing polluting coal with gas. This view is also described in 
the EU’s Energy Roadmap 2050 that states that natural gas is “critical for the transitional 
transformation of the energy system” as it can help to reduce emissions in the short and 
medium term.30 For EU Member States that are heavily dependent on coal for their 
energy production, such as Poland, gas is an attractive short-term alternative. Shale gas 
can be a “transition fuel, one that finally has no security trade-offs and only opportunities 
to move in a less costly way to a low-emission future.”31 The oil, gas and nuclear 
industries naturally challenge these assumptions, while others recognise the short-term 
benefits of gas but do not see it as a real long-term solution. Investing in shale gas would 
mean that less is invested in the development of renewable energy sources, which are 
believed to be a better solution in the long run.32
 More vocal are the concerns of the direct negative impact that fracking has on the 
environment. An overview of some of the most serious concerns can, for example, be 
found in the joint position paper of different European environmental organisations.33 
One of their fears is that the chemicals that are used during the fracking processes might 
not all be contained, which could pollute the soil and (drinking) water. It is also said that 
relatively large quantities of methane are released during the production process, which 
causes air pollution and possible smog. Furthermore, a lot of water is being used during 
the fracking process, which might become irretrievable or contaminated, thereby putting 
pressure on the local availability of water.
 The production also takes up a lot of land, produces noise and might cause 
earthquakes. As for stakeholders, both environmental groups and local citizens are 
actively campaigning against shale gas all over Europe for exactly these reasons. People 
are afraid of what the production of shale gas might do to their environments and 
pressure their governments to prevent this. Nevertheless, we have seen that the 
environmental arguments can also be used in favour of shale gas by those who note that, 
compared to coal, natural gas offers lower carbon dioxide emissions. Scientists are thus 
vehemently arguing on both sides of the spectrum.34
29 Inmaculada de Melo-Martín, Jake Hays, and Madelon L. Finkel, “The Role of Ethics in Shale Gas Policies,” Science of The 
Total Environment 470–71 (February 1, 2014): 1164.
30 European Commission, Communication on the Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons, 11.
31 Gostyńska et al., Path to Prosperity or Road to Ruin?, 26.
32 de Melo-Martín, Hays, and Finkel, “The Role of Ethics in Shale Gas Policies,” 1117.
33 Friends of the Earth Europe et al., Position Statement on Shale Gas, Shale Oil, Coal Bed Methane and “fracking,” April 22, 
2012, accessed May 13, 2014, http://www.greenpeace.org/eu-unit/Global/eu-unit/reports- 
briefings/2012%20pubs/Pubs%202%20Apr-Jun/Joint%20statement%20on%20fracking.pdf.
34 See e.g. Robert W. Howarth, Anthony Ingraffea, and Terry Engelder, “Natural Gas: Should Fracking Stop?,” Nature 477, no. 
7364 (September 15, 2011): 271–75.
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The European Union as a regulator
There are thus several conflicting interests that need to be resolved politically. The EU is 
just one of many actors involved, but it has – to a certain extent – the capacity to initiate 
further regulation and could as such play a major role in deciding upon its future. I have 
analysed the Commission’s communication about the current situation, the EU’s 
competency to legislate and the actions that it has already taken. My research is limited by 
the fact that only the final products of decision-making are accessible to the public, but the 
analysis of the various interests helps to understand why Member States are sometimes 
hesitant to formulate policies or why they change positions over time.
Regulatory needs
Among the institutions of the European Union, only the Commission has the right to 
initiate new legislation. Unlike the Parliament that represents the European citizens and the 
Council that represents the Member States, it is primarily concerned with the interests of 
the Union as a whole. It has, as such, other considerations than the other EU bodies but it 
cannot ignore these, as ultimately they also have to agree with the Commission’s 
proposals. As for shale gas, the Commission has expressed on several occasions that it is 
necessary to regulate its exploitation further. It has also commissioned and conducted 
studies that came to this conclusion. For example, a public consultation among EU citizens 
shows that a large majority thinks that more measures (e.g. strict environmental and health 
safeguards) are necessary to address the potential challenges of fracking.35 The 
respondents indicated that the current legal framework is not well suited to the scale at 
which Europe might be fracked. When asked what the EU should do, the option of doing 
nothing was the least popular.
 Interestingly, EU’s consultation also showed that also a part of the industry is in 
favour of introducing an EU framework, as they “desire clear and uniform rules of 
engagement everywhere.”36 Both industry and citizens are thus asking for more regulation 
for various reasons. The Commission has, however, been internally divided among the 
Directorate General (DG) for Energy, the DG for Climate Action and the DG Environment, 
all of which represent different interests. This division hampered the development of a 
clear vision on shale gas and the Commission is said to have remained largely in a reactive 
mode.37 Other bodies of the Union have also repeatedly called for a regulatory framework. 
The Parliament has voiced its concerns on several occasions and in 2012 called on the 
Commission to conduct an assessment of the current regulatory framework and to propose 
“as soon as possible and in line with Treaty principles, appropriate measures, including 
legislative measures, if necessary.”38 The Committee of the Regions likewise asked for a 
“clear and legally binding regulatory framework of the EU, preferably in the form of a 
directive.”39 It should be noted, however, that these two bodies are also not monolithic 
and represent various interests.
35 BIO Intelligence Service, Analysis and Presentation of the Results of the Public Consultation “Unconventional Fossil Fuels 
(e.g. Shale Gas) in Europe,” Final Report Prepared for European Commission DG Environment, 2013, 121.
36 Buisset, Øye, and Selleslaghs, Lobbying Shale Gas in Europe, 8.
37 Burson-Marsteller, How Will the EU React to the Shale Gas Revolution? (Brussels: Burson-Marsteller, May 2013).
38 European Parliament, Resolution of 21 November 2012 on the Environmental Impacts of Shale Gas and Shale Oil Extraction 
Activities (Strasbourg, November 21, 2012), para. 4.
39 Commitee of the Regions, Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on “Local and Regional Authorities Perspective on 
Shale/tight Gas and Oil (unconventional Hydrocarbons),” May 12, 2013, para. 10.
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 The Parliament as a whole is said to be less inclined towards environmental 
arguments and more towards those of jobs and growths, but when one looks closer, 
French MEPs are largely sceptical towards shale gas whereas Polish MEPs are strongly in 
favour.40 We can thus see that MEP’s views on shale gas are influenced by their national 
backgrounds rather than the European group to which they belong. Inside the 
Parliament there are different working groups that also hold very different views: the 
Environment committee raises different issues than the one on Industry, Transport and 
Energy.41 The various actors in the European political game thus play different roles. By 
deciding whether and how to move forward with shale gas, they are behaving along the 
three patterns described earlier: as regulatory pace-setters, fence-sitters or 
foot-draggers.
 The question whether more regulation is necessary is thus mostly political rather 
than legal. Several reports have been conducted on the adequacy of the current 
regulatory framework. For example, a report commissioned by the European 
Commission in 2012 concluded that the current regulatory framework was appropriate 
for the current state of exploration of shale gas.42 Energy experts Johnson and Boersma 
argue, however, that investigating the current state does not look into what would 
happen if shale gas were to be exploited commercially in large quantities.43 It also did 
not take into consideration that not all EU guidelines have been fully implemented yet 
into national legislation. They argue therefore that the current framework would not 
sufficiently cover all issues if the EU were to undergo the same developments as the 
United States. There are thus salient calls to investigate the necessity of regulation 
further. In 2014 a new report of the Commission came to similar conclusions when it 
wrote that: “by identifying the remaining gaps, it [...] shows that, for all environmental 
issues, some important aspects are not or only partially tackled by existing legislation 
and practices.”44 The Commission thereby recognized that it could be desirable to fill 
several legislator gaps.
Competences
The European Union is however limited in its capacity to regulate by the competences 
that have been transferred to it by the Member States. There are three degrees of 
competence – among these only the ‘exclusive’ give the EU the full and only right to 
regulate. The topic of shale gas transcends clear-cut boundaries and can fall both under 
the fields of energy and that of environment. The EU has a much stronger mandate to 
regulate in the latter than the former.45 Energy is a competence that has only recently 
been conferred on the Union by the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. The Union is 
further limited by an article that:
40 Buisset, Øye, and Selleslaghs, Lobbying Shale Gas in Europe, 11.
41 Ibid., 13.
42 BIO Intelligence Service, Analysis and Presentation of the Results of the Public Consultation “Unconventional Fossil Fuels 
(e.g. Shale Gas) in Europe,” 396.
43 Johnson and Boersma, “Energy (in)security in Poland the Case of Shale Gas,” 396.
44 European Commission, Communication on the Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons, 32.
45 Florence Gény, “Can Unconventional Gas Be a Game Changer in European Gas Markets?,” Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies, 101, accessed April 15, 2014, http://www.oxfordenergy.org/2010/12/can-unconventional-gas-be- 
a-game-changer-in-european-gas-markets/.
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 precludes the adoption of EU measures that would interfere with a Member State’s  
 right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, and to choose its  
 energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply.46
The EU is therefore unable to decide upon what energy sources could be used in a country 
and Member States continue to have the sole right to issue permits for shale gas exploitation. 
This explains why all Member States were able to respond differently to the possible use of 
shale gas. The Union is legally unable to intervene and this could only change upon the 
initiative of the Member States. If shale gas exploitation was only covered by the Union’s 
energy competence, the Member States would be completely free to decide upon its future 
and further regulations would have to be made and contested at the national level.
 However, the EU has a much stronger mandate in the field of environment. It should 
also be noted that the production of unconventional gas is already largely covered by 
existing EU environmental frameworks. The Commission could therefore decide to clarify or 
complement existing environmental legislation. The right to act is laid down in Article 191 of 
the TFEU:
 Union policy shall aim at a high level of environment protection taking into account the  
 diversity of situations in the various regions of the Union. It shall be based on the  
 precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken,  
 that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the  
 polluter should pay.47
 This ‘precautionary principle’ gives the Union the possibility to prevent further shale 
gas exploitation until more is known about its potential environmental consequences. This 
possibility is, interestingly, often forgotten, notes law scholar Elen Stokes.48 The Commission 
has the power to amend existing regulations or to introduce a new Directive on shale gas, 
thereby harmonising the different national legislations. A report issued by the Commission 
itself even provides many arguments for why more environmental regulations are required 
and explains its mandate for doing so.49 It argues that it is an EU matter, because 
environmental risks and impacts may spread across national borders. These cross-border risks 
are best addressed at an EU level. The Commission’s report refers to the example of offshore 
oil and gas, which was also only regulated by Member State at first, but was later covered 
under special EU regulation. This solved many legal and practical concerns, sent out a clear 
message to investors and it decreased public concerns. The report argues that shale gas 
should follow a similar trajectory. From a legal perspective the EU thus has a strong case to 
start regulating in this field.
Initiatives
The Commission issued its long-awaited response to shale gas on 22 January 2014. It 
conducted an Impact Assessment and additionally issued a Communication and a 
Recommendation. The Impact Assessment reviews four different policy options, of which 
46 Elen Stokes, “New EU Policy on Shale Gas,” Environmental Law Review 16, no. 1 (March 2014): 44.
47 European Commission, Communication on the Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons, 39.
48 Stokes, “New EU Policy on Shale Gas,” 44.
49 European Commission, Communication on the Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons, 39–40.
91
issuing a Recommendation ranks lowest: it is considered only slightly better than doing 
nothing at all.50 A Recommendation consists of a set of non-binding guidelines for 
Member States and the industry with the intention to harmonise existing legislations. At 
first sight, it thus seems surprising that the Commission opted for the least effective 
option (according its own assessment) which is favoured by the fewest stakeholders: only 
by a part of the industry and a minority of Member States who “prefer to rely only on 
national provisions.”51 This strategy can thus hardly be said to please any of the 
stakeholders, but it is nevertheless better than doing nothing: it could be a first step 
towards further regulation, while it does not cause additional compliance costs for the 
operators as all proposed measures are voluntary.52 The fact that the Union has opted for 
the least favoured option implies that the small lobby of foot-draggers must have been 
particularly powerful in order to prevent the EU from taking a stronger response.
 This is indeed what seems to have happened. The real deliberations of how the 
Commission came to this conclusion are not published, but the British newspaper The 
Guardian has revealed through leaked documents that there was a strong blocking 
minority. Their sources show that an attempt by the Commission to introduce a new 
legally binding Directive was “defeated by the UK and its allies, which include Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic.”53 The same article mentions France, Germany and 
Spain lobbying on the other side. Although the article does not elaborate on this, it 
seems most likely that the Commission decided to alter its proposal instead of proposing 
something that would fail to be accepted by the Council at a later stage. The 
foot-dragging strategy of the UK-led alliance has thus effectively succeeded in lowering 
the measures that were going to be introduced.
 UK’s position seemed to have been motivated by a typical foot-dragging strategy: 
UK shadow energy minister Tom Greatrex stated that, UK Prime Minister David 
“Cameron sees regulation as an inhibitor of activity rather than a safeguard.”54 Imposing 
new regulation would impose extra costs that the government was not willing to bear. 
The EU could not do more than it currently did - it was effectively paralysed by just a few 
of its Member States. However, this does not preclude the option of having EU 
regulation on this matter in the future. Recommendations are often a forerunner of 
legally binding regulations and in this case the Commission even explicitly stated that 
the Commission “will decide whether it is necessary to put forward legislative proposals” 
in the future.55 If therefore the Commission still thinks that this is necessary and the 
foot-draggers present a weaker opposition in the future, it could well be that shale gas 
will eventually follow a similar trajectory as the offshore oil and gas production. In that 
field there had been similar opposition at first, but it was nevertheless regulated at a later 




53 Damian Carrington, “UK Defeats European Bid for Fracking Regulations,” The Guardian, January 14, 2014, sec. Environment, 
accessed April 10, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jan/14/uk-defeats- european-bid-fracking-regulations.
54 Ibid.
55 Stokes, “New EU Policy on Shale Gas,” 48.
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entrenched the opposition by ignoring the legitimate environmental concerns that many 
people have.56 It could thus well be that overlooking people’s ‘legitimate’ concerns might 
eventually backfire as opposition will grow only stronger.
Fracking Europe?
There are various reasons why actors arguing either for or against shale gas. The European 
Union cannot directly take part in the debate about shale gas as an energy source for the future, 
because it has no competence in the field of energy. However, it has much more power when it 
comes to the environment, including the ability to introduce binding legislation even when this 
would influence the potential of shale gas as an energy resource. Interestingly, in the public and 
political debate the option of introducing fracking regulations is often seen as effectively 
hampering the future of shale gas as it would become increasingly difficult and costly to exploit 
it. This does, however, not necessarily have to be the case: an EU directive could also merely 
harmonise the already existing national laws.
 For some countries, such a harmonisation would not make much of a difference as they 
already have equally strict regulations in place or they have limited interest in fracking. These 
are the countries that would be fence-sitting according to the theory of Börzel. Those that have 
less strict regulations, on the other hand, fear that an EU directive would impose extra costs on 
them. Fracking-eager countries like the United Kingdom and Poland will therefore try to avoid 
this by pursuing a strategy of foot-dragging. So far, they have been successful in this, effectively 
paralysing the EU in any attempts to further regulate the field.
 If we look under the surface, we can see that there is a great demand for more regulation 
at a European level. There have been calls from citizens, the Parliament and the Committee of 
the Regions. Even the Commission itself has recognised it to be necessary. Also parts of the 
industry indicated that they desire harmonisation of the current legislation. However certain 
stakeholders – most notably Poland and the United Kingdom – have vested interests that they 
believe would be compromised if the EU were to create regulation. In both of these countries, 
fracking has so far been limited to exploratory drillings. They do not want to slow down the 
process by having to comply with new requirements. In the future, when fracking might have 
become a more established practice, they could recognise the need to adjust their national 
laws accordingly. This would subsequently reduce the costs of having to comply with new 
European regulation.
 Poland and the United Kingdom could then even pursue a fence-sitting strategy instead. 
It could also be that their national policy will change already by their own initiative, as the 
governments will have to respond to certain stakeholders. Especially in the United Kingdom, 
the voice of environmental groups is getting louder and louder. If the UK imposes stricter 
regulations while still exploiting shale gas, it might even become a trend-setter in order to 
prevent other countries from drilling at lower costs. Currently the EU has thus only released a 
Recommendation, but if the policy environment changes this might lead to a Directive later. The 
developments on the world energy market, the conflict with Russia and technological 
advancements that could reduce the environmental risks are all factors that may influence the 
further debate. Only the future will tell if Europe will be fracked and if this will occur within a 
European framework or not.
56 Carrington, “UK Defeats European Bid for Fracking Regulations,” para. 11.
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Differences and Similarities between Degrowth Movements




The economic crisis which began in 2008 brought to light many endemic issues of nowadays 
governments, and tested the ability of the European Union in keeping the existing 
institutional structures as they are. Combined with the environmental crisis and the climate 
change issue, many experts and scholars have been giving alternative solutions concerning 
the European model: among these there are degrowth thinkers.
 Degrowth, or Sustainable degrowth, is an economic and ecological paradigm 
according to which a downscaling of production and consumption would increase human 
well-being and would enhance ecological conditions and equity on the planet. It calls for a 
future where societies live within their ecological means, with open, localised economies and 
more equally distributed resources through new forms of democratic institutions. Material 
accumulation will no longer hold a prime position in the population’s cultural imagination1. 
Degrowth not only challenges the centrality of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as an 
overarching policy objective but proposes a framework for transformation to a lower and 
sustainable level of production and consumption, a shrinking of the economic system to leave 
more space for human cooperation and ecosystems2. Several actors are involved in the 
movement, from activists to scholars, from exponents of anti- utilitarianism to intellectuals, 
and the actions taken vary from grass-roots initiatives to conferences and international 
meetings. It developed mostly in the south of Europe, but nowadays it is seeing growing 
interests also in different parts of the world.
 In this paper, the development of degrowth in Italy and France will be analysed, to see 
the differences and ideas of these two movements. Since especially in the occasion of the last 
European Parliament elections these two countries movements have broaden their critics to 
the EU structure, a case study will be considered, looking at the two movements’ different 
approaches towards the European Union. In order to do these analyses, firstly a brief 
overview of the paradigm will be given, its main features and its roots. Then, a closer 
examination will be carried out of the history of degrowth in Italy and France, by identifying 
the main organisations and actors that have been participating in this project. Do the two 
countries present a similar path with regard to degrowth? Do they have the same 
organizations and the same kind of actors involved? What is the position of the degrowth 
movements towards the EU, and is it different in Italy and France? In the conclusion the aim 
IP subtheme: European Environments, European Identities
Keywords: degrowth, European Union, PPLD (Parti Pour la Décroissance),
Movimento per la Decrescita Felice.
1 Serge Latouche, La scommessa della decrescita (Milano: Feltrinelli, 2007), 12-15. 
2 Ibid.
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is to try to give an answer to these various questions. By examining articles and 
documents by the degrowth organisations that present ideas about the EU and its future, 
the paper will show how degrowth can lead its supporters to quite different ideas about 
how to evaluate the EU and European integration. Some think degrowth requires 
undoing the work of the EU, others think it calls for more European integration, although 
of a different kind.
What is Degrowth?
Degrowth aims to demonstrate that development of technology, of production and most 
of all of GDP is not strictly correlated to the improvement of human happiness. Indeed, 
thinkers of this movement believe that growth and development are two words that are 
no longer part of a secure duo, especially if we look at the world situation today. 
According to Serge Latouche, a French economist and philosopher considered one of 
the founding fathers of this theory, on the one hand, the quality of life has increased for 
many people particularly in the western countries. On the other hand, the gap between 
rich and poor has advanced and environmental pollution and climate change have 
increased. These negative outcomes which both spread and accelerate each year – show 
that this reality is no longer sustainable for the Earth3. The goal of the scholars of 
degrowth is to challenge these contemporary problems, by proposing solutions that aim 
to pursue well-being, social equity and ecological sustainability. In order to do this, they 
put forward a paradigm that would involve the implementation of political measures and 
technologies which embody appropriate and chosen limits, rather than continuous 
innovation to spur consumption; and that would involve innovations for consuming less 
through lifestyles4.
 In narrowing the attention to the aspects of this theory concerning its 
environmentally friendly facets, a first thing to be noticed is the deep and strong critical 
analysis of the current situation of our planet. In doing that, economic aspects are being 
linked to ecological ones: the global economic crisis that is progressively hitting all the 
sectors of our industrial civilization has negative outcomes that do not concern “only” 
pollution and environmental degradation. Also the global economy in its biophysical 
facet is being damaged, especially considering the processes of production, distribution 
and waste disposal5. The criticism is once again directed at the production system in its 
yearning for unceasing growth. To support their theory, degrowth thinkers underline how 
much the global productive system is already unsustainable for the biosphere. According 
to a study of 2002, the USA’s environmental footprint – i.e. the ecosystem areas used to 
produce resources consumed by the population and to assimilate waste – is five times 
higher than the global average. If the whole world consumed as much as Americans do, 
we would need five Earths6.
3 Serge Latouche, Come sopravvivere allo sviluppo: dalla decolonizzazione dell'immaginario economico alla costruzione di una 
società alternativa (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2007) 21-25.
4 Latouche, La scommessa della decrescita, 18; Latouche, Come sopravvivere allo sviluppo, 26.
5 Mauro Bonaiuti, “I paradossi della crescita obiettivo decrescita,” in Obiettivo decrescita, ed. Mauro Bonaiuti (Bologna: EMI, 
2005), 28.
6 Bonaiuti, “I paradossi della crescita obiettivo decrescita,” 29-30.
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 In approaching the economic and environmental-friendly policies, degrowth is based 
on the studies on bio-economics made by Georgescu-Roegen, a Romanian mathematician, 
statistician and economist. He was one of the first scholars that began to introduce the 
ecological perspective to economic studies in the 70s7. He applied a concept from 
thermodynamic laws to the production process, by claiming that it has an entropic nature. 
Each productive activity involves the irreversible degradation of increasing amounts of matter 
and energy. As the biosphere is a closed system (exchanges energy but not matter with the 
environment), the ultimate goal of the economic process, i.e. the unlimited growth of 
production and income, being based on the use of non-renewable energy resources, is in 
contradiction with the laws of thermodynamics. Moreover, in normal biological systems there 
are always limits that cannot be overtaken, and this shows another contradiction in the 
economic system. The concept of maximization (i.e. to maximize the difference between the 
total revenue from the sale of goods or services produced by a company and the total costs 
incurred for the production process), usually applied to economic theories, seems unlikely 
when the biological system is involved: it cannot be said that biological systems tend to 
maximaze a single goal, that is the case of profit for economic systems. Consequently, in this 
way degrowth theory rejects the idea of sustainable development. In these scholar’s opinions, 
those two words in these scholar’s opinions are contradictory8.
 The solutions suggested by degrowth thinkers are about changing the mentality on 
the so called myth of growth, by proposing a society of non-growth where continuous 
development is not to be considered as something positive. The final goal is to have a less 
aggressive impact on the Earth, and in order to do that, collaboration between economic and 
biological studies is compulsory. According to Serge Latouche all degrowth plans can be 
synthesized in the Program of the 8 Rs: Re- evaluate, Re-conceptualize, Restructure, Relocate, 
Redistribute, Reduce, Reuse, and Recycle9.
 Re-evaluate and re-conceptualize are the first, being connected with the change of 
perspective. They suggest a radical subversion of personal beliefs and values. Since such 
values and beliefs are systemic, meaning that they are determined by the system that 
surrounds human beings, it is the whole society that has to be re-evaluated and 
re-conceptualized. Relocate refers to the idea of scaling back the massive amount of 
movement of people and goods on the planet, with all of its negative consequences, in order 
to reduce the environmental impact. Behind this concept there is a suggestion to act and 
think locally instead of globally. With the verb reduce, Latouche wants to promote the idea of 
diminishing the impact that our ways of production and consumption have on the biosphere. 
It is necessary to lessen material consumption until the world’s environmental footprint 
corresponds to that of only one planet. Restructure points out the willingness to adapt 
consumption patterns, social relationships and lifestyles according to the changing values of 
7 Latouche, La scommessa della decrescita, 20.
8 Jacques Grinevald, “Georgescu-Roegen, bioeconomia e biosfera,” in Obiettivo decrescita, ed. Mauro Bonaiuti (Bologna: EMI, 
2005), 58-59.
9 Latouche, La scommessa della decrescita, 30-35; Serge Latouche, “Per una società della decrescita,” in Obiettivo decrescita, 
ed. Mauro Bonaiuti (Bologna: EMI, 2005), 13-15.
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the economic structures of production, so as to guide them towards a degrowth society. 
The more radical this restructuring will be, the more the systemic nature of the dominant 
values will be eradicated. Moreover, redistribute aims at guaranteeing to all inhabitants 
of the planet both access to natural resources and an equitable distribution of wealth, 
ensuring a satisfying job and decent living conditions for all. Finally, reusing common 
objects and tools instead of throwing them away and also recycling the incompressible 
waste of our activities are the solutions that most of all concern the everyday life of each 
citizen10.
 The social movement and the studies on degrowth are quite recent, since they 
have been developed as a consequence of the social and environmental problems that 
are increasing in world societies. This school of thought was born in the southern 
countries of Europe – especially France and Italy – but nowadays even the 
English-speaking part of the world has started to pay attention to this new way of seeing 
the process of growth that characterizes our social and economic systems11.
 The term was first mentioned in the seventies by Georgescu-Roegen and by the 
think tank Club of Rome, in the report The Limits to Growth. In both cases the word has 
been used to denounce economic growth as the main cause for environmental 
problems12. It became a slogan for activists only during the 2000s: in France in 2001, with 
the word Décroissance, in Italy in 2004 (Decrescita) and in Spain in 2006, translated in 
two terms, Decreixement (Catalan) and Decrecimiento (Spanish13. It did not connote 
social movements straight away, as we shall see later on. Indeed, the movement presents 
several origins and theories that nevertheless allow a common perspective14.
 First of all, it has to be noticed that degrowth does not aspire to became a 
common goal for States or international organisations (at least for the time being). It is 
more an attempt to introduce a new perspective in the ongoing political debate, 
especially in light of the new threats related to the sustainability of the environment. In 
this meaning, it is also a challenge to the ideas of green growth, or green economy: 
despite the fact that these kind of economies propose a model that reduce the 
environmental impact of production systems, they still represent a possibility inside the 
dimension of growth.
 Overall though, the movement can be interpreted as a social movement, by which 
it is meant that it is a mechanism that leads to several actors joining together in a 
collective action15. In this frame, following the theory of two Italian sociologists, Della 
Porta and Diani, it can be noticed that the movement in all its developments has often a 
common diagnosis (identification of the causes of a social problem) and prognosis 
(dimension that seeks solutions and new social patterns)16. At the core of each 
10 Latouche, La scommessa della decrescita, 40; Latouche, Per una società della decrescita.
11 Anca Elena Gheorghică, “The Emergence of La Decroissance,” CES Working Papers IV:2(2012): 60-75. 
12 Clément Levallois, “Can de-growth be considered a policy option? A historical note on Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen and the 
Club of Rome,” Ecological Economics 69(2010): 2271–2278.




16 Della Porta and Diani, in Federico Demaria, Francois Schneider, Filka Sekulova, Joan Martinez-Alier, “What is Degrowth? 
From an Activist Slogan to a Social Movement,” Environmental Values 22:2(2013): 194. For more information, please see 
Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: an Introduction, 2ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005).
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development of the movement are the same diagnostic ideas: that disparate social 
phenomena such as the social and the environmental crisis are to be related to the intrinsic 
problems of a system based on growth. According to Flipo17, a French philosopher and 
engineer who conducted intensive research on the field, there are four sources from which 
degrowth ideas arise: the cultural one (source culturaliste18), which promotes a 
“decolonization of our mind” from the myth of growth; the democratic source, that aims at a 
redistribution and re-localisation of resources; then ecology, stressing the problems related to 
the relation between ecosystem and production/consumption systems; and finally the source 
of bio-economy, that mostly follows the above-mentioned theory of Georgescu-Roegen19. At 
the base of all of them is located the idea of the implementation of human well-being through 
a reconsideration of the meaning of life20.
 When it comes to the prognosis, it can be observed that the number of actors involved 
in degrowth changes among the different associations and between nationalities.
Decrescita, Italy
One of the biggest developments of degrowth in Italy has been represented by the 
association Rete per la decrescita (Network for degrowth). Founded in 2004, it was the result 
of a joint action taken by scholars and activists, coming from different backgrounds and 
experiences, such as anti- utilitarianism, bio-economics, solidarity economy and criticism of 
development21. This group engages with both research and the promulgation of ideas: 
seminars, conferences and summer schools are organized on a regular base, and publishes 
books as well. This network is set up on the basis of a collective reflection on the complexity 
of socio-cultural dynamics and the linkages with the current system of consumption and 
production22. It operates in smaller sub-groups of people who, individually or in collaboration 
with other similar associations, work to promote the concepts of this paradigm. It has to be 
noted that since its foundation in 2004 there has been cross-border collaboration with some 
exponents of the French movement, such as Serge Latouche, a French economist and 
philosopher23.
 Another organisation that has developed in Italy is the Movimento per la Decrescita 
Felice (Movement for Happy Degrowth), which has gained more popularity than Rete per la 
Decrescita due to a more accessible approach. Indeed, this association is characterised by a 
pragmatic attitude to degrowth ideas, willing to propose activities that ordinary citizens can 
do in their everyday lives. They can act as a catalyst not only able to communicate a thought, 
17 Fabrice Flipo, “Voyage dans la galaxie décroissante,” Mouvements 50:2(2007): 143-151.
18 Ibid. 149.
19 Ibid. 150.
20 Ibid. 143-151. It has to be noted that another source has been added by further scholars, the “justice” one (see Demaria et 
al., “What is degrowth? From an Activist Slogan to a Social Movement”).
21 Among the different actors participating, the leading persons are the bio-economist Mauro Bonaiuti, the sociologist Marco 
Deriu and the activist Dalma Doeneghini (see www.decrescita.it).
22 “Research and Degrowth,” Research & Degrowth history section, accessed May 22nd, 2014, 
http://www.degrowth.org/short-history; “Network for Degrowth,” Rete per la Decrescita, accessed May 22, 2014, 
http://www.decrescita.it/joomla/.
23 Federica Cappello, “Decrescita: le Ragioni e il Dibattito,” (Master Diss., University of Verona, 2007), permanent link last 
accessed May 30, 2014, http://www.vronline.it/public/news%5C823%5CDecrescita_tesi_laurea_Federica_Cappello-vrd.pdf.
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but also capable of providing, for people who are sympathetic to this approach, the 
opportunity to meet, to discuss, to elaborate sets, and above all to put it into practice. 
In order to do so, the Movement has founded a publishing house (“Edizioni della 
decrescita felice”); it has created a series of lessons, the so-called University of know-how 
(Università del fare), to encourage a rediscovery of knowledge and practical skills 
required to self-produce goods; it has been promoting national conventions. It has also 
started to collaborate with business activities, particularly in the food, catering and 
hospitality sectors, to promote the ones that have a lower environmental impact. 
Moreover, the Movement organizes collaborations with companies and professionals 
who produce, sell and install technologies that increase resource efficiency, reduce 
environmental impact and recover materials contained in objects that are no longer in 
use. The aim is to support a parallel economy able to create employment in activities that 
reduce the carbon footprint24.
 So far, the Italian movement does not have a political party25. Nevertheless, it has 
been linked to several parties, among which most of them come from the green area26. 
In recent years, it has been connected more and more often with the party Movimento 5 
Stelle (Five Stars Movement)27, both because they share common ideas on specific 
subjects (such as supporting the ideas promoted by NO TAV activists, who are against 
the construction of the high-speed rail that would link Turin and Lyon28) and because the 
word degrowth has been used several times by Beppe Grillo, founder of the movement, 
and by other members of the party29. Despite that, the two do not overlap completely30. 
An example will be given further in this paper, when the Italian degrowth position on the 
EU will be analysed.
Décroissance, France
The French situation is more complex. Despite the fact that the term décroissance has 
been around for quite some time, it entered into the political debate only in the last 
decade31. In activist actions, it was first used in Lyon, relating to environmental 
associations in the wake of protests for car-free cities, anti-advertising and food 
cooperatives32. The spread of the term was sustained particularly by four journals, 
Casseur de pub, Silence, the French edition of the Ecologist and la Décroissance, le 
24 “Movement for a Happy Degrowth,” Decrescita Felice, accessed May 22, 2014, http://www.decrescitafelice.it.
25 A website of a party can actually be found at the link http://www.partitodecrescita.it/. It seems though, that there hasn’t been 
updates for a long time, and I wasn’t able to find any trace of it in Italian elections; it is never mentioned in any article (just in 
some blogs that refers to the website, not to the party). Moreover, I tried to contact them for more information, and I have never 
received any answer.
26 For more information see Ecologisti e Reti Civiche, http://www.ecologistiecivici.it/index.php.
27 Just by typing on Google the words “Decrescita” and “Movimento 5 Stelle” together, a long list of events and articles shows 
the links between the two.
28 Igor Giussani, “NO TAV, non solo una contestazione,” Decrescita Felice Social Network May 20, 2013, accessed May 22nd, 
2014, http://www.decrescita.com/news/no-tav-non-solo-una-contestazione/; “No TAV cathegory,” Movimento 5 Stelle, accessed 
May 22nd, 2014, http://www.beppegrillo.it/listeciviche/liste/piemonte/no-tav/.
29 Fabio Sabatini, “La decrescita infelice di Beppe Grillo,” Il Blog de IlFattoQuotidiano.it March 27, 2013, accessed May 22, 
2014, http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2013/03/27/decrescita-infelice-di-beppe-grillo/543667/.
30 Ibid.
31 “Research and Degrowth,” Research & Degrowth history section(website.
32 Demaria et al., “What is Degrowth? From an Activist Slogan to a Social Movement,” 195.
102
journal de la joie de vivre. The latter, which released its first edition in 2004, has been an 
especially effective tool to publicise the ideas of the movement, being distributed on a 
monthly basis, and selling currently around 30,000 copies33. Close to this journal, is the 
Institute of Social and Economic Studies for a Sustainable Degrowth (Institut d’Etudes 
Economiques et Sociales pour la Décroissance Soutenable), which intends to create a 
research centre on the movement34.
 From the beginning of the twenty-first century, many conferences and meetings 
among different actors, such as scholars, intellectuals and activists have helped in bringing 
social attention on degrowth in France, such as the case of “Unmake development, remake 
the world” (Défaire le développement, refaire le monde), which took place at UNESCO in 
Paris in 2002; or the “March for degrowth” (Marche pour la Décroissance), which in 2004 in 
Lyon saw an attendance of 2000 persons – it is during events such as these that leading 
figures of the movement start to emerge, like Serge Latouche and Paul Ariés35. In parallel with 
these more political and practical actions, the theoretical ones continued: an example is the 
creation of the review Entropia, founded in 2006, which aims to give more consistence to the 
debate over degrowth.
 The situation became more complicated in 2006, when the Party for Degrowth (Parti 
pour la Décroissance, PPLD) was founded. Since its very beginning it has been contested by 
several exponents of the movement, such as Latouche, who did not believe it was time to 
enter into the political arena, being too young and not ready. The journal La Décroissance 
distanced itself from this action36. One year later the “Movement of growth objectors” 
(Mouvement des Objecteurs de Croissance, le M.O.C.37) was also founded, willing to 
represent a political alternative to a party.
 Despite the differences among them, the two join together for the 2009 European 
elections with the campaign Europe Décroissance, which did not aim to run for a position, but 
solely to implement a political debate. Also in 2012 another party, called Parti des Objecteurs 
de Croissance (POC), proposed Clement Whitman as a candidate for the presidential 
election38. Despite that, the effort of engaging in politics through traditional ways – such as 
with the creation of a party – have remained very marginal39. Moreover, the critics and 
uncertainties on the creation of a political party have persisted. Even the members of the 
PPLD itself changed the direction of it in 2012, by declaring that the “second generation of 
activist does not represent anymore a party, but a non electioneering political movement”40. 
It has to be noted that most of the people who define themselves as a degrowth supporter 
33 Flipo, “Voyage dans la galaxie décroissante,” 143; “la Décroissance,” the journal la Décroissance, accessed May 22, 2014, 
http://www.ladecroissance.net/?chemin=accueil.
34 Demaria et al., “What is Degrowth? From an Activist Slogan to a Social Movement,” 195.
35 “Research and Degrowth,” Research & Degrowth history section(website); Baris Gencer Baykan, “From limits to growth to 
degrowth within French green politics,” Environmental Politics, 16:3(2007): 513-517.
36 Baykan, “From limits to growth to degrowth within French green politics,” 513-517.
37 “Movement of degrowth objectors,” Mouvement des Objecteurs de Croissance, accessed May 22, 2014, 
http://www.les-oc.info/.
38 “Genealogy of French Degrowth in Politics,” Parti pour la Décroissance, 2012, accessed May 22, 2014, 
http://www.partipourladecroissance.net/?page_id=481.
39 “Research and Degrowth,” Research & Degrowth history section(website).
40 “Genealogy of French Degrowth in Politics,” Parti pour la Décroissance.
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do not participate in these kind of structures, but mostly in smaller local organizations, 
debates, round tables, and so on41. Overall, the debate on Décroissance has reached a 
large part of the French population, as it can be seen also in the press, including the 
mainstream one, which regularly mentions the issue42.
Degrowth and the EU
The European Union is not a topic usually discussed by the degrowth movement, 
especially at the academic level. If the attention is moved to the grass-roots associations 
though, it can be observed that since the parliamentary election of 2009 some 
campaigns have been made in France, and with the new legislature of 2014, more 
interest in the EU has grown in both countries. This is because the economic crisis and 
the environmental crisis of the last few years brought degrowth activists to broad their 
criticism, also challenging the nowadays structure of the EU. To remain in line with the 
comparative purpose of this paper, I limit my analysis to the actions taken in the year 
2014.
Italy
In the Italian case it has been the Movimento per la Decrescita Felice that has begun to 
express its position toward the EU. On 9th April 2014 the organisation released a 
“Manifesto for a Europe of Degrowth” (Manifesto per un’Europa Decrescente), through 
which the participants of the association proposed not only the cornerstones of 
degrowth ideas (criticism of GDP, the difference between the words degrowth and 
recession, the praise of self-production, the decolonisation of the mind), but they have 
also tried to sketch out a political project compatible with the ideals of this paradigm43. 
Recognizing the fact that this manifesto is a first step for the movement, 13 points are 
touched upon in order to describe their perspective on the Union.
 In a first introduction, the EU is criticised as it is considered to be too technocratic, 
elitist and distant from the citizens, together with a statement about their point of view 
over the capitalistic system. Also, activists of this movement state from the beginning 
that if on the one hand they argue that the European Union, as it is currently configured, 
does not meet the needs of the challenges that humanity is forced to face – climate 
change in the first place – and “actively supports ecological degradation and social 
disintegration44”, on the other hand they also refuse the positions of those who want to 
“turn back the clock of history, proposing solutions that are worse than the illnesses they 
want to cure”45.
 The first issue mentioned in the manifesto concerns the environment and 
especially common goods such as air and water. It asks for an EU that adopts laws 
directed to member states; to avoid privatisation of these goods and instead to adopt 
41 “Genealogy of French Degrowth in Politics,” Parti pour la Décroissance.
42 “Research and Degrowth,” Research & Degrowth history section(website.)
43 “Manifest for a Europe of Degrowth,” Manifesto per un’Europa decrescente, Movimento per la decrescita felice, accessed 




common standards, taxation; and budget to protect them adequately. The preservation of 
the soil is also mentioned, as well as a critic against excessive construction and a proposal for 
an environmental requalification of abandoned areas. As a second point, the editors of the 
manifesto desire a territorial reorganisation that would give more prominence to municipality 
or eco-region – even across national borders – to promote a direct relation between them and 
the European institutions. These new municipalities must be characterised by an 
environmental, historical, cultural and linguistic alignment, to better meet the needs of 
citizens and environmental sustainability. When it comes to the Euro, they argue that the 
primary objective of the European Central Bank should not only consider the maintenance of 
price stability but it should also focus on tackling unemployment, providing credit support to 
small entrepreneurs (in particular to artisans and rural workers) and financing new investments 
that would have as their objective the protection of the environment. Moreover, a proposition 
is made regarding a more flexible bureaucracy: Europe needs to support more small and 
medium enterprises. The excessive weight of documentation to start a business and of 
demanding tax, sanitary and hygienic regulations are bringing to the rapid extinction of these 
categories of workers, all for the benefit of large industrial and foreign multinationals46.
 Furthermore, degrowth activists’ aims include the promotion of public transportation 
and generally a reduction of pollution, lowering the use of fertilizers, and the implementation 
of organic agriculture (which would include an elimination of Genetically Modified organisms, 
GMOs). According to them, to focus attention on a soil requalification that brings to less 
polluted ones, would also decrease imports and consequently create jobs, to partially solve 
the unemployment crisis. They also argue that the EU needs to increase tax breaks and 
low-interest loans to insulate residential buildings and that it should fund a convincing media 
campaign to highlight the savings in terms of money (and pollution) that this would entail. To 
reduce public expenditure so as to save money that could be donated to the municipalities, 
they also promote the idea of a common defence policy, with a single army supported by an 
unarmed Civil Peace Corps. Finally, they campaign for a Union more involved in human rights 
protection that considers having a healthy environment a fundamental base for human 
rights47.
 The Italian associations of degrowth have never proposed a candidate for the 
European Parliament. Despite that though, several activists are engaged politically at the EU 
level. One example is Andrea Zanoni, who in 2011 became an MEP. He has been inside the 
Movimento per la Decresctia Felice of Padua, and also of several animal-rights associations. 
He is a member of the Democratic Party, and he sits in the PES, Party of European Socialists48.
 It should be noted that in the elections of May 2014, several degrowth activists were 
candidates for the Five Star Movement, a recent political party that share some of degrowth 
opinions, especially concerning environmental policies49. Nevertheless, it may not be said 
that the two movements share always the same idea: indeed, the party is considered to be a 
Eurosceptic one, as its campaign mainly focused on a possible way out from the Euro50.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 “Andrea Zanoni,” Andrea Zanoni, accessed May 22, 2014, http://www.andreazanoni.it/it/chi-sono/.
49 Giovanni Fez, “L’Europa? Noi la vogliamo local, al servizio del cittadino,” Il cambiamento, accessed May 22, 2014, 
http://www.ilcambiamento.it/decrescita_felice/dario_tamburrano_europa.html.




The French degrowth organizations PPLD and MOC joined together in a single platform 
for the European elections of 2009 and of 2014. The reason for this union are to be found 
in a need for the activists of this movement to emphasise the debate on degrowth at the 
political level. In order to do that, they sought to engage in several ways, including 
demonstrations, petitions, electoral campaigns, to export what they call “radical ideas”, 
mainly a rupture with capitalism51. In the election of May 2014, five electoral lists were 
presented for five constituencies (the names of the lists are: Décroissance Ouest, Europe 
Décroissance Nord Ouest, Europe décroissance Ile-de- France, Est Décroissance 2014, 
Europe décroissance Centre)52.
 The ideas promoted by these electoral lists are in line with what they termed an 
ecological and social radical rupture, supporting the concept of estrangement from 
growth to reduce social inequality and environmental impact. Seven propositions have 
been posed which can be summarized as follows.
 First of all, an exit from the single currency and a return to the national ones is put 
forward. Then, the exit from what they called food sovereignty (Souveraineté 
alimentaire), aiming at taking distance from the Common Agricultural Policy, to promote 
instead a bigger attention on family farming and biodiversity, without the production of 
GMOs and bio-fuels. This proposition is to reduce green-house gas emission, and to 
promote short-distance instead of long-distance trade. In the third point of their list, they 
claim to be against the current common market based on free trade, instead preferring 
treaties based on cooperation and free relocation. Without explaining further this 
argument, they criticise the Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA) agreement, which is 
seen as an undemocratic accord done mainly to please lobbies. After that, the 
propositions go from rupture with a system based on “megapolis”, to an ecological 
disruption in the energy and industrial policies, to encourage energy sobriety, 
non-exploitation of unconventional fossil fuels and the use of local renewable energy. 
The list goes on by promoting a higher control and fair sharing of resources at the local 
level, also to prevent migration caused by poverty. Then the seventh point regards 
foreign policies, attacking the idea of having an integrated one, that would trail the 
“imperialism” of U.S., and it also mentions the removal of any possibility of nuclear 
powers. Finally, the last proposition is about the implementation of the use of languages 
other than English inside of the EU institutions53.
 The two movements have never won a seat in the European Parliament, neither in 
2009 nor in 201454. However, it can be noticed that there have been activists who have 
also been deputies, such as Yves Cochet, editors of the review Entropia, and affiliated to 
the Europe Ecology – The Greens (Europe Écologie – Les Verts) party at national level, 
and to The Greens/European Free Alliance party in the European Parliament55.
51 “Plateforme de convergence,” Converging platform, Degrowth-elections, accessed 25 May, 2014, http://decroissance- 
elections.fr/plateforme-de-convergence/.
52 “Europe-Décroissance présente 5 listes aux élections européennes 2014,” Degrowth-elections, accessed 25 May, 2014, 
http://decroissance-elections.fr/europe-decroissance-presente-5-listes-aux-elections-europeennes-2014/.
53“Des Décroissants se présentent aux élections européennes,” Degrowth-elections, accessed 25 May, 2014, 
http://decroissance-elections.fr/des-decroissants-se-presentent-aux-elections-europeennes/.
54“Résultats des élections européennes de 2009,” Ministère de l'intérieur, accessed 25 May, 2014, 
http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Actualites-des-elections/Dossier-elections-europeennes-2014/Annexe-10- 
Resultats-des-elections-europeennes-de-2009.
55“Europe Ecologie Les Verts,” Europe Ecologie Les Verts, accessed 25 May, 2014, http://europeecologie.eu/.
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 After having analysed these two perspectives on the European Union, one wonders 
whether degrowth can be considered as a Eurosceptic movement. To answer to this question, 
the definition given by Taggart and Szczerbiak will be followed, who divided the category in 
to two sub-groups, namely “hard” and “soft” Euroscepticism56 57. If the first one refers to a 
principled opposition that seeks a withdrawal from the EU, the second invokes “concerns on 
one (or a number) of policy areas [that] lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the 
EU”58.
 The ideas proposed in the Italian Manifesto for a Europe of Degrowth can hardly be 
linked with these terms, considering the fact that its aims in some cases look for a further 
integration and a deeper participation of the institutions in local policies (e.g. the idea of a 
common army, or the call for an implementation of EU laws on prohibition of privatisation of 
common goods). The French PPLD though, is on the opposite side: the proposition of the exit 
from the euro zone or the separation from the Common Agricultural Policy, are some of the 
aspects that put this party under the term of (at least) soft Euroscepticism.
Conclusion
In summary, it has been seen that degrowth ideas both in Italy and in France stem from an 
agreed diagnosis of the problem affecting our world. All the components of the movement, 
in both countries, challenge to the myth of growth and the concepts related to an unlimited 
development of production that represents the core of modern economic systems, along with 
the preoccupation with an ever increasing GDP. Moreover, degrowth thinkers on both Italy 
and France support the theory proposed by Georgescu-Roegen (that sees in the 
contemporary economic paradigm a contradiction with natural laws). They believe that the 
earth is no longer able to bear the current situation, having a limited amount of resources 
used in an equation that seeks infinite growth. Also when it comes to the aims of degrowth, 
it can be seen that the scholars of this paradigm share the ideas of promoting a delocalised 
world, in which a drastic change of mentality would bring a higher ecological sustainability 
and would promote equality among human beings, likewise an improvement of well- being. 
The four common sources proposed by Flipo and others (Culture, Ecology, Democracy and 
Bio-economy) summarise all these ideas.
 But not everything is the same when it comes to the ways in which the paradigm has 
developed in the two countries analysed. On the one hand, in Italy there are two main groups 
– Rete per la Decrescita and Movimento per la Decrescita Felice. The first focuses more on 
research and on theoretical ideas over the different aspects proposed by the paradigm, 
whereas the second involves more engagement with civil society, proposing alternative ways 
of everyday life. Despite the fact that some activists have engaged with some political parties, 
the movement in the Mediterranean peninsula proposes itself as an apolitical one. On the 
other hand, the French situation is more complex, presenting a larger variety of features. For 
example, a theoretical group that conducts research and debate over décroissance can be 
found there, i.e. Institute of Social and Economic Studies for a Sustainable Degrowth. 
56Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, “The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States,” SEI Working 
Paper No. 51, Sussex European Institute, University of Sussex (2002).
57 The theory proposed analyses only political parties. Despite that, it can be easily applied also to the Manifesto of the 
Movement for a Happy Degrowth (it is not the movement to be analysed, but the document produced).
58 Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, “The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States,” SEI Working 
Paper No. 51, Sussex European Institute, University of Sussex (2002).
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Moreover, a newspaper has been launched called la Décroissance, le journal de la joie 
de vivre, among other similar publications, together with a review, Entropia. Contrary to 
the Italian situation, in France there has been also the development of some political 
movements, mainly the Parti Pour la Décroissance and the Mouvement des Objecteurs 
de Croissance.
 As seen in the final sections of the paper, along with these differences, diverse 
approaches towards a subject such as the EU can be noticed. In Italy, the Movement for 
a Happy degrowth has proposed what has been called a Manifesto for a Europe of 
Degrowth. Divided into 13 points, the activists criticise the current situation and propose 
a more environmentally friendly Union. The exhaustive explanation gives an idea of 
institutions more linked to the local level, and more engaged in implementing 
sustainable policies for the Earth (such as the application of bans on privatisation of 
common resources, or on use of chemical products). Among other things, they propose 
a unified army, the prohibition of nuclear power plants, a lighter bureaucracy closer to 
the citizens, and so on.
 In France, it has been the political part of the movement which has expressed an 
opinion on the EU, being engaged in the European Parliamentary Elections of both 2009 
and 2014. Especially with regards to the latter, it has been noticed that the position 
expressed by these activists is more radical than the Italian one; indeed, during the 
electoral campaign, the party has made several propositions, among which the exit from 
the eurozone and separation from the Common Agricultural Policy. These positions lead 
to the conclusion that this party can be labelled as a Eurosceptic one, which on the 
contrary is not the case for the Italian Movement for a Happy Degrowth.
 The analysis over the differences in degrowth approaches towards the European 
Union could go further. This paper though, has begun to show how this new and 
constantly growing paradigm, despite the similarities, can lead to different outcomes.
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Low Tide for Climate Refugees – Legal Recognition
of Environmental Migrants in the European Union
Lisa Ziemann
Introduction
The number of natural disasters induced by climate change, as well as 
the gravity of their short- and long-term consequences, has grown 
profoundly over the past decades. While climate change causes 
floods and droughts, it simultaneously takes a toll on human beings 
by causing a phenomenon known as environmentally induced 
migration.1 Although climate change has been the subject of 
controversial public discussion for a substantial period of time, so 
called climate refugees have only recently made their way onto the 
radar of politicians. Ever since the UN predicted that “there will be 
millions of environmental migrants by 2020 with climate change as one of the major drivers 
of this phenomenon,” it was officially declared by the European Commission that “Europe 
must expect substantially increased migratory pressure” since the EU is bordering some of 
the regions that are most vulnerable to climate change.2 Even though there is a widespread 
disagreement about reliable predictions regarding the expected number of environmental 
migrants, environmental scientists as well as other scholars and politicians begin to concur 
that the topic nonetheless deserves undivided attention. Although issues of migration are 
usually grounded in the individual competency of each Member State, environmental 
migration, ultimately linked to the effects of climate change, might eventually be a shared 
competency led by the decision making of EU institutions. However, even though it has been 
argued that “the EU is in a unique position to respond to the impacts of climate change on 
international security, given its leading role in development, global climate policy and the 
wide array of tools and instruments at its disposal,” the EU has struggled immensely to reach 
conceptual clarity and consensus about climate refugees.3 Nor has the Union developed a 
coherent and legally binding instrument or provision dealing exclusively with the recognition 
and protection of environmental refugees.
 The aim of this paper is to conceptualise the absence of a EU climate refugee policy 
as well as the possibilities for policy development and to assess the importance given to the 
debate by EU officials. Based on official documents published by the European Parliament 
IP subtheme: The Climate of European Politics
Keywords: European Union, Climate Change, Environmental Migration,
Climate Refugees, Refugee Policy
1 The International Organization for Migration (IOM) currently proposes to define environmental migrants as “persons or groups 
of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or 
living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who 
move either within their country or abroad.” (IOM, MC/INF/288)
2 Javier Solana, “Climate change and international security,” (Paper from the High Representative and the European 
Commission to the European Council, S113/08, Brussels, 2008), 4.
3 Ibid., 2.
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and the Commission, as well as a wide array of expert opinion, this paper seeks to 
determine the different actors involved in the debate and the content thereof, ultimately 
assessing the position held by the debate in the current climate change policy agenda of 
the European Union. Lastly, the idea of the European Union as a possible role model or 
leader in climate refugee policy is discussed. The main research method used to answer 
the previously raised questions is content analysis, in which books, magazines, web 
pages, newspapers, laws and constitutions are considered to be appropriate for study.4 
Content analysis is particularly suitable because it offers the possibility to answer the 
elementary questions of “who says what, to whom, why, how, and with what effect?”5 
Relevant primary sources involve statements and studies published by official EU 
institutions, mainly the European Commission as well as the European Parliament. 
Secondary sources are more varied and include books, numerous journals, reports, staff 
working papers provided by the EU as well as EU directives. The secondary sources were 
used to compose the literature review which can be found in the following of this paper 
and which is set out to provide a more elaborative context as well as a basis for the 
analysis of the data sample – a study conducted by the European Parliament – presented 
subsequently. A large number of different key words were used in order to find the most 
relevant but still varied documentation. Considering the fact that there is neither a 
European nor a global agreement about the terminology or the concepts surrounding 
environmental migration and climate refugees, it turned out to be rather challenging to 
immediately find useful and appropriate sources. The usage of all concepts and terms 
ever associated and used in the context of environmental migration eventually led to the 
finding of sources and ultimately to the critical content analysis which constitutes the 
core of this paper.
Hindrance through Uncertainty: Multifaceted Gaps
Conceptual Gap
While the definition of a normal refugee and his rights is to be found in article 1a of the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, an official, institutionally accepted 
definition of an environmental refugee has not been adopted yet.6 In addition, the mere 
concept of environmental migration is subject to a vivid discourse and constant 
alteration. The question whether it is more appropriate to use the term migrants of 
environmentally induced displacement, climate refugee or environmental migrant lies at 
the core of many of the scholarly writings concerned with environmentally induced 
migration.7 According to a wide array of researchers and experts the entire discussion, as 
well as research and policy making attempts, are significantly hindered and limited by 
4 Earl R Babbie, The Practice of Social Research (Belmont: Thomson Higher Education, 2006): 320.
5 Ibid.
6 Article 1a of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees exclusively defines a refugee to be “a person who owing 
to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a 
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”
7 Henceforth, for reasons of clarity and comprehensibility, the term environmental migrant, as defined by the IOM, will be used 
to describe those involved in climate change induced movements.
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this conceptual gap. Frank Biermann, professor of political science and environmental policy 
sciences, explains that even though “the notion of environmental refugees includes climate 
refugees, its breadth makes it impossible to specify or quantify climate-related migration,” 
which can obstruct data collection or comparative research programmes.8 Furthermore, he, 
as well as other authors and intergovernmental bodies, see the very term refugee as 
controversial and therefore suggest the usage of the terms migrants or displaced persons.9 
Jean Lambert, a Green MEP from the UK, agrees and concedes that it will be a rather 
complicated task to clearly define environmental migrants and refugees. Besides pointing out 
that the existence of environmental refugees has to be officially recognised in order for the 
affected people to receive recognition, Lambert also opposes the definition suggested by 
the IOM, stressing the necessity to specifically refer to the migrants as refugees because only 
that will ensure the host nations’ responsibilities towards the peoples’ well being and 
recognition of specific rights. Still others propose to recognise the people concerned on the 
basis of already existing categories in order to prevent possible confusion regarding “the link 
between climate change, the environment and displacement.”10 According to Vikram 
Kolmannskog, a sociologist from the University of Oslo, whose approach is grounded in 
European asylum law, every take on environmentally induced migration and associated 
categorisation runs the risk of creating further gaps or even excluding persons.11
Two Schools of Thought
Even though leading and powerful institutions predicted the possibility of a high influx of 
environmental migrants in upcoming decades, other experts’ and scholastic opinions differ 
largely on this question. The Global Strategic Trends Programme, published by the UK based 
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, concludes that “a combination of resource 
pressure, climate change and the pursuit of economic advantage might stimulate rapid large 
scale shifts in population,” which will particularly draw Sub-Saharan populations towards the 
Mediterranean, Europe and the Middle East.12 On the other hand the German Council on 
Global Change considers it likely that “most [environmental] migration currently takes place 
within national borders and that this will continue to be the case in future” which makes 
“environmental migrants therefore more likely to be internally displaced persons rather than 
migrants who cross national borders.”13 Cecilia Tacoli, a senior researcher at the International 
Institute for Environment and Development, conducted migration and climate change 
research in the context of high mobility and argues that even though it is generally misleading 
to presume that the predominant form of any migration is the simple movement from poorer 
to richer countries, migration related to climate change at the global level will not just be 
8 Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas, “Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate 
Refugees,” Global Environmental Politics 10, no.1. (February 2010): 62.
9 Ibid., 63.
10 Vikram Kolmannskog and Finn Myrstad, “Environmental Displacement in European Asylum Law,” European Journal of 
Migration and Law 11. (2009): 314.
11 Ibid., 315.
12 UK Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC). “The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007–2036.” 3rd 
edition (2007): 28.
13 German Advisory Council on Global Change. “World in Transition: Climate Change as a Security Risk.” (2007): 118.
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across borders but most likely also from poor to rich countries.14 Referring back to the 
European Union being a collection of comparatively rich countries bordering poorer 
nations, which are simultaneously vulnerable to the effects of climate change, the influx 
of environmental migrants is described to be quite likely. The variety of sources and 
propositions indicate that the number of currently and prospectively displaced people is 
and will continue to be largely unknown.
Policy Gap
The European Union’s regulatory powers in the fields of environment and migration are 
substantial. But even though the “complex, multi-polar, and multi-faceted governance 
regime in Europe on migration and the environment holds significant potential for policy 
developments on migration linked to environmental change,” no progress has been 
made and no policies dealing exclusively with the treatment and protection of 
environmental migrants in the EU has been published.15 According to Karen McNamara, 
a researcher in sustainable development, the absence of policies regarding 
environmental refugees is largely due to the highly varied discourses and debates 
involving countless actors and agencies and the subsequent inability to come to an 
agreement. Similar to others in her field, McNamara suggests rethinking the entire 
concept of environmental migration and also its worth.16 In either case there is an almost 
unanimous agreement that the EU has the ability to pursue a leading role in the 
discourse surrounding environmental refugees. A number of scholars advise the 
European Union not to wait for other global actors to lead but rather to play a proactive 
role by openly proposing ideas and possibly even leading the decision-making 
process.17
 Besides the absence of direct legal recognition of environmental migrants 
through policies, official and only recently passed conventions and directives dealing 
with refugees in the European Union also offer no visible, let alone useful, reference to 
climate refugees. The overarching system which the EU has been working on since 1999 
comprises the most relevant directives regarding refugees is the so called Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS)18. It was and still is set out to improve the current 
legislative framework in order for asylum not to be a lottery.19 Among other things, the 
CEAS also oversees the Temporary Protection Directive, the (revised) Qualification 
Directive20 as well as the (revised) Dublin Regulation.21 These all deal with the influx of 
14 Cecilia Tacoli, “Crisis or adaptation? Migration and climate change in a context of high mobility,” Environment and 
Urbanization 21. (2009): 514.
15 Andrew Geddes and Will Somerville, “Migration and environmental change: Assessing the developing European approach,” 
Research from Migration Policy Institute Europe, Issue no.2. (May 2013):2.
16 McNamara, Karen Elizabeth. “Conceptualizing Discourses on Environmental Refugees at the United Nations.” Population 
and Environment, Vol. 29, no. 1. (September 2007): 22.
17Durkova, Petra, Anna Gromilova, Barbara Kiss and Megi Plaku. “Climate refuges in the 21st century.” Regional Academy on 
the United Nations. (December 2012): 14.
18 Between 1999 and 2005, several legislative measures harmonizing common minimum standards for asylum were adopted. 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm
19 European Commission on the Common European Asylum Sytem. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what- 
we-do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm (accessed April 6, 2014).
20 “The revised Qualification Directive clarifies the grounds for granting international protection and therefore will make asylum 
decisions more robust. It will also improve the access to rights and integration measures for beneficiaries of international 
protection.” (European Commission, accessed April 6, 2014.)
21 “The revised Dublin Regulation enhances the protection of asylum seekers during the process of establishing the State 
responsible for examining the application, and clarifies the rules governing the relations between states. It creates a system to 
detect early problems in national asylum or reception systems, and address their root causes before they develop into fully 
fledged crises.” (European Commission, accessed April 6, 2014.)
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displaced persons, referring to people fleeing persecution or serious harm in their home 
country, but essentially with no word mentioned, flight triggered by climate change and its 
consequences.
A flood of ideas met by a tide of legal force
As indicated above, environmental migration has received substantial attention from scholars 
as well as activists and the media over the past years. This diverse attention has resulted in a 
range of bodies publishing different numbers of possible environmental migrants, in the 
context of different concepts as well as the use of terminology. A first step towards a more 
common understanding of environmental migration and its possible victims was taken by the 
European Parliament in 2011 with a study, titled “Climate refugees” – Legal and policy 
responses to environmentally induced migration, exclusively dealing with ‘climate refugees’ 
and possible policy responses for future cases involving the influx and ultimate the handling 
of environmental migrants.
 Like most literature concerning the link between climate change and migration, the 
study found that even though there is a link between environmental change and migration, 
the link is not always easy to identify. The degree to which individuals or large groups of 
individuals will be affected by consequences of climate change largely depends on their 
vulnerability and their capacity to adapt, not just exposure to the effects and consequences 
of climate change. In order to at least provide some distinctions of effect, the European 
Parliament study distinguishes between “rapid-onset climate events describing extreme 
weather events and slow-onset climate events comprising drought, desertification, land 
degradation and sea-level rise.”22 Extreme weather events include floods, storms and tropical 
cyclones and on the one hand guarantee movement of people but on the other hand make 
it very difficult to predict possible numbers of individuals affected by these rapid-onset 
events. The temporary damage of homes and the destruction of crops are expected to 
require either temporary or even permanent relocation of individuals, which is again largely 
dependent on the general vulnerability of regions and individuals involved. Slow-onset 
climate events on the other hand primarily refer to phenomena like water scarcity, which 
negatively influences parts of the economic sector as for example agricultural productivity but 
also livelihood systems in general. Compared to fast-onset events, the long-term 
consequences of slow-onset events are even more difficult to identify and predict, simply 
because the environmental changes are a lot slower and ultimately harder to observe 
statistically. The study conducted by the European Parliament suggests that “there are many 
well reported cases of mass population movements as a result of droughts [but] that many 
researchers question that there is a direct link between drought and emigration highlighting 
the variety of causes determining migration.”23 The study clarifies, however, “that migration 
always constituted a core element of responses to changes in livelihoods.”24
22 Albert Kraler, Tatiana Cernei and Marion Noack, “‘Climate Refugees’: Legal and Policy Responses to Environmentally 
Induced Migration.” Briefing paper prepared for Directorate General for Internal Affairs, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights 
and Constitutional Affairs of the European Parliament. (2011):10.
23 Albert Kraler, Tatiana Cernei and Marion Noack, “‘Climate Refugees’: Legal and Policy Responses to Environmentally 
Induced Migration.” Briefing paper prepared for Directorate General for Internal Affairs, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights 
and Constitutional Affairs of the European Parliament. (2011): 22.
24 Ibid.
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 Besides the highly academic discourse that developed around environmentally 
induced migration, the topic has increasingly moved to a policy level regarding the global 
efforts to understand and limit climate change and the effects thereof, showing that European 
policy makers are becoming more aware of their responsibility regarding this issue. Because 
policies regarding environmental migration are generally nonexistent, significantly large 
protection gaps persist particularly in “the case of slow-onset migration and displacement 
across borders.”25 In order to address these gaps, keeping in mind that no policies are 
available, a reappearing question is whether to amend an already existing policy or law 
dealing with general migration or whether to establish an entirely new one. The European 
Parliament study offers five options to be considered by the European Union, even though 
they are generally considered at the global level. The first option is the extension and 
rephrasing of the Geneva Convention which was quickly declared unrealisable, simply 
because it bears the risk of devaluating the existing protection of normal refugees currently 
offered by the convention.26 The second proposal is to extend the Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement which, despite offering some potential, will show very little efficiency 
because they offer guidelines but no legal forces, which are necessary in order to guarantee 
any form of progress. Surprisingly the study acknowledges that the third option, the creation 
of an entirely new framework, is also unlikely to be implemented because of the “potential 
lack of political will,” which would, similar to the previous option, lead to the creation of ideas 
that are useless without legal force.27 A further option mentioned is the inclusion of an 
additional paragraph in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
which has encouraged further discussion but again neither action nor actual implementation. 
The last option presented is the amendment and usage of existing forms of temporary 
protection. All of the aforementioned options indicate that the few possibilities that do exist 
rather, if at all, apply to victims of rapid-onset climate events, only creating a further 
protection gap.
 Directly at the EU level, environmentally displaced individuals could only be helped in 
case of mass influx caused by a natural disaster, in which the Temporary Protection Directive 
could theoretically apply.28 Introduced in 2001, the Temporary Protection Directive is a 
specific measure aimed at providing third country nationals with immediate but temporary 
protection in case of displacement through war or other causes. It aims to harmonise the 
protection efforts of EU member states in case of a mass influx and also specifies the 
treatment and rights of the displaced persons. The directive, which has actually never been 
implemented, calls for EU member states to agree to a proposal made by the Commission 
that, in case of war or other reasons for displacement, a certain national group could qualify 
for temporary protection. Once a group is able to receive temporary protection, each 
member state can decide – individually and voluntarily – how many places of protection they 
25 Ibid., 36. 
26 Ibid., 72. 
27 Ibid.
28The Temporary Protection Directive was the EU response to the conflicts in Yugoslavia and Kosovo and is an exceptional 
measure to provide displaced persons from non-EU countries and unable to return to their country of origin, with immediate 
and temporary protection. It applies in particular when there is a risk that the standard asylum system is struggling to cope with 
demand stemming from a mass influx that risks having a negative impact on the processing of claims. (European Commission)
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can offer to the displaced group with funding for these efforts coming directly from the EU. 
Ultimately the directive’s main function is to give bodies in the asylum decision-making field 
enough time to assess the individual claims in a situation of mass influx while still offering 
basic protection and meeting basic needs like housing and health care. Similar to the other 
proposed options, the Temporary Protection Directive composes a rather limited and 
inherently useless instrument because it again theoretically provides protection for a group 
but not for an individual. A group of green MEPs has argued that “the activation of this 
Directive needs the support of a qualified majority in the European Council, which represents 
another hurdle [...] while it might also be worth noticing that so far, the Directive has never 
been invoked.”29 According to the study, there are currently a number of non-EU harmonised 
protection statuses at the national level of some EU member states that could theoretically be 
granted to asylum related applicants but that only four member states – Sweden, Finland, 
Italy and Cyprus – have applicable specifications about protection of individuals in case of a 
natural disaster.30
 Ultimately the absence of policies dealing with environmental migrants is not just a 
result of major conceptual gaps but also a result of institutional gaps. Besides the dominant 
incoherency of institutional responses at the international level, no agency “has so far 
assumed a responsibility for persons displaced across borders in the context of climate 
change.”31 Whereas the International Office for Migration tried to find an inclusive definition 
by collectively calling individuals concerned environmental migrants, which ultimately does 
not differentiate between key components of migration as for example forced or voluntary 
migration, the UNHCR32 will continue to work on a case by case basis, simply because there 
still has not been any agreement about possible changes and leadership. The role and sphere 
of influence of the UNHCR remains at a continuously limited level even though the potential 
for responsibility exists. Still the EU can by all means be considered an active international 
actor in fighting against climate change but only in the field of environmental policy. The EU 
definitely tries to portray a positive picture to the outside which could encourage third 
countries to see the EU as a role model in whose footsteps it is worth following, especially 
with regard to possible EU legislation. If the EU were to take the step to officially and legally 
recognize environmental migrants, other nations could follow the lead. The EU shows 
promise as an international actor who, if it decides to establish an agreement mentioning the 
relevant terms, could certainly instigate other countries to participate in a global recognition 
of environmental refugees.
Conclusion
It stands without a doubt that “climate change threatens to cause the largest refugee crisis in 
human history.”33 Over the past years, climate change and its’ consequences of 
29 Helene Flautre, Jean Lambert, Ska Keller and Barbara Lochbihler, “Climate Change, Refugees and Migration.” The Greens in 
the European Parliament, Position Paper. (2013): 11.
30 Albert Kraler, Tatiana Cernei and Marion Noack, “‘Climate Refugees’: Legal and Policy Responses to Environmentally 
Induced Migration.” Briefing paper prepared for Directorate General for Internal Affairs, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights 
and Constitutional Affairs of the European Parliament. (2011): 73.
31 Walter Kälin and Nina Schrepfer, “Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate Change- Normative Gaps 
and Possible Approaches.” Legal and Protection Research Series, Division of International Protection. PPLA/2012/01. (February 
2012): 44.
32 “United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.”
33 Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas, “Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate 
Refugees,” Global Environmental Politics 10, no.1. (February 2010): 83.
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environmentally induced migration, has attracted large amounts of attention from a variety of 
scholars. The concern about the absence of policies dealing with the recognition and 
protection of environmental migrants has triggered innumerable discussions as well as 
requests for policies and conceptual clarifications. Recently published documents like the 
study conducted by the European Parliament have acknowledged the severity of the issue 
and have slightly evolved in realizations about possible policy changes and options. However, 
the overall response by official EU institutions is still conceptually incoherent and does not 
offer an outlook for speedy decision-making and policy establishments.
 As long as no EU-wide policy response towards environmental migrants is provided, it 
would be desirable to at least have the option of providing a state-wide, harmonised and 
actually applicable Temporary Protection Directive, even though this directive is currently only 
laid out to react to mass influx rather than to small displaced groups or displaced individuals. 
Finland and Sweden can be seen as role models in this regard, which should encourage other 
Member States to provide some sort of temporary protection. Countering the usage of scare 
tactics regarding a threat to security and economy, often used by policy opponents, it is 
highly important to mention that by recognising environmental migration and by 
implementing certain policies, the EU does not automatically agree to take in all those who 
are displaced due to environmental changes and the associated consequences. However, as 
mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the mere recognition of environmental migrants 
goes hand in hand with the highly important recognition of the problem. This in turn could 
lead to the protection of the migrants’ rights and the provision of international aid. Besides 
the fact that there is no completely satisfying solution to the problem, short term international 
aid and the provision of material aid of course offer temporary help but again do not meet the 
true need. An international plan of adaptation, relevant to every country concerned, has to be 
developed which then coordinates the risk management as well as a sufficient preparation for 
possible disasters.
 Legal and policy responses towards environmental migrants have to be a multifaceted 
combination of different strategies which preferably involve either the actual option to 
migrate safely or otherwise a well developed and financed plan dealing with the adaptation 
of environmental migrants on site, for example offering options to move within or to a 
neighbouring country. Migration does not inherently have to be a sign of complete failure to 
adapt or general vulnerability. Often the attainment of physical safety and basic human rights 
is to be considered a reason for movement. Furthermore, leaving the importance of EU 
leadership and decision-making aside, country-specific or even local response mechanisms 
are just as necessary to provide control on site. Lastly, while the rapid-onset climate events 
require immediate decision-making and help, slow-onset climate events at least give the 
chance to prepare and plan ahead, an option that is not to be underestimated.
 In conclusion, the entire process surrounding environmentally induced migration can 
be described as utterly complex and unpredictable. The debate revolving around climate 
refugees and appropriate policies is highly diverse and includes a wide array of participants. 
The diverse group of debaters combined with conceptual as well as institutional gaps has, up 
118
to now, primarily led to confusion and to stagnation in the policy making process. Even 
though the topic of environmental migration tends to appear more frequently, especially due 
to the persistence of scholars and activists, the topic does not hold a prominent role in the 
climate change agenda of the EU. In either case, the times of talking about a possible policy 
response to environmental migrants are over since the time of implementing policies is 
impatiently waiting next in line. Even though the critical discourse surrounding environmental 
refugees is already varied and complex, it might simultaneously be considered incomplete 
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What’s For Dinner?: The European Union Informs On Its
Objectives for Sustainable, Yet Increasing Food Production
Rixt van Dongera
1. Introduction
“It’s quite normal for a species to go extinct simply as a result of overpopulating its 
environment . . . A similar fate could easily await mankind. Far sooner and faster than any of 
us imagine.”1 In 2013, Dan Brown’s latest book, Inferno, shockingly pointed out the world’s 
fast increasing population and Brown questioned if the world’s food supply would be able to 
feed this great amount of people. Critics were quick to sneer; such predictions have been 
made and proven false in the past, most notably in regard to the theory designed by Thomas 
Malthus in the eighteenth century.2 Although this may be reassuring, this does not mean that 
one should not take Brown’s observation of this problem seriously. Brown’s prediction that the 
world’s population will increase to nine billion in 2050 is grounded in sound research. 
Currently roughly 15% of the world’s population has little to no access to food and people are 
literally starving.3 Additionally, Malthus’ theory did not take into account the large amount of 
fossil fuels that would be discovered and have continually enabled to sustain the world’s 
current large-scaled food production. However, these amounts of fossil fuels have reached 
their peak a few years back and will continue to decrease and eventually disappear. 
Meanwhile, the agricultural4 sector depends on natural capital such as land, water, but also 
the biodiversity of the world’s ecosystems. The intensive use of these resources in the 
twentieth and twenty-first century cannot be continued in the same manner, or these will 
disappear as well. Natural and energy resources are declining, whilst the population is 
increasing, this could lead to a stark increase of food prices in the future. Often hunger is 
regarded as an ‘African’5 problem, but if scientific predictions proof to be sound, starvation is 
likely to become a European problem as well. Producing food in a sustainable manner 
therefore appears to be essential in order for agriculture to be able to increase its production 
in the next decades.
 The Directorate General (DG) in Agriculture and Rural Development of the European 
Union has consistently informed its citizens on the EU’s efforts in sustainable agriculture by 
their press releases. In reaction to the growing concerns about sustainable agriculture, is one 
able to identify an increasing focus on sustainable food production through content analysis 
in these press releases between 2008-2013? It is important to determine what have been the 
EU’s goals for sustainable agriculture in this time period and its objectives for the future are.
IP subtheme: The Climate of European Politics
Keywords: European Union, Common Agricultural Policy, Food Production,
Sustainable Agriculture, Fossil Fuels.
1 Dan Brown, Inferno, (New York: Doubleday, 2013,) 214.
2 Adjiedj Bakas, The Future of Food, (Amsterdam: Scriptum, 2012,) 118.
3 Jonathan A. Foley, et al. “Solutions for a Cultivated Planet,” Nature 478, (2011): 337.
4 Please note that this paper defines agriculture and food production as vegetable producing farming, and therefore this essay 
in no way focuses on meat and dairy production.
5 This is a generalisation that exists in Western media and not an expressed opinion of the author.
123
Based on the analysis, how does this focus and these objectives then coincide or clash 
with experts’ goals for sustainable agriculture? In order to answer this question, this 
paper will first define agriculture experts’ identified problems and goals for sustainable 
agriculture by reviewing relevant literature. Specifically resource scarcity and wastage, 
consumer behavior, and the pros and cons of organic farming and Genetically Modified 
(GM) food are discussed. Second, this paper determines that there is an increasing focus 
on sustainability to be noted in the DG on Agriculture and Rural Development’s press 
releases, as content analysis of the releases between 2008-2013 shows that the amount 
of press releases on sustainable food production have increased from 6.06% of all the 
DG’s press releases in 2008, to 37.93% in 2013. Third, the content analysis of these press 
releases demonstrates that the Union’s efforts to increase food production in a 
sustainable manner partly clash with experts’ objectives. In its press releases, the 
European Union appears to be committed to increasing the sustainability of its 
ever-increasing food production. However, when analysing the content of the actual 
goals the Union has set out in the 2008 CAP Health Check and 2014-2020 CAP to 
increase sustainability, these objectives seem unable to tackle problems such as the 
anticipant oil, land, and water shortage. This paper will begin by determining what 
sustainable food production actually means, and what experts’ objectives in the field are. 
After such a literature review, this paper identifies the EU’s sustainability efforts between 
2008-2014 through content analysis of a selected sample of the DG’s press releases, and 
finally a short content analysis of the 2008 CAP Health Check and the 2014-2020 CAP is 
provided in order legitimise the content analysis and determine what the EU’s efforts in 
sustainable food production have been and why.
2. Sustainable food production
2.1 Problems defined by agriculture experts
First, it is important to frame the current situation Europe’s food sector is in; in what 
manner are European citizens involved in regard to food production and what 
implications can experts find in this involvement when put into a sustainable agriculture 
framework? The majority of European citizens currently live in urban areas.6 Whilst they 
are no longer involved in the food production process, they are active consumers. To 
meet the increasing demands of Europe’s increasing population, the food industry has 
intensified its production over the last thirty years.7 The earth’s population is rapidly 
increasing. In the past eighty years it has already grown from two to seven billion people 
and it is expected that these numbers will rise to nine billion in 2050.8 These people all 
need to be fed and currently one in seven people already have little to no access food 
and these numbers will only increase.9 Climate change increases the agricultural sector’s 
problems, which in its turn has an effect on meeting the rising food demand. Ironically it 
6 Bakas, The Future of Food, 117.
7 Víctor Falguera, Núria Aliguer, and Mercè Falguera, “An Integrated Approach to Current Trends in Food Consumption: 
Moving Towards Functional and Organic Food,” Food Control 26, (2012): 274.
8 Bakas, The Future of Food, 112.
9 Foley, et al. “Solutions,” 337.
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appears that most of these changes are partly caused by the food producing sector itself. 
Agriculture namely uses roughly thirty-eight percent of the earth’s soil, and is influencing and 
sometimes destroying the natural benefits these areas bring.10 Whereas Europe’s demand for 
food will increase by seventy percent in 2050, sixty percent of our food-producing 
ecosystems are used in an unsustainable manner.11 The usage of agricultural land leads to a 
depletion of the earth’s biodiversity, and this diversity is essential for all current as well as 
future food production. Ecosystems are vital for human kind’s survival, as farming can only be 
done in a varied ecosystem. However, biodiversity’s essential part in farming is often 
overlooked in economic calculations regarding food production.12 This is problematic as 
agriculture can have tremendously positive or negative effects on the diversification of 
ecosystems.
2.2 Diminishing resources
If Europe is to increase its food production, it cannot do this by greatly expanding its 
agricultural lands. There simply is a limited amount of fertile soil in Europe that the agricultural 
sector can produce on.13 It appears that high quality soil, which is perfect for food production 
is often treated badly. The land is continually turned over and sprayed with synthetic fertiliser 
in order to have as much produce growing on it as possible.14 However such farming ways are 
unsustainable, as Godfray et al. explain that farmers are slowly destroying soil in this manner, 
whilst there is only a limited amount of such soil on the European continent.
 Climate change leads to rising sea levels and floods, which in its turn will decrease the 
amount of valuable fertile soil that is currently used along the seasides of Europe. 
Additionally, it seems that natural sweet water resources are increasingly affected by 
agriculture, as agriculture uses more water than any other field in the world.15 Slowly, but 
certainly the world’s sweet water resources are diminishing.16 Due to climate change, the 
earth is warming up, which leads to an increase of evapotranspiration, the sum of the 
transpiration into the atmosphere of water in waterbeds and plants.17 Increasing 
evapotranspiration consequently leads to declining available sweet water resources. With 
agriculture’s dependency on water, the demand for sweet water will simultaneously increase 
when the world’s need for food does.
 Most of all, food production is reliant on fossil fuels.18 The entire food production 
process uses tremendous amounts of energy, mostly using fuels such as oil. Not only 
agricultural devices such as tractors use big amounts of energy, so do pesticides made of oil, 
fertilisers made out of gas, heaters, greenhouses, and the food processing industry.19 To 
10 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), “The State of Food Insecurity in the World: Economic 
crises—Impacts and Lessons Learned,” (FAO, 2009): 8-12.
11 Bakas, The Future of Food, 132.
12 Godfray, et al. “The Future of the Global Food System,” 2773.
13 Godfray, et Al. “The Future of the Global Food System,” 2773.
14 H. Charles J, Godfray, et al. “The Future of the Global Food System,” Philosophical Transaction: Biological Sciences 365, 
(2012): 2773.
15 Godfray, et Al. “The Future of the Global Food System,” 2773.
16 Bakas, The Future of Food, 135.
17 Godfray, et al. “The Future of the Global Food System,” 2772.
18 A Farm for the Future, directed by Rebecca Hosking (London: BBC Documentary, 2009,) Broadcast.
19 A Farm for the Future.
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finally deliver the products to the consumer, cars, trucks, airplanes, boats, and other 
means of transportation are used and of course all these vehicles also run on energy.20 
This is not only damaging for the environment and speeds up climate change; such 
reliance on energy is also appears to be impossible to persist in the (near) future.
2.3 Consumer behavior
Consumers have become more aware of what they eat and why. This awareness creates 
reflective consumers; people who see consuming as part of their identity and therefore 
often demand more ethical foods, such as organic food, or products that are produced 
fairly or locally.21 In the 21st century, food is not only a natural necessity it is also trendy. 
Eating organic food can now be characterised as part of a life style.22 Consuming ethical 
foods enables one to identify as a healthty and ethical (and thus ‘better’ in regard to 
others) person. Biological products are often perceived as being double beneficial in this 
regard. Organic food is deemed to be healthy for consumers, as there are no 
pesticides/antibiotics/chemicals/etc. used in its production process.23 A person therefore 
appears to care more about one’s health when consuming organic products. 
Additionally, biological products are deemed to be more environmentally friendly than 
conventionally produced food. The argument for this rationale is that when one farms 
organically, the soil and plants are not treated with synthetic fertiliser and chemicals. One 
can thus be perceived as more environmentally aware when purchasing biological food. 
However, both of these claims cannot be sufficiently grounded in scientific research. 
According to Víctor Falguera, et al. these assumptions exist amongst consumers because 
the public and the scientific language do not always coincide; messages from the 
scientific fields are therefore reaching citizens through mass media in a disorienting 
manner which leads to consumers to make ungrounded assumptions.24
 According to hard scientific research, organic food is not necessarily healthier, nor 
does it provide more nutrition than conventional food does. In 2009, the English Food 
Standards Agency codncuted a large-scaled research, which concluded that currently 
there is no scientific base on which one can claim that organic food is healthier than other 
food.25 It appears that contemporary food scares are fueled by fears that food might 
harm citizens in any way. However in comparison with the conditions of food in the past, 
“food has never been safer.”26
 Then again, not all people buy biological products because of the presumed 
health benefits; the ethics of food production are becoming increasingly important for 
consumers.27 The assumed positive influence of organic farming on the environment is 
also an important factor on the basis of which people consume biological food. Are 
organic farms relatively more environmentally friendly however? The answer lies 
20 A Farm for the Future.
21 Falguera, Aliguer, and Falguera, “An Integrated Approach,” 275. 
22 Bakas, The Future of Food, 245.
23 Bakas, The Future of Food, 246.
24 Falguera, Aliguer, and Falguera, “An Integrated Approach,” 275.
25 Bakas, The Future of Food, 244.
26 Falguera, Aliguer, and Falguera, “An Integrated Approach,” 276.
27 Falguera, Aliguer, and Falguera, “An Integrated Approach,” 275.
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somewhere in the middle: it is neither a full yes, nor a no. The “environmental benefits of 
organic food production are often not so clear.”28 One the one hand, does organic farming 
use less oil in for example fertiliser and pesticides and the ecosystem definetely benefits from 
that. On the other hand, are organic farms considerably less productive than conventional 
farms are. Although biological farms might use less energy to produce products, it takes 
much more fuel to end up with the same amount of food products as conventional farms can 
produce.29
 Biological food is becoming increasingly popular, the demand for biological products 
is already higher than the current European market can supply.30 As biological farming is not 
productive enough to supply the EU’s community, the EU’s organic food supply increasingly 
relies on import.31 Falguera et al. explain that imported food has an incredibly high number 
of food miles (the economic, social, and environmental costs it takes for food to be 
transported from seeds to final consummation)32 especially in regard to the amount of energy 
is used for its transportation, making it impossible to state that the EU’s organic market would 
be relatively better for the environment. Generally, one can claim that organic farms are only 
good for the environment on a small scale. When considering this paper’s research question, 
whilst keeping the future food demand scenario in mind, it is not likely that organic food will 
play a significantly positive part in this discussion.
 Supporters of organic food production often oppose other forms of production; most 
significant is the stark opposition to GM food.33 This opposition is unfortunate, as it appears 
that GM food could partly be the solution for feeding the world’s growing population, whilst 
simultaneously being sustainable for the environment. In 2010, ten percent of the world’s 
farming was already using GM plants.34 Plants are often modified to be more nutritious and 
contain more vitamins. In this manner, one can produce larges amounts of the much-needed 
food, whilst using less soil. Additionally, GM has proven to be most helpful in making plants 
more resistant to diseases, so fewer pesticides will be needed.35 This would result in an 
agricultural system that would be less reliant on oil and thus quite good for the environment.
2.4 Resources and food wastage
Food production in Europe has more opportunities to increase its production whilst being 
increasingly sustainable. The food miles of products in Europe are often high.36 When the 
demand for food is going to increase in the currently predicted manner, it will rise with 
seventy percent.37 Whilst, sixty percent of the planet’s food-producing ecosystems are treated 
in an unsustainable manner and will eventually be worthless. If the agricultural sector
28 Falguera, Aliguer, and Falguera, “An Integrated Approach,” 277.
29 Bodini, Richter, and Felder, “Quality Related Communication,” 367.
30 Bakas, The Future of Food, 245.
31 Falguera, Aliguer, and Falguera, “An Integrated Approach,” 278.
32 Antonella Bodini, Toralf Richter, and Robert Felder, “Quality Related Communication Approaches for Organic Food,” Journal 
of Food Products Marketing 15 (2009): 366.
33 Bakas, The Future of Food, 272.
34 Bakas, The Future of Food, 269.
35 Shiuan-Huei Wu, et al. “Global Hunger: A Challenge to Agricultural, Food, and Nutritional Sciences,” Critical Reviews in 
Food Science and Nutrition 54, (2014): 153.
36 Antonella Bodini, Toralf Richter, and Robert Felder, “Quality Related Communication Approaches for Organic Food,” Journal 
of Food Products Marketing 15 (2009): 366.
37 Bakas, The Future of Food, 132.
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continues to waste raw materials in a similar manner as it has been doing for the past 
century, the sector will need three planets to feed its nine billion people in 2050.38 Earlier 
this paper identified land, water, and fossil fuels to be agriculture’s most important 
resources. Although these exhaustible resources are vital for food production, they are 
often wasted in the production process. Growing large amounts of vegetables is an 
intensive process,39 in order too optimise harvests, land is often used the entire year 
around and is continually turned over and sprayed with synthetic fertiliser.40 These are 
relatively new farming techniques and very distant from the ‘traditional ways’ of growing 
crops. The influence on the land’s biodiversity is extensive and fertile soils are slowly 
destroyed by this exhaustive method of farming.41
 Additionally, Europe’s vital water resources are diminishing slowly, but surely, 
whilst the demand for water will only increase.42 Currently, twenty to forty percent of 
Europe’s sweet water is wasted in the food-production process. The EU Water Saving 
Potential claims that these numbers can be decreased by forty percent when innovative 
water efficiency techniques will be used.43 Although such techniques are developed on 
a small scale, it is necessary for water efficiency research to acquire more funds and 
expand their research. Cleary, the EU agrees with experts upon the priority of such 
research and more developments in this area can be expected. Lastly, although oil use is 
unsustainable in itself, agriculture does not generally waste oil; it just uses a lot. 
Agriculture’s dependence on oil can only be changed by fundamentally changing the 
means of food production.44 Such changes can be expensive and intensive, but will most 
probably also be necessary in order to prevent a world-wide famine when oil resources 
decrease in the predicted manner.45
 When this variety of resources is used, the final food product is often thrown away 
or wasted in another manner, for example by expiring. The Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) states that about forty percent of food products are wasted after 
production in Europe and the United States.46 Supermarkets are mostly to blame for this 
as “wastage has become an integral part of the manufacturing process.”47 Often 
perfectly edible food is thrown away after these eat-by dates, a small portion might be 
going to food banks, but about ninety percent is stashed away as trash.48 However, not 
only supermarkets are to blame for food wastage, consumers also often throw away 
food. Eat-by dates are again a factor in this discussion, but these dates need to be 
combined with problematic nature of the large product packages that are sold in Europe. 
Such large portions of food can often not be eaten in time, so when the eat-by date 
38 Bakas, The Future of Food, 132-133. 
39 Bakas, The Future of Food, 63.
40 A Farm for the Future.
41 A Farm for the Future.
42 Godfray, et al. “The Future of the Global Food System,” 2772. 
43 Bakas, The Future of Food, 135.
44 A Farm for the Future.
45 A Farm for the Future.
46 Bakas, The Future of Food, 142.
47 John Preston, “Waste Uncovering the Global Food Scandal by Tristam Stuart: Review,” The Telegraph, 12 July 2009, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/5786024/Waste-Uncovering-the-Global-Food-Scandal-by- Tristram-Stuart-review.html 
(accessed 1 May, 2014.)
48 Preston, “Waste Uncovering.”
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emerges, the food is thrown away.49 In this age of plenty, most Europeans are hardly bothered 
by such waste, but such irresponsible treatment of food can be problematic when the world’s 
demand for food increases.
2.5 Experts’ solutions
As Jonathan Foley et al. concluded “we face one of the greatest challenges of the 
twenty-first- century: meeting society’s growing food needs while simultaneously reducing 
agriculture’s environmental harm.”50 Fortunately, Foley et al. also provide their readers with 
some possible solutions for these challenges. Foley et al. focus on most of the 
aforementioned topics and one can find much agreement amongst experts on these 
fundamental issues.
 Recognising the importance of land and water for the agricultural sector, better water 
and land management practices are necessary for agriculture to increase its production in a 
sustainable manner. To increase the value of soil without increasing its use, it is needed to find 
a proper balance in nutrient inputs. This seems rational, however nutrients put in the soil need 
to have been specifically adjusted to the characteristics of that land, otherwise the imbalance 
will decrease the efficiency of the soil.51 Ways for farmers to do this include a decrease of 
disproportionate fertiliser usage; an improvement in manure distribution, wetland restoration, 
and recycling unnecessarliy used nutrients.52 Foley et al. also propose that more research is 
needed on agro-ecological innovations and this claim is supported by Victor Falguera in “An 
Integrated Approach to Current Trends in Food Consumption.”53 International organisations 
such a the United Nations sponsor research that focuses on how “to increase agricultural 
production, conserve natural resources, promote yield-enhancing technologies and facilitate 
adaption to global changes, in response to current global hunger and poverty concerns,” 
examples of agro-ecological innovations that Foley et al. mention.54 As aforementioned, 
water is often wasted in the food productions process. In order to decrease water wastage, as 
well as increase efficiency in water-usage, Foley et al. suggest to increase the effectiveness of 
irrigation. Limiting the evaporative losses that occur during storage and transportation is an 
example of efficient water use.55 Additionally, can the water that is lost during farming be 
decreased by mulching, mulches are loose coverings or sheets of material placed on the 
surface of cultivated soil,56 as well as by reduced plowing. 
 Foley et al. do not disregard the role GM food can play in overcoming these 
challenges. They express the necessity of agriculture not limiting itself to one path, whether 
that may be organic farming, conventional farming, or GM production.57 All of these farming 
49 Bakas, The Future of Food, 144.
50 Foley, et al. “Solutions,” 337.
51 Foley, et al. “Solutions,” 340.
52 Foley, et al. “Solutions,” 340.
53 Falguera, Aliguer, and Falguera, “An Integrated Approach,” 277. 
54 Wu, et al. “Global Hunger,” 160.
55 Foley, et al. “Solutions,” 340.
56 “Mulches and Mulching, ” Royal Horticultural Society, n.d. http://www.rhs.org.uk/advice/profile?pid=323 (accessed 5 May, 
2014.)
57 Foley, et al. “Solutions,” 339.
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types have their own pros and cons, which led Shiuan Huei Wu et al. to suggest that 
policy makers and politicians (people who have a considerable amount of power to solve 
the food crisis) should be busying themselves with: “expanding large commercial farms 
and ending GM crops bans.”58
 Richard Heinberg suggests a re-ruralisation of Europe in order to solve the food 
crisis. This means that more young Europeans should decide to go into farming. In this 
manner, more small-scaled farms would meet the demands of the European foodmarket, 
which is a stark contrast with the current farming scene in Europe, which is dominated by 
large-scaled farms.59 Re-ruralisation fits into the idea that producing more food products 
locally can increase agricultural sustainability. Foley et al. hardly address the problems 
that oil causes, which is one of agriculture’s most important and vital resources, however 
Adjiedj Bakas in The Future of Food does. Bakas argues that by increasingly producing 
food in the area where it is consumed, the fossil fuels needed for transportation can be 
decreased. This might mean that fruits and vegetables vary in availability depending on 
what season it is, but the environmental and cost gains would be incredible.60
 It appears that people might need to change their dietary habits in order for their 
food to be produced sustainably. Changing eating habits to eating nuts instead of 
cereals as suggested by Martin Crawford, could not only increase the locality of food 
production, but also maintain biodiversity and increase agriculture’s food productivity, as 
nuts contain much more nutrition and calories than cereals and are therefore more 
efficient.61 However, changing people’s habits is a tremendous challenge in itself. 
Transforming the entire agricultural system would probably be most desirable, but such 
change is hard to achieve.
3. The EU’s sustainability efforts
3.1 Sample and methodology
It is apparent that resource and food wastage are challenges that Europe needs to 
overcome while increasing its food production. The DG in Agriculture and Rural 
Development of the European Union informs its citizens on how it is tackling such 
problems via its press releases. As both the increasing demand for food and the 
importance of sustainability have become pressing issues over the past few years, it is 
interesting to determine if there is an increasing focus on sustainable agriculture in the 
DG’s press releases to be noted between 2008-2014.
 In order to identify an increasing focus on sustainable food production, I looked 
at all the DG’s press releases between 2008-2013 an created a research sample. In order 
to avoid an incomplete perspective, I calculated what the percentage of these press 
58 Wu, et al. “Global Hunger,” 160.
59 A Farm for the Future.
60 Bakas, The Future of Food, 160.
61 A Farm for the Future.
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releases focused on sustainable agriculture was in regard to the total. The numbers are 
illustrated in the graph below.
As illustrated above, do the numbers of press releases focused on sustainable agriculture go 
up from 6% in 2008 to 38% of the total in 2013. It is clear that there is indeed an increasing 
focus on sustainability to be noted in these press releases. This increase occurs between the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Health Check in 2008 and the newly reformed CAP for 
2014-2020. Through content analysis of these press releases, this research wants to 
determine what the EU informs its citizens on about what the Union is doing in order to 
sustainably be able to supply its citizens with food over the next 50 years. Depending on the 
frequency of press releases centered on sustainable food production, either one or two 
releases were randomly selected for analysis from each year. This final selection consists out 
of 9 press releases, one from 2008, 2010, and 2011 and two from 2009, 2012, and 2013.
3.2 Findings
It can be noted that the EU’s messages on sustainable agriculture are similar, but the 
information varies slightly over time. In 2008 and 2009, all of the earlier mentioned 
environmental problems are addressed. The increasing demand for food is less addressed in 
the 2008 and 2009 press releases, but climate change, energy use, water management, and 
biodiversity are all discussed and marked as important in these press publications. All the 
claims made in these press releases communicate well in regard to expert opinions on these 
topics. For example, the press releases are highlighting necessity of more innovative farming 
technology in order to manage water and soil better. This appears to be in agreement with 
experts’ views on the matter. These media releases are written in either 2008 or 2009 and 
mostly relate to the CAP Health Check in 2008. It therefore seems rational for these press 
releases to mostly recognise the challenges that agriculture is facing, without actively 
addressing these problems. One press release in 2009 accurately claims that climate change 
is ongoing process that has already begun years back. Such a claim stresses that the climate 
Figure 1: DG in Agriculture and Rural Development’s Press Releases on Sustainable Agriculture
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change problem should not only be viewed as a future one, but as a current problem.62 
Recognising the negative influence agriculture has on climate change, all three press 
releases in 2008 and 2009 address the importance of cutting greenhouse gasses.
 Interestingly enough energy issues do not come up in any of the later press 
releases. Whilst climate change and sustainable food production appear to be more 
pressing topics after 2009, the cutting of greenhouse gasses is hardly addressed these 
releases. The media publications in 2010-2013 tend to concentrate on the reformed CAP 
for 2014-2020. The importance of sustainability is clearly recognised in these press 
releases; in 2012 Dacian Coloş clarifies “Sustainable agriculture is not a luxury but a 
necessity. It concerns us all, whether we live in Europe, or on any other place on Earth.”63 
However, the importance of cutting greenhouse gasses is hardly addressed in these 
releases that focus on the 2014-2020 CAP. This is apparent as the press releases inform 
on how the EU is currently making agriculture more sustainable; and these releases solely 
focus on sustainable land and water management. All press releases address the CAP 
2014-2020 and the importance of direct payments to increase agriculture’s sustainability. 
One third of these direct payments namely will be “invested in the environmental 
sustainability of European agriculture.”64 Organic farmers immediately receive these 
direct payments, an initiative which can be seen as questionable as the aforementioned 
experts defined organic farming as being sustainable, but not when it comes to fuel use.
 Next to such an abstract means to battle climate change and sustainably increase 
Europe’s food production, these six press releases also focus on some techniques on 
how to do such a thing in a practical sense. Part of the aforementioned direct payments 
are part of the EU’s greening process, this money will go to farmers who are treating soil 
in a sustainable manner.65 The most vital suggested techniques to treat soil sustainably 
appear to be green cover, permanent pasture and crop diversification. Identifying the 
rising scarcity of natural resources as well as the importance of maintaining as much 
biodiversity as possible, all of these advised techniques are tackling the declining 
availability of these resources. Additionally, these press releases focus on locally 
produced foods. This fits into the earlier defined concept of re-ruralisation. Growing and 
trading local products is not a specific aim of the EU. However, this certainly would 
decrease the amount of food miles such a product makes and European products can be 
defined as part of the EU’s sustainability process.
 Using content analysis this paper identified what the EU is informing its citizens in 
regard to sustainable agriculture. When analysing these nine publications, it becomes 
apparent that the EU mostly wants to communicate to its citizens what it is doing in order 
to help the farming sector to become more sustainable. These press releases focus on 
better land and water management in order to increase agriculture’s sustainability and 
62 Mariann Fischer Boel, “The Challenges Ahead for the CAP,” EUROPA Press Releases Database, 1 September, 2009, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-09-354_en.htm (accessed 28 April, 2014.)
63 Dacian Coloş, “Europe’s Path Towards Sustainable Agriculture,” EUROPA Press Releases Database, 21 June 2012, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-480_en.htm (accessed 27 April, 2014.)
64 Dacian Coloş, “The CAP Serving European Agriculture’s Competitiveness, Diversity and Sustainbility,” EUROPA Press 
Releases Database, 14 November 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13- 814_en.htm (accessed 27 April, 
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this coincides with the earlier identified sustainability problems such as natural resource 
scarcity and wastage. Better energy management appears not to be a current effort in this 
sustainability process as after 2009, the concept reducing carbon emissions is hardly 
addressed at all. Most probably, because cutting emmissions by a significant amount would 
be impossible for the 2014-2020 period, whereas there are means to manage natural 
resources better. It appears that for now, the EU is not significantly reducing its energy use in 
the agricultural sector and at least is not informing its public on how to do so in the future.
3.3 The CAP 2008 Health Check and the CAP 2014-2020
This paper acknowledges the limits of a sample that consists out of nine press releases. The 
EU’s efforts in sustainable land and water management are explained clearly in these releases 
and can be assumed to be addressed in as well the CAP Health Check in 2008 as in the 2014- 
2020 CAP. However, the previous claim that the EU’s DG in Agriculture and Rural 
Development seems to address energy use reduction less, whilst increasingly focusing on 
land and water sustainability between 2008-2014 cannot solely be made on the basis of these 
press releases. Therefore, to ensure that this essay does not oversee any EU efforts in 
sustainable energy use in agriculture, a short content analysis of the CAP 2008 Health Check 
and the new CAP 2014-2020 is made in order to verify this paper’s previous claims.66
CAP 2008 Health Check
In the 2008 CAP Health Check, renewable energy is identified as a priority. The Health Check 
provides its readers with an overview of the EU’s challenges in sustainable agriculture. 
Renewable energy is the second point of this list of the EU’s challenges in the agricultural 
field. A nine-line paragraph stresses the importance of renewable energu, especially in 
relation to the Union’s renewable energy roadmap. Three lines focusing on improvement of 
energy efficiency can be found, amongst other priorities, in the first point of these challenges.
CAP 2014-2020
Six years later, the newly reformed CAP is mainly focused on natural resource efficiency. 
Energy use is not mentioned amongst the policy objectives. One could anticipate the policy 
objectives in 2014 to be focused on the challenges identified in 2008, however in regard to 
energy this expectation is not applicable. This does not mean that energy is not mentioned 
in the 2014-2020 CAP at all. Resource efficiency and the importance of decreasing carbon 
emissions are identified as point 5 on the list of Rural Development’s priorities. Three lines are 
dedicated to the importance of reducing carbon emissions and energy use in all the DG in 
Agriculture and Rural Development’s fields. The CAP mentions it does have a special reserve, 
which can be used in times of crisis, but also does not specifically focus on increasing food 
production.67
66 “Overview of the CAP Health Check and the European Economic
Recovery Plan Modification of the Rural Development Plans,” European Commission Agriculture and Rural Development, 2010.
67 “Overview of CAP Reform 2014-2020,” European Commission Agricultural Policy Perspectives Brief 5, (December 2013).
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Although renewable energy and energy efficiency are clearly identified as a challenge and a priority 
in the 2008 CAP Health Check, it is not a policy objective in the 2014-2020 CAP, although it is 
mentioned to be a priority in rural development. Literature suggests that there a still little means to 
decrease energy use in agriculture, this could be a reason why the DG in Agriculture and Rural 
Development is currently focusing less on this challenge and perhaps is waiting for more research 
to enable such a decrease on a large scale. The EU is promoting locally produced food and 
researching the possibilities of GM foods, which are means to reduce energy use in food 
production and transportation, and thereby is working on reducing agriculture’s energy use.68 
However these energy cuts appear to be marginal in comparison to the benefits a fundamentally 
reformed farming system would give the EU. Reforming an entire system is certainly going to be 
costly and therefore not an attractive means to reduce energy use. It appears advisable to at least 
research the possibilities of such reform, as oil will become scarcer and therefore increasingly 
expensive in the next decades.
4. Conclusion
It is apparent that in a few decades there will be increasing problems in the world’s food supply, and 
Europe will not be exempt from this. It will be a challenge for the EU to supply its citizens with all 
the food they demand (whether organic, conventional or local), whilst these same citizens are 
relatively pickier in what they want to eat. The EU’s organic food market is already unable to meet 
the demands that exist amongst EU consumers. However, organic food is produced unsustainably, 
which is an element that is often overlooked, but essential for future food supply. According to 
experts’ views on the matter, the EU needs to decrease its wastage of resources and food products 
in the production process in order to increase its productivity whilst being sustainable. In order to 
decrease this wastage as well as increase its efficiency, the EU is currently trying to manage its 
water, land, and energy better. It appears that the EU is not focusing on the on the wastage of food 
after the production process, which is unfortunate as the Union could have a significant influence 
on product requirements such as eat-by dates and the size of products’ packages.
 The DG in Agriculture and Rural Development of the European Union informs its citizens on 
how the EU is sustainably increasing its food production via its press releases. These publications 
increasingly focus on sustainable agriculture between 2008-2013. Whilst these press releases offer 
information on how the EU is increasing agriculture’s sustainability, the EU’s energy use is most 
prominently addressed in 2008 and 2009. After 2009, the earlier given attention on reducing 
carbon emissions is hardly mentioned again. After analysing this sample of nine press releases in 
addition to a content analysis of the 2008 CAP Health Check and the new CAP 2014-2020, this 
paper concludes that whilst the EU is clearly working on sustainably managing its natural resources, 
it appears that the Union currently has no well- defined perspective on how to reduce energy use 
in the agricultural sector. The problematic nature of this is yet to be observed. If no alternative for 
the agricultural system’s intensive use of fossil fuel is found, oil will continue to get scarcer and 
farming’s dependency on fossil fuels could turn out to be catastrophic. Food prices can be 
expected to skyrocket in the next few decades. It is advisable for the EU to tackle its agricultural use 
of fossil fuels in the next decade. Otherwise it might be necessary for its citizens to go through 
another Inferno before they will be able to live in a European paradise of plenty once again.
68 “Green Paper on Promoting the Tastes of Europe,” EUROPA Press Releases Database, 14 July 2011, 
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134
28 Falguera, Aliguer, and Falguera, “An Integrated Approach,” 277.
29 Bodini, Richter, and Felder, “Quality Related Communication,” 367.
30 Bakas, The Future of Food, 245.
31 Falguera, Aliguer, and Falguera, “An Integrated Approach,” 278.
32 Antonella Bodini, Toralf Richter, and Robert Felder, “Quality Related Communication Approaches for Organic Food,” Journal 
of Food Products Marketing 15 (2009): 366.
33 Bakas, The Future of Food, 272.
34 Bakas, The Future of Food, 269.
35 Shiuan-Huei Wu, et al. “Global Hunger: A Challenge to Agricultural, Food, and Nutritional Sciences,” Critical Reviews in 
Food Science and Nutrition 54, (2014): 153.
36 Antonella Bodini, Toralf Richter, and Robert Felder, “Quality Related Communication Approaches for Organic Food,” Journal 
of Food Products Marketing 15 (2009): 366.
37 Bakas, The Future of Food, 132.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A Farm for the Future, directed by Rebecca Hosking (London: BBC Documentary, 2009,) Broadcast.
“Background Note: Commision Communication on the Future of the CAP.” EUROPA Press
 Releases Database. 18 November 2010, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
 10-587_en.htm (accessed 27 April, 2014.)
Bakas, Adjiedj. The Future of Food. Amsterdam: Scriptum, 2012.
Bodini, Antonella, Toralf Richter, and Robert Felder. “Quality Related Communication Approaches for   
 Organic Food.” Journal of Food Products Marketing 15 (2009): 364-377.
Boel, Mariann Fischer. “Paths to Success for Young Farmers.” EUROPA Press Releases Database.
 17 April 2008, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-08-202_en.htm
 (accessed 27 April, 2014.)
Boel, Mariann Fischer. “The Challenges Ahead for the CAP.” EUROPA Press Releases Database, 
 1 September, 2009, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-09-354_en.htm
 (accessed 28 April, 2014.)
Brown, Dan. Inferno. New York: Doubleday, 2013.
“CAP Reform – An Explanation of the Main Elements.” EUROPA Press Releases Database.
 12 October 2011, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-685_en.htm
 (accessed 27 April, 2014.)
Coloş, Dacian. “Europe’s Path Towards Sustainable Agriculture.” EUROPA Press Releases Database. 
 21 June 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-480_en.htm 
 (accessed 27 April, 2014.)
Coloş, Dacian. “The CAP and Research Facing the Challenges Ahead.” EUROPA Press Releases Database.  
 26 February 2013. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-156_en.htm 
 (accessed 27 April, 2014.)
Coloş, Dacian. “The CAP Serving European Agriculture’s Competitiveness, Diversity and Sustainbility.”   
 EUROPA Press Releases Database. 14 November 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
 SPEECH-13-814_en.htm (accessed 27 April, 2014.)
Coloş, Dacian. “To Reconcile the Expectations of the Markets and of Society: Opening a New Path for   
 Europe and Its Farmers.” EUROPA Press Releases Database. 27 March 2012,     
 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-228_en.htm (accessed 27 April, 2014.)
“European Group on Ethics (EGE) Asks European Commision to Embed Ethical Principles in Agriculture   
 Policies.” EUROPA Press Releases Database. 21 January 2009, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
 release_IP-09-86_en.htm (accessed 27 April, 2014.)
Falguera Víctor, Núria Aliguer, and Mercè Falguera. “An Integrated Approach to Current Trends in Food   
 Consumption: Moving Towards Functional and Organic Food.” Food Control 26, (2012): 274-281.
Foley, Jonathan A., Navin Ramankutty, Kate A. Brauman, Emily S. Cassidy, James S. Gerber, Matt Johnson,  
 Nathaniel D. Mueller, Christine O’Connel, Deepak K. Ray, Paul C. West, Christian Balzer, Elena M.   
 Bennet, Stephen R. Carpenter, Jason Hill, Chad Monfreda, Stephen Polasky, Johan Rockström,   
 John Sheenan, Stefan Sieber, David Tilman and David P. M. Zaks. “Solutions for a Cultivated   
 Planet.” Nature 478, (2011): 337-342.
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). “The State of Food Insecurity in the   
 World: Economic crises—Impacts and Lessons Learned.” (FAO, 2009.)
J. Godfray, Charles H., Ian R. Crute, Lawrence Haddad, David Lawrence, James F.Muir, Nicholas Nisbett,   
 Jules Pretty, Sherman Robinson, Camilla Toulmin and Rosalind Whiteley. “The Future of the   
 Global Food System.” Philosophical Transaction: Biological Sciences 365, (2012): 2769-2777.
“Green Paper on Promoting the Tastes of Europe.” EUROPA Press Releases Database. 14 July 2011,   
 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-885_en.htm (accessed 27 April, 2014.)
“Mulches and Mulching. ” Royal Horticultural Society. n.d. http://www.rhs.org.uk/advice/profile?pid=323   
 (accessed 5 May, 2014.)
“Overview of the CAP Health Check and the European Economic Recovery Plan Modification of the Rural  
 Development Plans.” European Commission Agriculture and Rural Development. 2010.
“Overview of CAP Reform 2014-2020.” European Commission Agricultural Policy Perspectives Brief 5,   
 (December 2013).
Preston, John. “Waste Uncovering the Global Food Scandal by Tristam Stuart: Review.” The Telegraph, 
 12 July 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/5786024/Waste-Uncovering-the-
 Global-Food-Scandal-by-Tristram-Stuart-review.html (accessed 1 May, 2014.)
Wu, Shiuan-Huei, Chi-Tang Ho, Sui-Lin, and Chi-Fai Chau. “Global Hunger: A Challenge to Agricultural,   









An Analysis of the Consumer Shift Towards Fair Trade Coffee
Current job:
Research and project assistant at
Mercator European Research Centre for Multilingualism and Language Learning
Rixt van Dongera
Rixt van Dongera is a 25-year old young professional who specialises in the 
field of American and European Studies, with specific regard to the European 
Union, American and European identity, minority and regional languages and 
the sociopolitical environment of Central and Eastern Europe.
My best memory of Eurocuture
I would recommend Euroculture because...
How has Euroculture helped me in my professional life?
In my current job I deal with many people and organisations from a variety of 
countries. The skills in international and intercultural communication that I 
developed (both in theory as in practice) during my time as a Euroculture 
student have assisted me greatly.
you can enjoy all the possiblities that studying (and graduating) at two 
European universities offer you.
is the semester I spent in Kraków, in this city all the things that matter to a 
Europhile (European history, culture, politics, law) come together in one big 
exciting and vibrating environment!
136
49 Bakas, The Future of Food, 144.
50 Foley, et al. “Solutions,” 337.
51 Foley, et al. “Solutions,” 340.
52 Foley, et al. “Solutions,” 340.
53 Falguera, Aliguer, and Falguera, “An Integrated Approach,” 277. 
54 Wu, et al. “Global Hunger,” 160.
55 Foley, et al. “Solutions,” 340.
56 “Mulches and Mulching, ” Royal Horticultural Society, n.d. http://www.rhs.org.uk/advice/profile?pid=323 (accessed 5 May, 
2014.)
57 Foley, et al. “Solutions,” 339.
Whose Land Is It Anyway? A Socio-Ecological Perspective
on the ‘No Tav’ Movement in the Val di Susa, Italy.
Sharon Mehta
Introduction
To establish the fact that social inequality and environmental inequality go together one need 
not look further than the placement of toxic landfills and the population profile living next to 
them. According to the European Environment Agency, between 250,000 and 1.3m tonnes of 
electrical waste products are shipped out of the EU to Asia and West Africa every year1. In 
Europe itself exists the Triangle of Death2 – another name for the city of Naples in Italy and its 
surrounding areas that have become an illegal dumping ground for toxic waste. It is not a 
coincidence that Naples has the highest rate of environment related health problems as well 
as the highest rate of unemployment in Italy - 42.7%3. This phenomenon has given rise to 
concepts such as ‘environmental racism’, ‘environmental justice’ and ‘ecological inequality’ 
that first originated in the United States of America4. The demand for environmental justice 
is the basis of many social movements as well. According to a case study conducted by 
Fabrizio Trocchia of Lund University, when the environmental consequences of the systematic 
exploitation of our natural resources and accumulation of pollution are unevenly distributed 
amongst the different sections of society, it gives rise to struggles for environmental justice by 
relatively excluded and powerless communities.’5  A major causal factor for this phenomenon 
is lack of political power for the marginalized sections of society. Italian political scientist 
Donatella della Porta further argues that this evolving conflict is a result of new urban regimes 
involving the coalition of public and private actors, which are increasingly becoming the 
development paradigm involving government and corporate partnerships6. This power 
relation is what has started contesting the notion of welfare state as it involves a certain class 
of citizens, ‘super citizens’ - who through financial investment have higher claims on land and 
natural resources meant for public use, thereby using social and economic inequality to 
further create ecological inequality for the marginalized classes.
IP subtheme: Global Stewardship, European Citizenship
Keywords: Environmental Security, No Tav, Development paradigms,
Focault, Habermas.
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This then is the cause of material threat created by the subordination of environment to 
economic growth and more precisely economic growth for a selective few. This material 
threat has resulted in many sections of society demanding alternative models of 
development with adequate public participation in the decision making process. But as 
Porta and Piazza assert, this perception of threat is not just motivated by resistance to 
change in the social systems that one is used to. It is the combination of a strong sense 
of Injustice along with the perception of material threat that pushes people towards 
radical forms of protest7. Thus, there is a need for a different conception of 
environmental protest, one that integrates our social fabric into the environmental 
studies framework to obtain a socio-ecological perspective. As Trocchia points out 
‘social systems as a separate entity from the surrounding natural environment is a 
fictitious simplification as there are anthropogenic outcomes on the environment.’8
 Therefore, the aim of this paper is to highlight the social and security 
consequences of ecological inequality and the need to focus on public institutions and 
development policies as corrective or regulatory factors. In this context the No Tav 
movement of Italy forms an apt example to highlight the connections between these 
myriad issues. The first part of the paper presents the background of the No Tav 
movement and various socio-economic, political and ideological factors that take it out 
of its one-dimensional context as merely an environmental protest. The second part of 
the paper, first, briefly outlines the concepts of ‘Biopolitical Governmentality’ and 
‘Struggles for Subjectification’ by Michael Foucault and secondly the concepts 
‘Communicative Action’ and ‘Deliberative Democracy’ by Jürgen Habermas. These 
concepts help to provide the theoretical lens through which to understand the risk of 
radicalization and the democratic potential of environmental protests. Since this paper 
begins from a critical hypothesis, an interpretive approach to these concepts has been 
used to adapt to the socio-ecological dimensions of an environmental movement, in this 
case, the No Tav. The empirical data in the concluding part of the paper is based on a 
pilot case study and so it is necessary to stress on the fact that the results of the survey 
should not be generalized. The point of the case study is merely to begin to map the 
radicalization and consequences of environmental protests and lay out the groundwork 
for further inquiry.
7 Ibid.
8 Trocchia, “Habermas on the Barricades
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Conflict in the Valley
Origins of NO TAV.
Susa Valley is a stretch of land between Maurine, France and Turin, Italy, extending over 
50km. Considered to be a beautiful and scenic area, much of its local economy depends on 
nature tourism, skiing and other traditional activities such as livestock and dairy production. 
The valley was also the base for the 2006 Winter Olympics but for years there have been 
increasing infrastructural projects such as massive highways and bridges, three hydroelectric 
dams and two electric lines9 being built in the valley. The rise of infrastructural activity, is an 
attempt by the national government to turn it into a ‘transit corridor’ therefore, is at odds with 
the local governments efforts to preserve nature as a source of sustainable livelihood. This 
macro development paradigm has lead to the NO TAV movement beginning in 1990. No Tav 
is short for ‘No Treno Alta Velocità’ or ‘No High Speed Train’ and refers to a passenger or 
freight train, capable of traveling at a speed of 250 km/h or higher10. This spontaneous, 
grass-root movement originated in the Susa Valley, near Turin in the Piedmont region of Italy. 
Originally the movement was composed of the Comunità Montana Bassa Valsusa or the 
Mountain Communities of Susa Valley, residents associations, the local Green Party and the 
Italian Communist Party11. The movement’s main protest is against the creation of a new 
high-speed railway line between Turin and Lyon in France. This line is located at the 
intersection of two main European axes to complement the European railway network. 
According to the European Commission Report of 2001 this proposed construction of the 
Lyon-Turin segment of the Trans-European Transport Network, (TEN-T) is part of the priority 
corridor 6, that connects ‘‘Lyon-Turin-Milan-Venice-Trieste/Koper- Ljubljana-Budapest,’’12. 
With this, thus, a significant question has been brought up; what kind of development should 
the EU promote? Under the ambit of infrastructural modernization, the Pro Tav protestors 
argue for reduced emission and road congestion and economic advantages while the No Tav 
protestors are concerned about the threats to their health, ecosystems and quality of life. 
None of the arguments are unfounded. Pro Tav officials estimate an increase of 60 million 
tonnes of cargo on the high capacity rail line that would reduce road bottlenecks thereby 
cutting down carbon emissions not to mention making the region more competitive in the 
European economy.13  The No Tav on the other hand argues that the environmental damages 
outweigh the economic benefits. The digging and extent of such massive infrastructure could 
change the course of the underground water table, ruin agricultural land and cause health 
concerns due to management of hazardous waste such as asbestos and uranium present in 
the valley that cause tumors and cancer through radiation. Furthermore, in their 
environmental assessment report, Giunti et al, especially highlight the aspects related with 
9 L.Giunti et al., “Economic, Environmental and Energy Turin-Lyon High-Speed Rail.,” International Journal of Ecosystems and 
Ecology Sciences (IJEES) Vol. 2 (4) (2012): 361–68.
10 Ibid.
11 Lucie Greyl et al., “High Speed Transport Infrastructure in Italy,” in Ecological Economics from the Ground Up (New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 592, http://www.ceecec.net/case-studies/high-speed-transport-in-italy/.
12 Fausto Marincioni and Federica Appiotti, “The Lyon-Turin High-Speed Rail: The Public Debate and Perception of 
Environmental Risk in Susa Valley, Italy,” Environmental Management 43, no. 5 (May 1, 2009): 863–75, 
doi:10.1007/s00267-009-9271-2.
13 Greyl et al., “High Speed Transport Infrastructure in Italy.”
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with local hydrogeology and its consequences that could lead to floods landslides and 
electromagnetic pollution.14 This would not only ruin an economy based on tourism and 
skiing in the event of degradation and soil erosion but could erode the homes and 
livelihoods of these residents as well. However, these opposing interests create a conflict 
situation when dealt with under an authoritarian development paradigm. Porta and 
Piazza observe that the central theme of the supporters of large-scale public works is that 
economic development requires large- scale ‘strategic projects.’15 This changes the 
framing of an environmental protest into an anti-development or anti-national one 
especially with the passing of the Strategic Infrastructure Act, Italian Law No. 443/2001, 
during the Berlusconi lead government of 2001-2006.16 This takes the development 
debate out of the public sphere under the moniker of ‘strategic interest’ and bypasses 
mediation with the local governments and residents by increasing the centralization of 
decision-making power. According to Marincioni et al, this also allows the national 
government to elude some environmental impact assessments. The obfuscation of the 
environmental and development agenda then furthers to disambiguate economic reality. 
Ivan Cicconi explains the connection between public debt, the financial structure and the 
contracts upon which the TAV in Italy is based. According to him the debt generated by 
the realization of this initiative is hidden in the balance sheets of private companies that 
are underwritten by the State, resulting in a relationship between the debt and the Italian 
GDP estimated at 135% instead of the official 120% 17.
 Thus this environmental conflict has transcended regional and national borders to 
become a hot topic in the European Parliamentary debates, which question the wisdom 
of the EU to finance this project given the current financial situation of Italy. At the crux 
of the No Tav is what seems to the core issue in all environmental conflicts today – the 
choice betweeneconomyandenvironment.
Transition of the environmental movement into a wider context.
The transformation of forms of environmental movements can be derived from changes 
in the social structure. One of the unique factors of this movement is its creative capacity 
to evolve through time and take into its ambit various other social issues such as 
capitalistic mode of development, sustainable living, corruption, democratization of the 
public sphere, green energy, lack of technical knowledge diffusion and much more. In 
doing so, unlike many other environmental movements that come with a shelf life, the 
No Tav has avoided being pigeonholed into the restricting definitions of just another 
green movement that can be dealt away with uni-dimensional, anti-development or 
anti-establishment rhetoric.
Leonardi makes 5 distinct phases of the movement, which are reiterated by Greyl et. al 
into 4 distinct periods again. Broadly speaking, the first phase of the movement focused 
14 L.Giunti et al., “Economic, Environmental and Energy Turin-Lyon High-Speed Rail.” 
15 Porta and Piazza, “Local Contention, Global Framing.”
16 Marincioni and Appiotti, “The Lyon-Turin High-Speed Rail.”
17 Ivan Cicconi, “High-Speed Railway Systems Increase Public Debt and Put a Break on Growth That Signals That the European 
Parliament Is Rethinking the Strategy.,” November 16, 2011, 
http://www.notavtorino.org/documenti/inglese/press-release-strasbourg-16-11-11.pdf.
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on the ‘liveability’ 18 factor, i.e. the disruption to everyday life that the construction activity would 
cause with noise, dust, storage sheds for materials and so on to the population in the immediate 
vicinity. This period between 1990 -1995 marks the beginning of the conflict which included not 
just the Lyon–Turin line but High Speed Train projects all over Italy and resulted against the first 
national march against High Speed rails in 1995.19 The second phase in the mid-90’s to 2000 
began to question the economics of the project which reinforced concern and brought the 
debate into a wider public sphere. According to Porta and Piazza the main bone of contention 
lies in the use of public money to realize large-scale infrastructure projects through private 
companies in collaboration with political parties, which essentially work for profit.
 So then we have a repeat of the traditional passage from public money to private profit.20 
The third phase brought to light new environmental concerns. The discovery of asbestos, 
uranium and radon in the mountains lead to concerns about the mining and disposal of these 
hazardous substances as well as concerns about the extent of deep digging required for such a 
gigantic project that could cause disruptions to the underground water table. This changing 
landscape is further connected to the changing identity of the people connected to the territory. 
The fourth period between 2000 and 2005 is when there was an intensification of the conflict and 
an escalation of violence by both the police and protestors. Leonardi writes about how the valley 
was militarized in the winter of 2005 with more than two thousand carabinieri or police trying to 
protect the constructions sites and bulldozers from sabotage, which resulted in a general strike 
with 80,000 protestors marching into Turin. The protestors then entered a mode of ‘permanent 
mobilization’ and set up camps or garrisons called ‘presidi’ to occupy the intended construction 
sites to match the radical militarization of the valley21. Having visited the Venaus presidio one can 
see phase 4 in action.
 These presidios have become more than just land occupation sites; they are spaces for 
socialization where people live, farm, cook and eat communally. Over books, games, 
fund-raising concerts and local wine these communal spaces have given rise to innovations and 
debate on alternate modes of living that question the current system of macro development. 
People not just from the No Tav in Italy but all over the world visit the presidios giving rise to 
what is termed as political tourism. As a result these spaces have allowed the No Tav movement 
to subsume several social issues under its environmental paradigm and become a point of 
convergence for anarchists, socialists, communists and movements for de-growth, green energy, 
food sovereignty, organic farming and democratic debates.
Introducing the Framework
An inquiry trying to explain the link between social systems and the natural environment in order 
to be more focused needs to be contextualized within a specific framework. This section will 
explain the theoretical framework through which to critically analyze the evolution and the 
impact of how environmental movements have the potential to radicalize or democratize.
18 Emanuele Leonardi, “Foucault in the Susa Valley: The No TAV Movement and Struggles for Subjectification,” Capitalism 
Nature Socialism 24, no. 2 (June 2013): 27–40, doi:10.1080/10455752.2013.789216.
19 Greyl et al., “High Speed Transport Infrastructure in Italy.”
20 Porta and Piazza, “Local Contention, Global Framing.” 
21 Leonardi, “Foucault in the Susa Valley.”
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Foucault and Habermas in the context of environmental movements.
In its simplest terms, Foucault’s theory of power can be summarized, as knowledge is 
power. Herein lies the basis for his articulation of ‘knowledge apparatus’, i.e. privileged 
or superior knowledge that the government uses as control mechanism over the public 
which do not have access to privileged knowledge. An increasing influence of the 
government into the everyday life of its citizens gave rise to Foucault’s concept of 
‘biopolitical governmentality.’ The term is described as ‘the political creation of an 
intermediate space between natural environment and artificial urbanization, investing in 
particular the process of shaping natural systems according to the needs of 
governmental expansion.’22 Foucault explains that this phenomenon came into being 
around the 80’s when the relation between life and politics changed from one that was 
extrinsic to one that is intrinsic, which means that politics went from being an external 
factor in society to one that was inextricably linked to everyday living. This was possible 
due to the advent of technology and ‘biological modernity’, that is, the technological 
control over biological life. Therefore the government knowledge apparatus began to 
use political power to target life and thereby control population. This lead to what 
Foucault terms as struggles for subjectification. In its very basic form, this term means 
resistance against power. This resistance takes place in three different categories – 
domination, (moral/political/religious), exploitation, in the Marxist notion of separation 
between producer and product of her labour and subjection – the set of practices that 
tie individuals to a fixed identity and in doing so favors their submission to others.23 
According to Foucault and especially pertaining to the context of this paper, in politics 
these struggles for subjectification are a result of the shift in the economic policy from 
liberalism to neo-liberalism, thus, changing the emphasis from exchange to competition 
resulting in an ‘overly powerful absolute state’ as compared to the early liberal model.24   
 Thus we see this struggle for subjectification in environmental movements as an 
increase in control over public decision-making by economic interests which creates a 
strong sphere of biopolitcal governmentality. This in turn, results in resistance amongst 
the masses, thereby creating the potential for environmental movements to radicalize 
within this framework.
 According to Trocchia, advanced capitalistic societies concentrate capital in the 
hands of a few powerful people or enterprises creating a monopoly, which changes the 
role of the welfare state to a more interventionist actor in the economy thus, having a 
greater impact on the private lives of citizens.25 These political and economic 
transformations lead to a displacement of the public sphere as the locus for debate and 
information thereby excluding the possibility of citizens being part of the decision 
making process. According to Habermas, this space in civil society, where citizens 
engage in free and unconstrained communication aimed at reaching consensus on 
22 Michel Foucault, “The Birth of Biopolitics,” in Michel Foucault: Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth., vol. 1, The Essential Works of 
Foucault, 1954-1984 (New York: New Press, 1997).
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Trocchia, “Habermas on the Barricades.”
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universal principles, is the locus of “communicative power.”26 Habermas’s concept of 
communicative action is defined as ‘cooperative action undertaken by individuals based upon 
mutual deliberation and argumentation.’27
 This theory helps develops the theory of social conflict as well as takes into its framework 
the democratic processes that require participation and deliberation based on communication 
and exchange of information. Deliberative democracy therefore is, in Habermas's view, ‘the 
mechanism through which a functional and direct relation between communicative power and 
administrative power can be realized as what keeps together the social system and permits its 
self- reproduction is communication among its participants aimed at consensus, rather than 
actions aimed at success.’28 According to Habermas the difference between new social 
movements, like environmental movements from the traditional workers movement is that the 
latter arises from a conflict between life and labour whereas the former arises from conflicts 
located “at the seam between system and lifeworld.29 Particularly in the case of environmental 
movements:
 
 “what sparks the protest, however, is the tangible destruction of the urban    
 environment, the destruction of the countryside by bad residential planning,   
 industrialization and pollution, health impairments due to side effects of    
 civilization-destruction, pharmaceutical practices, and so forth. These are    
 developments that visibly attack the organic foundations of the life-world and
 make one drastically conscious of criteria of livability”30
In this context Habermas’s concept of deliberative democracy when combined with social and 
economic justice can be more effective for democratic practices and sustainable living by 
fostering debate and free exchange of information between all actors involved.
Case Study
Having established then that the concerns of environmental protests go beyond the issues of 
clean air, water and preservation of biodiversity to socio-economic issues as well which in turn 
lend these movements the potency to radicalize into resistance movements; the example below 
attempts to prove the direct impact of this radicalization on state security.
Methodology
A pilot case study was conducted for which a short survey was developed to measure the 
correlation between the forms of resistance and forms of state repression evolving from 1990 to 
2014. The participants were recruited on the basis of a non- probability sample. The survey was 
carried out via a closed questionnaire distributed amongst residents in Susa valley residing in and 
around the towns near the Venaus presidio.31 This area was taken as these residents are closest to 
26 Lasse Thomassen, Habermas: A Guide for the Perplexed, 1 edition (London ; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010).
27 Ibid.
28 Trocchia, “Habermas on the Barricades.”
29 Thomassen, Habermas.
30 Trocchia, “Habermas on the Barricades.”
31 In 2005 mass occupations of 30.000 protesters brought building works and the initial plan for the line to a grinding halt. Since 
the succesful occupation the site in Venuas has developed into a permanent base for the No Tav movement. - protestcamp, 
“No Tav in Val Susa,” Protest Camps, accessed April 8, 2014, http://protestcamps.org/2013/09/17/no- tav-in-val-susa/.
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to the railway line and will be directly affected by it. The final sample consisted of 26 
participants, 7 females, and 19 males ranging from the ages of 20 to 66 with a majority 
of 8 participants in their 50’s. The main focus of the questionnaire was a table divided 
into five year time periods spanning from 1990 to 2014. Each time period contained a list 
of the forms of protest the participant was part of in those years and the forms of state 
response they faced. The categories of both forms of protest and state response are 
organized from mild to radical in every time period.
 Participants were asked to check the type of protest they staged and the 
corresponding state response they faced within each time period. A sample survey 
questionnaire is presented in the appendix to give a better understanding of the 
categories.
Results
There are many correlations that can be made from the resulting data collected, 
including the varying participation of women in the movement in its nascent stages from 
1990 to 2000 (19%) and now 2000 to 2014 (40%). But for the purposes of this study, there 
are 2 broad categories of time from 1990-2000 and 2000 to 2014. This is done as the 
data shows a definite turning point between 2000 and 2005 in the conflict. To illustrate; 
46% of the total protests are in the form of marches and demonstrations, distribution of 
pamphlets and information materials/concerts/public-meetings /exhibitions. These 
occur during 1990 to 2000. Correspondingly 31% of the state response, which is in the 
form of relatively mild intervention such as police presence, personal checks and fencing 
off sites and roadblocks, also occurs in the same time period. In this time period only 3 
of the 26 cases refer to land occupation and none to infringement or sabotage of 
government property.
 Compared to this 54% of the protests that have been in the form of land 
occupation, breaching government territory and sabotage to government property, take 
place between 2000 and 2014. Correspondingly 69% of police response, that have been 
more severe, in the forms of physical beatings, use of tear gas and water canons and 
arrests and imprisonments also occur in the same time period.
 The years between 2000 to 2005 has been taken as a turning point as this is the 
first time we see the emergence of more radical forms of protest such as breaching and 
sabotage of government property. Correspondingly between 2000 and 2005 is also 
when the state responded with extreme forms of repression such as water canons, tear 
gas, making arrests, holding trials and sentencing the protestors to imprisonment, house 
arrest or hefty bails.
 In trying to establish a general social class of the protestors the results show that 
of the 26 residents to have participated in this survey none had advanced degrees in 
education and 61% had only completed their education till the highschool level. 
 Amongst the participants, 6 were involved in agriculture, 6 were students, 3 in 
government administration, 2 in the transport sector and the remaining 9 distributed 
amongst pensioners, freelance workers/writers and unemployed.
144
Although beginning in Turin and Susa valley, there have since been disruptive demonstrations 
in more than 40 towns and cities.32 In many cases the clashes between protestors and state 
have been violent and even resulted in casualties. In February 2012 for example, a protestor, 
chased by police, was electrocuted after climbing a pylon in a construction site and taken to 
hospital in a coma. On June 27, 2011, about 1,800 police officers fired tear gas against 
hundreds of protesters. ‘‘The battle of Seghino’’ and the ‘‘Defense of Venaus’’ are considered 
as some of the most violent clashes of the No Tav movement. The former refers to the clashes 
with the police on October 31, 2005, when protestors resisted the installation of work yards 
for preliminary studies in Mompantero. The latter refers to the clashes on December 6th, 
2005, following the removal of the demonstrators at Venaus by the police at the construction 
site of an exploratory tunnel.33
 As a result of this the government formed the Lyon-Turin High-Speed Rail Observatory, 
a technical body advising on the track’s construction in 2005 to have a more all rounded 
dialogue and assessment of the project.34 According to Marincioni and Appiotti though this 
institution is not considered independent by the protestors who see it as a means of justifying 
the benefits of the rail track or the least harmful means of constructing it and not weather the 
track is needed in the first place or not. To quote Alberto Perino, an advocate of the Gandhian 
philosophy of development and resistance who since 2005 has been the face of the No Tav 
movement, “They say, ‘let’s sit around the table and discuss the least impactful way to build 
it, we say, ‘let’s first find out if it’s useful and indispensable, and then we can sit at the table.”35 
In Susa itself, the red and white No Tav flags hanging from virtually every home and public 
space and the heavy police presence lend it an unreal atmosphere of a valley being up in 
arms. During the march of 15,000 against the ‘militarisation’ of the Susa valley, a participant 
declared on the megaphone: ‘It is immoral to keep all these men here to guard a peaceful 
valley. This is not an emergency, this is participatory democracy.’36
 The more protracted the battle against the government is, the more it leads to 
changing forms of local protests. At the time of the paper the most recent form of protest was 
the sabotage of railway infrastructure by 4 activists, who have since been arrested and face a 
20 year prison term because the state views them as terrorists.37 An extreme situation such 
this where citizens of their own country are perceived as terrorists requires an inquiry into the 
dynamics of this environmental movement.
Analysis
This clash between the No Tav and Pro Tav can be captured by the key concept of Weak vs 
Strong sustainability also known as the Hartwick-Solow sustainability paradigm, where weak 
refers to the interchangeability between man-made and natural capital and strong refers to 
32 Peter Popham, “Italy Erupts over Plans for High-Speed Rail Link,” The Independent, accessed April 2, 2014, http://www.inde-
pendent.co.uk/news/world/europe/italy-erupts-over-plans-for-highspeed-rail-link-7534770.html. 33 Marincioni and Appiotti, 
“The Lyon-Turin High-Speed Rail.”
34 Ibid.
35 Stephan Faris, “Italians Rail Against a High-Speed Train Project,” BusinessWeek: Global_economics, April 12, 2012, 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-04-12/italians-rail-against-a-high-speed-train-project.
36 Porta and Piazza, “Local Contention, Global Framing.”
37 “‘No Tav’ Activists Support Four Protesters Arrested on Sabotage Charge | Demotix.com,” Demotix, accessed May 22, 2014, 
http://www.demotix.com/news/4708574/no-tav-activists-support-four-protesters-arrested-sabotage-charge.
145
the complementary nature of manmade and natural capital.38 It has been proved however by 
case studies and examples cited by Ayers et al, that the problem with weak sustainability is 
that once you have converted the natural resources to man-made goods, there is no going 
back as manufactured products cannot be converted back to natural resources. Therefore 
once those natural resources are destroyed the economy will collapse. That is why in the case 
of the No Tav what the protestors are arguing for is a development model that focuses on 
strong sustainability, whereas the economic model of the Pro Tav looks at the immediate 
benefits of weak sustainability. Instead of recognizing this difference in demands however, the 
dynamics of the No Tav movement changed when the government characterized the protest 
as a NIMBY – Not In My Backyard movement by using its superior economic and political 
power and its ability to influence decision-making, or according to Foucault – its elite 
knowledge apparatus. As Porta and Piazza elaborate, the NIMBY as a frame for interpretation 
is associated with conservative attitudes and motivated primarily by selfish resistance to social 
change.39 This framing makes it possible for the government to criminalize the protest and 
justify the military interventions against its own citizens using anti-national rhetorics. Thus 
arises the theme of danger to pubic security as demonstrated in a quote by former Prime 
Minister Berlusconi, “antagonistic extreme left groups and anarcho-insurrectionalists are 
trying to extend the disorder from Val di Susa to Turin, Milan, Rome, and various other 
cities.”40
 This is typically seen as a stand that makes illegitimate any dissent against majority 
rule, though this paper does argue that the realisation of the project is not a majority ruling 
but an elite one. However this top-down method is what goes against the deliberative 
democracy approach proposed by Habermas that is based on consensus forming and not a 
majoritarian ruling. On the French side of the line for example, we see the effectiveness of a 
communicative approach. The central government, from the beginning established 
communications with the local governments and residents whose territory would have been 
affected by the railway, resulting in smooth proceedings of the construction.41 Other themes 
that evolved out of talks and discussions with the people of Val di Susa is the fear of losing 
their cultural identification with the territory with the erosion and changing landscapes the 
project would cause. These themes then connect the campaigns against large-scale public 
works in Italy into the framework of a more general struggle against neo-liberal globalization. 
Although this study is restricted to the No Tav its conclusions can be applied to various 
socio-environmental movements across the globe such as the Narmada Bachao Andolan in 
India that opposes the construction of a hydroelectric dam on the river Narmada in the state 
of Gujarat.42 Also, In Europe, we see how the opposition has overcome the local frame to 
become European by the Heydanes Charter - a declaration by the association of movements 
in France, Spain and Italy against the high Speed Railway lines.43
38 Robert U. Ayres et al., Viewpoint: Weak versus Strong Sustainability (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, 1998), 
http://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/85599.
39 Porta and Piazza, “Local Contention, Global Framing.”
40 Ibid.
41 Marincioni and Appiotti, “The Lyon-Turin High-Speed Rail.”
42 Arundhati Roy, “The Greater Common Good,” Outlook India, May 24, 1999, http://www.outlookindia.com/article.as-
px?207509.
43 Micol Magglioni, “Traditional Actors Dealing with Local Protests: The Case of the Turin-Lyon Rail-Link Observatory” (presen-
ted at the Civil Society and Democracy, Wien, Austria., 2012), 22.
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Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to explore how socio-ecological inequality has the potential to 
manifest itself into resistance movements that directly impact state security. The pilot case 
study based on the No Tav movement therefore highlights the consequence of bad 
planning, bad political process, non involvement of community in decision making as part 
of what fosters ecological inequalities leading to resistance movements. In the context of 
the No Tav then, we see how the changing socio-economic structure of infrastructural 
planning interferes with the daily life of the people of the valley creating a sphere of 
biopolitical governmentality. Laws like the ‘Objective Law’44 under which projects of 
strategic importance are operated and which exclude the participation of the local 
governments and residence therefore create the struggles for subjectivity. This is one of the 
root causes of new social movements due to the lack of communication and exchange of 
information between various actors involved such as the central government, the local 
government and residents, the private companies and the European Commission. This has 
resulted in the protestors finding new ways to resist the imposition of centralized decision- 
making, like forming very strong counter-information networks. In the Susa Valley itself there 
is a huge concentration of transport experts, environmentalists, activists and engineers with 
expert knowledge. This can be interpreted as communicative power used as a means of 
dispersing the hegemony of privileged information by producing their own environmental 
impact assessments and alternative development paradigms. The study therefore 
demonstrates the power of local conflicts to transform as a resource for democracy by 
mobilizing participatory action which can be seen as ‘active citizenship’ and therefore 
promote social and political change towards a more democratic and a more sustainable 
society. This paper has set the groundwork for further research on identifying how a critical 
theory of participation and deliberation as democratizing forces must recognize the central 
role played by environmental movements in creating an autonomous public sphere, 
thereby, dissipating their potential to radicalize and impact state security.
44 Act No. 443 of 2001 , also known as the Objective Law is the legal instrument that establishes procedures and funding 
arrangements for the construction of major infrastructure strategic Italy for the decade from 2002 to 2013 .
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